A

POLITICAL AND MILITARY

RHAPSODY,

ON THE

INVASION AND DEFENCE

OF

Great Britain and Ireland.

BY THE LATE

GENERAL LLOYD.

ILLUSTRATED WITH THREE COPPER-PLATES.

To which is annexed,

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR,

AND A

SUPPLEMENT BY THE EDITOR.

PRO ARIS ET FOCIS.

CHARLES XII. at Bender.

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1795.

PRICE SEVEN SHILLINGS IN BOARDS.

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INTRODUCTION.

A PAMPHLET on the preſent armaments, and on the *Invaſion of Great Britain*, was lately publiſhed in Paris, that is, in 1790, by a Mr. Dupont, ſome time ſince Preſident of their National Aſſembly, and conſidered there as a patriotic writer and orator. In this oſtentatious and calumnious publication, after accuſing Great Britain of a variety of crimes, of her dreading, and wiſhing to overturn the new conſtitution of France, he exhorts, with national zeal and acrimony, his countrymen to ſupport, and to ſtrengthen the Family Compact: he boaſts that France, Spain, and the United States of North America, whom he is pleaſed to enumerate with his allies, are an overmatch, at ſea, for Great Britain and Holland. He anticipates the triumphs that would follow a national war, and lays it down as a preliminary that peace ſhould not afterwards be reſtored, until the Bank of England ſhall have become bankrupt, and all her naval arſenals ſhall be

deſtroyed. He talks, not a little vauntingly, and ſuperciliouſly, of the exhauſted credit and finances of Great Britain, and of the comparative ſuperiority of riches in France, by means of the recent ſequeſtration of the clerical revenues. And he propoſes ſchemes, particularly by numerous Privateers, and Cruizers, for the ruin of the Britiſh commerce, and the crippling of the Britiſh Navy.

Here follows, " verbatim," a ſpecimen of Mr. Dupont's ſtyle and modeſty, " If the " war be *ſhort*, it ſhall be in the heart of " your own country, and with all the im- " petuoſity of the French nation. If it be " *long*, the conqueſt ſhall be obtained by the " laſt *Crown*. What is to prevent the in- " ſpection of the Engliſh *Bank*, by our na- " tional Grenadiers? Great Britain has yet " no idea of a *national* war with France, of " its activity, its obſtinacy, its ferocity, and " of the irreſiſtible energy of the veteran " warriors, and of the new warriors of France. " We ſay not this *boaſtingly*; we ought to " conquer you, as we are ſuperior in number, " and treaſure. As ſoon as we have got " together a ſufficient force to protect our " paſſage, *we will come over among* you. News

" from

" from America, or from India, is naturally
" long coming. We are, however, certain,
" that the power will be *theirs*, who ſhall be
" maſters in Europe. If now you refuſe peace
" to us, and our allies, upon our *honour*, we
" will come to ſeek for it in *London*, and
" there we ſhall *aſſuredly find it*. Reply
" quickly, for the diſarming muſt commence
" within a *week*, or hoſtilities in a *month*."

" Riſum teneatis Britanni & Hiberni."

There are French writers on every art and ſcience, who are an ornament to their country, and to human nature; but in that reſpectable liſt, I cannot claſs Mr. Dupont, and far leſs ſhould I compare him to heroic names of antiquity. He is neither an Agamemnon, an Ulyſſes, nor a Neſtor; but, in argument, and not improbably in heroiſm, bears a nearer reſemblance to Therſites. I take notice of him, merely becauſe I know that multitudes of his countrymen are inflated with ſimilar ideas of their power and proweſs. Indeed, diffidence is not a characteriſtic feature of our neighbours.* Whenever the brazen throat of

* All the ſucceſſive factions in France, down to the preſent moment, have inveighed with equal inveteracy, envy,

of war ſhall ſummon Britain to arms, we may expect to have our ears ſtunned with invaſion: our enemies without, and their emiſſaries within, will ring the changes on theſe exaggerated perils; and, probably, without any ſubſtantial hopes of permanent conqueſt, they may flatter themſelves of being able to confine us to mere defenſive operations; to embarraſs us with additional expence and taxes; to intimidate, and diſconcert the nation; and to injure public confidence and credit. For theſe reaſons, I ſhall take a more comprehenſive view, and enter into a more minute diſcuſſion of this ſubject, than has ever yet been attempted. Such diſcuſſion will, at leaſt, adminiſter ſome conſolation to the inexperienced, and to thoſe of weak fibre. It will from thence be obvious, that unleſs the nation, and its governors, are deſtitute of judgment, patriotiſm, and courage, we may be invulnerable at home, and that we ſhould rather ſolicit than dread the execution of theſe inſolent threats.

The following celebrated Eſſay alone, will enable the reader to form ſome critical judg-

and vindictiveneſs, againſt Great Britain; and have been buſied in concerting plots for her deſtruction. It was one engine of their popularity.

ment on this intereſting topic. The Author, General Lloyd, had before eminently diſtinguiſhed himſelf, in his Commentary on the laſt ſeven years War in Germany, and on the Elementary principles of the Military Art, two volumes of which, in Quarto, with Plates, were publiſhed by himſelf; and, lately, a third volume, from his manuſcripts, by Lord Fielding. His Treatiſe on the invaſion, and defence of England, was printed in London, in 1779, during the latter part of the unfortunate American war, at the critical period when the fleets of France and Spain, rode triumphant in the Channel; when our veteran regiments were mouldering acroſs the Atlantic, and invaſion, invaſion, was thundered at our gates.

A very few copies of this publication had been diſtributed by the Author amongſt his military and other friends, when lucrative overtures were made to him to ſuppreſs it, and to part with the remainder of the impreſſion. Perhaps it might have then given riſe to a public and parliamentary ſcrutiny, and might alarm thoſe to whom the ſafety and defence of the nation was entruſted. But I think it will be manifeſt, that France was infinitely more intereſted than Great Britain

in its ſuppreſſion; becauſe it unfolded ſecret ſtratagems and plans of her cabinet, in maturing of which ſhe had expended large ſums. It will appear, from the following hiſtory of this able Engineer, General, and Author, that all the alleged fears of communicating, through this publication, improper information to the enemy, were abſurd phantoms; that in 1744, and 1754, France had this identical plan of invaſion chalked out to her by General Lloyd, who was then engaged in the ſervice of that nation, and of the Pretender.

It was juſt 39 years after the firſt ſketch of this plan of invaſion, that the preſent Rhapſody on the enemy's objects, and the means of defeating ſuch attempts were digeſted, and printed; and after the author had been engaged in a variety of hot ſervice, as a field officer, in the Pruſſian, Imperial, and Ruſſian armies. From this we may conclude, that the ſubject had been arranged, corrected, and improved, with all the military perſpicuity and judgment with which General L——d was ſo conſpicuouſly endowed.

This Treatiſe reflects much light on a late

litigated

litigated and important topic—the propriety of the fortification ſyſtem, and ſecurity of the Britiſh marine arſenals on the Channel coaſt. And as that ſyſtem ſtill continues to be reprobated by many, the public, and the parliament, if they chuſe, may derive from hence intrinſic information. Without the critical talents of an engineer, one might almoſt, *a priori*, infer, that where nature has left us weak or expoſed in any political vital part, that there art ſhould be ſubſtituted. In our own formation, we may draw this principle and inſtruction from the Divine Architect. But, at the ſame time, I do not preſume to aſſert or maintain, that the Fortifications which, of late years, have been, and thoſe which are yet intended to be erected round Plymouth, and Portſmouth, are the moſt judicious and effectual for ſecuring theſe Naval Arſenals. Whether, in their general plan, outline, and poſition, there may not be errors of dangerous magnitude; whether the projected Lines, and Forts, may not be of too great extent; whether they are calculated to ſwell the ſtationary military force beyond its juſt proportion to the moving force of the Nation; all theſe diſputed and intereſting topicks, I leave to the diſcuſſion

of abler criticks, and to Parliament.* But, ſuppoſing they can bear the teſt of ſevere ſcrutiny, I ſhall endeavour to demonſtrate, that they are not, alone, ſufficient for the defence of the Channel frontier.

The Editor of this unrivalled Treatiſe, conſiders himſelf as conferring an eſſential favour on the nation, by ſnatching it from obſcurity, and reſtoring it to its merited rank and notice. Are thoſe to be conſidered as the public's friend, or foe, who point out to them their vulnerable and crazy parts, and the means of ſelf defence; or thoſe who would lull them into apathy, negligence, and ſecurity? Which of theſe moſt deſerve the epithet of parricides? Who is ignorant that the ſoundings of our coaſts, the plans of our forts, and harbours, the charts of our roads, and country, are ſold at every geographer's ſhop? that, in peace at leaſt, all theſe are as open to the view and acceſs of Frenchmen, as of natives? Can any one be ſo ſimple, and credulous, as to ſuppoſe that an enemy, ſo near and vigilant, has not frequently revolved and digeſted every practicable plan for

* See a late Publication, intituled, "An Examination of the Duke of Richmond's Fortifications."

our domeſtic deſtruction, as well as for our neighbours on the Continent? We ſhall produce convincing proofs to this effect, in the following pages. Their publicity will have the good effect, not only of inſtructing, but of rendering future Miniſters more vigilant and circumſpect in diſcharging this part of their duty. Defence, ſays a profound writer and politican, is of much more importance to a Nation, than even opulence. But, notwithſtanding this importance, I have good reaſons to believe, that publication and notoriety alone would produce beneficial conſequences, together with ſeaſonable preparation, and prevention. There is more meant here, than I chuſe, at preſent, to expreſs, or proclaim.

Ever ſince the ſuppreſſion of this publication, a printed, or manuſcript copy of it has been ſought after, with extraordinary avidity, by the firſt military and political characters, and was conſidered as a valuable acquiſition. The Editor knows London Bookſellers who have been repeatedly offered ten guineas for a ſingle copy: and, ſome years ago, at the ſale of General Lloyd's effects, after his deceaſe, a manuſcript copy, without the plates, was purchaſed, for a Britiſh Miniſter of State, at the

price

price of one hundred guineas. The Editor alſo conſiders it as a duty to the public, and to truth, to add, that, ſome months ago, he ſaw a Treatiſe, under nearly the ſame title of the preſent, advertiſed for ſale by a London Bookſeller, with whom he is unacquainted. He did not take the trouble to inſpect more of this compilation than the plates; and theſe he, at one glance, ſaw were a ſpurious impoſition.

The annexed ſhort account of General Lloyd, is communicated by Mr. Drummond, a gentleman deſcended from an ancient and noble family in Scotland, whoſe anceſtors were ruined by their unfortunate attachment to the exiled houſe of Stuart; a gentleman who has ſince atoned for the miſtaken zeal of his family, and for his own juvenile and unavoidable connections, by rendering eminent political ſervices to Great Britain. In General Lloyd's other works, there is no hiſtory either of himſelf, or the place of his nativity.

N. B. Mr. D. was born in France.

MR. DRUMMOND'S LETTER

TO THE

EDITOR.

MY Firſt knowledge of General Lloyd was in France, in 1744. He was then, as I underſtood, a Lay Brother in ſome religious houſe. Mr. Gordon, my tutor, recommended him to my father, as a proper perſon to teach me Geography, and Field Engineering, in which line Mr. Lloyd had given ſpecimens of ſuperior talents to ſome Scotch and Iriſh officers in the French ſervice. He appeared to be between 20 and 30 years of age, was a Welchman by birth, and ſaid to be of a reſpectable family. He had received a liberal education; and, although deſigned for the church, he ſaid he had been ſome time with a Lawyer, before he went to France. His aim then was the army; but having no friend

to procure him a commiſſion, he was perſuaded, by ſome Britiſh prieſts, to take the habit of a Noviciate, or Monk. Nevertheleſs, his genius ſtill continued for the military line, and he was engaged to attend my elder brother, and myſelf, who joined the French army under Marſhal Saxe, in 1745. Mr. L. was with us at the battle of Fontenoy, which, I believe, was the firſt actual ſervice he ever ſaw. My ſtation, on that day, being a Cadet in the corps of Engineers, as well as a Lieutenant in Lord John Drummond's regiment of Royal Scotch, Monſ. de Rochauard, the chief engineer (under whom I acted), ſaw an acuteneſs in Mr. Lloyd's manner of drawing, and making ſketches of the ground about the villages of Fontenoy (which was a part of my duty to examine and plan), that he got an order from Marſhal Saxe to allow Mr. L. to wear our corps uniform, and to attend me, on horſeback, as an aſſiſtant draughtſman, with the pay of a ſub-enſign.

When the expedition to Scotland was ſet on foot, Mr. Lloyd was appointed *third Engineer*, with the rank of Captain, by a commiſſion from the Pretender. He then went to Nantz, and was with me on board the Elizabeth,

Elizabeth, in the action with the Lion, Capt. Sir Piercy Brett, in the Channel. He behaved gallantly; was wounded in the right ſhoulder: and, after the fight, we went out of the Elizabeth on board a brig, which carried us after the young Chevalier to Scotland, where we attended him till that Prince arrived at Carliſle. Mr. L. was diſpatched from thence with letters to our friends, in Wales: he did not join us again, but went into South Wales, where he re-aſſumed the character of a Prieſt, and became a ſpy, to look round the coaſts of Wales, and of the Channel, for an expected French fleet. In this tour, he examined all the coaſts from Milford Haven round the Briſtol Channel, to Bridgewater, and Barnſtaple Bay; continuing his ſurvey from thence to Plymouth, and Dover, and from the Downs to Margate, and London. No man ever was more correct with his eye; he ſaw at once the advantages and diſadvantages of ground; and his remarks were made with ſo much penetration and judgment, that all his obſervations were to be depended upon. At length, by ſome accident, he became ſuſpected, and was taken up in London by a General Warrant. When I came to London, a priſoner of war, in the winter of 1746, after the battle

of

of Culloden, I found my friend Lloyd at Carington's, the meſſenger, in Jermyn Street; where I, with ſome of my brother officers, were lodged for ſafety. I rejoiced to ſee him; but it was not known that he had been with us in Scotland, otherwiſe he muſt have been tried as a rebel, and have ſuffered as ſuch; his miſſion, knowledge, and great abilities, having made him a conſiderable object and character of that time.

In 1747, I got him relieved, by means of my relation, a noble Duke, and I then employed him under the denomination of a tutor, ſeeming never to have known him before. In the ſame year, he went with me to France, and followed me to the ſiege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where he became in high eſteem with Marſhal Lovendhall. During that ſiege, he obtained the rank of *Major*, and was of infinite ſervice in mounting batteries, in chooſing ground, and exploring mines, as well as in opening ſluices. When I went to Spain, in 1748, my father recommended Major Lloyd to the Earl Mareſhal, who was at that time in great reputation with the King of Pruſſia. This nobleman recommended Lloyd to his brother, Marſhal Keith; and when I returned

from

from my Spaniſh voyage, and ſurvey of the coaſt of Terra Firma, in 1754, I met with him in Paris. At which time, there being a plan laid for an invaſion of England, Lloyd was recommended to the Marſhal duc de Belliſle, then Miniſter of war, who had alſo appointed me to come to England as Commiſſary General, to ſuperintend all the French priſoners taken before the formal declaration of war, in 1756. Lloyd's former knowledge of the Britiſh coaſt, the exactneſs of his deſcriptions, and his genius as a ſpy, afforded him great advantages on this occaſion; in conſequence of which, he reſigned his Pruſſian rank, accepted a new Field Officer's commiſſion, in the French ſervice, with an appointment of five louis *per diem*, to re-ſurvey the Britiſh coaſt, and to report thereon to the Duc de Belliſle. He accordingly came to England, in 1756, re-aſſumed the habit *Bourgoiſe*, and, having nothing of a military look, he went where he pleaſed, as a trader, or rider. Thus he re-examined the Britiſh coaſt, and laid the foundation of his much eſteemed Treatiſe upon the natural ſtrength of Britain; pointing out all that could be done by invaſion, and all that might be done by defence. His report, however, made the French Miniſtry

change their intentions of invading Britain; and the Mareſchal Duc de Richlieu was better pleaſed at being ſent to Minorca, than to attempt a landing at Torbay.

Lloyd then quitted England, and went to Germany, where he was employed ſome years in the Auſtrian and Ruſſian ſervice, and promoted to higher rank. From my remaining in Great Britain, after 1756, and quitting the army, as well as going to the Weſt Indies, in 1758, I loſt my friend till about 1776, when I again met with him in London, under the title of General Lloyd. He then told me that he had made his peace here; and afterwards informed me, that he had obtained a penſion upon the Chelſea, or Ordinance eſtabliſhment.

JOHN DRUMMOND.

London, Jermyn Street,
Nov. 5, 1790.

PART

PART II.

Consists of Extracts from General Lloyd's Military Hiſtory, reſpecting the various modes of invaſion, and defence, of all the European nations. From this, I have ſelected thoſe parts only, which relate to Great Britain and France. The Reader will readily perceive, that theſe additions tend, eſſentially, to the elucidation of the intereſting topics now under diſcuſſion; to collect into a focus all General L——d's opinions, and reflections on this ſubject; and to increaſe the value of the Rhapſody, as he was pleaſed to term it.

PART III. or, SUPPLEMENT,

Is from the Editor's own ſtores. It appeared to him indiſpenſible, and equally in illuſtration of the main object and outline of the preſent Treatiſe. It exhibits Great Britain, from infancy to manhood, ſtruggling, throughout a ſeries of eighteen centuries, againſt foreign and domeſtic aſſaults, and, in her turn, retaliating upon her aggreſſors and

rivals. At the ſame time, it ſupplies a portion of what G——l L——d, in his Rhapſody, had recommended, and left unfiniſhed—an Eſtimate of the relative and abſolute Force of Great Britain and France. It will naturally occur to the judicious reader, that the errors, misfortunes, and ſhipwrecks, of our rude anceſtors, furniſh their poſterity with important practical leſſons in difficulties of a ſimilar nature.

I ſhould alſo apprize the reader, that there are two eſſential circumſtances in which I have ventured to diſſent from G——l L——d: theſe are, certain parts of the Channel frontier, which I conceive to be as inviting to the attack of an invader, as either of thoſe he has principally dwelt upon, and ſo ably illuſtrated: 2dly, the general ſyſtem of Military Tactics. I have alſo ſuggeſted a variety of practical expedients for augmenting our internal ſecurity and ſtrength, and for enabling us to encounter an implacable enemy with rational proſpects of ſucceſs. Every impartial judge muſt aſſent to this aphoriſm, that they who cannot, or will not foreſee and provide againſt danger

of

of ſuch magnitude in every ſhape, are unworthy of both the ſtation and name of Miniſters, or Stateſmen.

In order to demonſtrate ſtill more ſatiſfactorily, the importance of the ſubject of this Publication, both to the Monarch, and to the Nation at large, I ſhall tranſcribe a quotation from a late celebrated Britiſh Author, Dr. Smith, in his Wealth of Nations. "The "*Sovereign* has only three important duties "to attend to: 1ſt, *The duty of protecting the* "*Society from the violence and invaſion of other* "*independent Societies:* 2dly, The duty of "protecting, as far as poſſible, every member "of the Society from the injuſtice, or op-"preſſion, of every other member of it; or, "the duty of eſtabliſhing an exact adminiſ-"tration of juſtice: 3dly, The duty of erect-"ing and maintaining certain public works, "and certain public inſtitutions." He adds, "an induſtrious, and, upon that account, a "wealthy nation is, of all nations, the moſt "likely to be attacked." Britain and Holland are each in this predicament.

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RHAPSODY

ON

FRENCH POLITICS, &c.

IT is impoſſible to calculate, with any degree of probability, the duration and event of a war, unleſs we are acquainted with the political ſyſtem, principles of government, and reſources of the contending powers. I ſhall, therefore, give a ſhort view of them, which will enable the Reader to form ſome judgment of the preſent ſtate of affairs.

CHAP. I.

A general view of the Politics of France during the two laſt Centuries.

WHILE the Houſe of Auſtria was all-powerful in Europe, and poſſeſſed of many provinces on the weſt ſide of the Rhine, now united to France, it was evident that the French nation could have no other permanent ſyſtem of politics, but that which tended to reduce that Houſe within narrower bounds, particularly in the Low Countries, and towards the Rhine. Accordingly, we find France continually employed in raiſing diſturbances in Germany, Italy, Spain, *&c.* and exciting the different powers of Europe and Turkey againſt Auſtria. Richelieu having reduced the Hugonots, took an active part at the latter end of the war, which had been maintained in Germany for near thirty years; and by the treaty of Weſtphalia, the French, as one of the guarantees, obtained a right to interfere in the affairs of Germany, of which they have availed themſelves on every occaſion to embarraſs the Houſe of Auſtria. More

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than once, they brought her to the brink of deſtruction, and had it not been for the powerful ſupport and aſſiſtance of the maritime powers, particularly of England, ſhe muſt have fallen a victim to the ambition of France. Thoſe powers who feared Auſtria, very naturally looked up to France for protection, and increaſed her ſtrength by the addition of their forces.

During the minority of Lewis XIV. the adminiſtration of Mazarine was almoſt totally confined to domeſtic occurrences, which were ſufficiently embarraſſing to occupy his whole attention.

Lewis XIV. on taking the reins of government, purſued the ſyſtem of his predeceſſors with regard to Auſtria. Having, in the beginning of his reign, met with great ſucceſs in war, and added ſome provinces to his crown, he became ambitious, from that principle, rather than from neceſſity, (for he was already ſufficiently powerful to have nothing to fear from Auſtria) Lewis did not ceaſe to embroil Europe, almoſt during his whole reign. In the courſe of his wars, he found himſelf checked, chiefly by the maritime

powers; England was out of his reach; without ſhips of war nothing could be done againſt her. Seconded by able miniſters, in a few years, to the aſtoniſhment of all the world, he raiſed a powerful fleet, and, for a little time, maintained a ſuperiority at ſea, of which he availed himſelf in an attempt to reinſtate James II. on the throne of England, but without ſucceſs. The confederacy formed againſt the French monarch on the continent became ſo powerful, particularly towards the cloſe of his reign, that the whole force of his kingdom was ſcarce ſufficient to reſiſt the progreſs of the allied armies. The marine was of courſe abandoned, and ſunk nearly into the inſignificant ſtate in which he found it. Soon after Lewis XV. had mounted the French throne, Cardinal Fleury became prime miniſter; happily for France, who wanted peace to recover from the innumerable loſſes which the ambition of Lewis XIV. had brought upon her. This prelate, from principle, as well as temper, purſued invariably a pacific ſyſtem; the wars excited by the turbulent ſpirit of Alberoni for the kingdom of Naples, and that on the *Rhine*, occaſioned by the *pretenſions* of Auguſtus II. to the throne of Poland, were tranſitory, and of very ſhort duration.

duration. The Houſe of Auſtria having imprudently engaged in that quarrel, Fleury availed himſelf of her diſtreſsful ſituation, to tear Lorraine from her, which connected and compleated the French frontier on the German ſide.

On the death of Charles VI. a new and general war broke out in Germany, wherein the maritime powers engaged alſo. Cardinal Fleury wiſhed to keep France neuter, believing either that Auſtria would find ſufficient employment from the ſeveral Princes who formed pretenſions to the Emperor's ſucceſſion; and that by remaining neuter, the French might mediate and dictate the terms of peace, without partaking of the dangers and expences of the war: Or, perhaps, judging that France, recovered from her loſſes, and ſtrengthened by her new acquiſitions, would always be a match for Auſtria hereafter, whatever might be the event of a war. The cardinal, however, was over-ruled, and a general confederacy was formed againſt the Houſe of Auſtria, which tended to annihilate her entirely: Indeed the ſucceſs did not anſwer the hopes and expectations of the confederates, and things remained in great part,

as they were at the commencement of the war. The King of Pruſſia acquired Sileſia, the King of Sardinia increaſed his poſſeſſions in Lombardy, and a ſettlement was procured for Don Philip, in the ſame country. The French and Spaniſh trade ſuffered greatly in the courſe of this war; for the expences of the land armies in Germany and Italy were ſo exceſſive, that no effort could be made by theſe two powers to eſtabliſh a marine. Our trade and navigation increaſed, and furniſhed the means to purſue the war on the continent. France in the mean time excited diſturbances in Scotland, which ſoon were quelled; becauſe, for want of a marine, ſhe could not ſupport them, had ſhe really meant to do it.

The laſt war offers us a new ſyſtem of politics adopted by the French, contrary and oppoſite to that which they had for many ages proſecuted. The Houſe of Auſtria being no longer an object of fear or jealouſy, they engaged in a confederacy, calculated for her aggrandizement, at the expence of a Prince whoſe alliance they had heretofore, and ought always to have courted. However formidable they might believe France to be, Auſtria had likewiſe

likewiſe increaſed in wealth, power, and, above all, her adminiſtration, in regard to finances, &c. was much improved. It ſeemed, therefore, highly advantageous for the French that there ſhould be Princes in Germany, able, in ſome degree, to check the power of Auſtria. Pruſſia, was, of all others, the moſt proper to be oppoſed to her, as they had done it with ſucceſs during the preceding war. There is no explaining a ſyſtem ſo very contrary to the apparent intereſts of France, unleſs we ſuppoſe that court had an after-game to play, as circumſtances might offer, during the courſe of the hoſtilities.

The French originally engaged to furniſh only twenty-four thouſand men, avowedly to deliver Saxony; and, if that had been effected, it is probable they would have forced the contending parties to conclude ſuch a peace as they approved of. They had a numerous army to enforce their mediation. I cannot think they intended ſeriouſly to promote in the leaſt the greatneſs of their ancient rivals in power, and much leſs at the expence of Pruſſia, whom they will find a powerful and neceſſary ally, in caſe of any future war with the former. The negotiations at Teſchen

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laſt year, and the part they acted there, evince that they are not real friends to the Houſe of Auſtria.

By engaging partially in the war in Germany, it is probable the French thought they might direct their principal attention to their marine, and to the defence of their colonies. All their ſchemes were defeated by the extraordinary efforts of the King of Pruſſia, and the allied army. Their new-raiſed fleet being beat and diſperſed, our ſuperiority at ſea enabled us to overcome every obſtacle; we conquered all we attacked, and reduced the Houſe of Bourbon ſo low, that we might have preſcribed any terms of peace. Unhappily we miſtook entirely in the choice of our acquiſitions, ſome of which, ſo far from being advantageous, have been one of the principal cauſes that brought the preſent calamities upon us. We attend too much to the contracted, and very often ſelfiſh, views of the merchants; we act upon too narrow a ſcale, like traders, and ſeldom as a powerful nation. In forming treaties, a Miniſter ſhould have the whole globe before his eyes, and by no means confine himſelf to this or that province, or branch of trade; theſe are not to be overlooked,

looked, but they muſt never ſerve as a foundation for a treaty, unleſs you mean to reduce the nation to a company of mercantile people. Towards the end of the war the Duke of Choiſeul became all-powerful in the French Miniſtry. He is a man of a bold, extenſive, and enterpriſing genius. His country found in him the vaſtneſs of Richelieu, the activity of Louvois, the magnificence of Seignelay, the amiableneſs of Pompone and .... they diſmiſſed him. He projected and concluded the Family Compact, which unites the different branches of the Houſe of Bourbon in the cloſeſt connection, and we now ſee the effects of that maſter-piece of politics.

The great loſſes that the French ſuffered during the laſt war, the imminent danger with which the taking of the Havannah, in particular, threatened the reſt of the Spaniſh dominions in America, very naturally drew the whole attention of both nations to us. It was obvious that while we were ſuperior at ſea, notwithſtanding the diſproportion of our land forces, in any future conteſt, their Colonies would always be expoſed to the ſame danger, and if loſt, might not always be reſtored at a peace. They have therefore

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attended to their marine alone; and have purſued this meaſure with ſuch induſtry and activity, that a fleet has been raiſed by them which aſtoniſhes Europe, and muſt be very alarming to England. It is impoſſible to foreſee how far ſucceſs may correſpond with their force or their ambition. Their views are great, and tend to reduce us within very narrow limits. That nothing ſhould divert them from their main object, the French have, with the utmoſt care, avoided and prevented a German war, which might have engaged a part of their forces, and fruſtrated the general deſign againſt our country.

The preſent ſtate of affairs enables us to reſolve a political problem, often diſcuſſed within and without doors, *viz.* Whether continental connections are uſeful or otherwiſe to this nation? I need not recapitulate the arguments for and againſt them; ſuffice it to ſay, that while we paid allies on the continent, the attention of France was ſo intirely taken up in the different wars in Germany, that ſhe could not raiſe a marine in any degree proportioned to ours; that we have conſtantly maintained a deciſive ſuperiority at ſea, which increaſed the power,

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glory, and political influence of the nation, notwithſtanding the immenſe ſums which were ſent abroad for ſuch connections; that ſince we have abandoned the continental ſyſtem, France has acquired an unlimited influence in the different courts of Europe; without anxiety on that ſide, ſhe has been enabled to direct the whole force of the Houſe of Bourbon againſt England alone, and God knows what may be the iſſue of this, I fear, unequal conteſt. Let us draw a veil over ſuch an alarming proſpect: Let every man exert himſelf to the utmoſt of his power for the ſervice of his King and Country, that we may avert the ſtorm which hangs over our heads, and baffle the efforts of our combined enemies.

Whoever conſiders the poſition of England, and of its Colonies, will perceive that our very exiſtence depends on this circumſtance alone, *viz.* that we ſhould be ſuperior at ſea; all our politics ought therefore to be directed to that object ſingly. Had we millions of armed men, equal in diſcipline to the Pruſſians, they can be of no uſe to defend our trade or Colonies; and if we are reduced to defend England, all is over. Why

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has our fleet been neglected? Why have the national funds been conſumed and exhauſted to multiply land forces, inſtead of being applied to raiſe a powerful fleet, which is the only force that can protect us? It is impoſſible to explain this by any principle of reaſon; our militia alone are more than ſufficient to repel any invaders, if our fleet be ſuperior to theirs; and even the idea of an invaſion in that caſe is abſurd. Standing armies appear an uſeleſs burthen; and now, to our coſt, they will be found totally inadequate to the defence of England and its Colonies.

Having abandoned continental connections, it became more than ever neceſſary to apply all our reſources to the fleet. The queſtion is by no means, whether it be equal or ſuperior to what it was at any other period? I aſk, why it is not ſuperior to the fleet of the Houſe of Bourbon? Does it ariſe from want of funds or men? Why do we not appropriate the ſums employed in levying numberleſs corps, to build ſhips and raiſe twenty or thirty thouſand marines? Why are not the new levies converted into marines? With proper encouragement this may

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be done, and unleſs it is done, we ſink under the ſuperior forces of the enemies.

Land forces are nothing. *Marines* are the only ſpecies of troops proper for this nation; they alone can defend and protect it effectually. During the peace they garriſon all your ports in each quarter of the globe; in time of war your fleet is inſtantly manned; and by employing many of them, fewer ſeamen are wanted in proportion. Beſides, a fleet having on board twelve or fifteen thouſand marines, is equal to almoſt any enterprize againſt the enemy's ſettlements, and keeps them in continual anxiety in every part of the world. By this means the expence and delays attending the embarkation of a conſiderable body of land forces, deſtined to attack the enemy, would be ſpared, and the ſucceſs become more certain. Every other method to prevent the final ruin of this country will be hurtful or ineffectual. *A powerful fleet and thirty thouſand marines*, I repeat it, *will ſave us from deſtruction, and nothing elſe.*

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Force of Nations, particularly of France, Spain, and Great Britain.

NO Author, that I know of, has given any data which can enable us to calculate the force of nations; it is therefore with diffidence that I propoſe my ideas on the ſubject. I think that the power and ſtrength of a nation depend on the number of its inhabitants and the quantity of their induſtry. This can be found and eſtimated only by the yearly revenues raiſed on the ſubject, which bear a given proportion to the yearly production of the whole nation. It is the revenue which enables the Sovereign to maintain fleets and armies. It is the number of inhabitants which furniſhes men for the one and the other; and in theſe I place the abſolute force of a nation; for its relative force will depend upon poſition, quantity of induſtry, ſtrength of contiguous powers, military ſyſtem, nature of the government, *&c.* which vary often in the courſe of a few years. It is therefore neceſſary we ſhould attend only

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to the abſolute force of nations, when we compare them with each other, in order to form a general ſcale, by which we meaſure their ſtrength.

France contains above twenty millions of inhabitants: the yearly revenues of that kingdom amount to above ſixteen millions ſterling, five of which being appropriated to pay the intereſt of the national debt, eleven only will remain free, and according to our ſyſtem, the abſolute force of the French nation will be thirty-one.

Spain contains more than ſeven millions and a half of inhabitants in Europe, and above two in America, with a yearly revenue of five millions; ſo that her abſolute force will amount to about fifteen. Conſequently the abſolute force of the Houſe of Bourbon will be found equal to forty-ſix.

To this ſum may be added that of our Revolted Colonies, which increaſes ſtill the force united againſt us.

I wiſh that others, better informed than I am, would calculate the force of my own

country upon this principle, and compare it with that of the Houſe of Bourbon: though the contraſt might appear very unfavourable to England, I do not doubt but her relative force, compared alſo with that of her enemies, would make amends for the enormous diſproportion in point of inhabitants and revenues.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Analogy between the Form of Government and the State of War.

DESPOTISM acts with the rapidity of a torrent; like it it leaves desolation and solitude behind, or it declines into a lethargy. In despotism there is no system; its motions are instantaneous, and arise from trifles, or the caprice of the moment. They are extremely violent, but transitory. If you can resist, or more safely avoid, their first impetuosity, you will easily conquer in the end.

Monarchy, though not so violent and rapid in its motions, is sufficiently strong to collect and exert the national forces. When endowed with wisdom, it directs them, so that they procure the most general and permanent advantages. It is like a majestic river, which, if kept within bounds, and its waters judiciously distributed, embellishes and enriches the country. But when Administration is too violent, this beneficent river becomes a torrent, and ruins the country: if weak, it

branches out into a thouſand ſmall rivulets, which finally dwindle to nothing.

As in monarchies the whole power of the ſtate is centered in one man, and the exerciſe of it depends upon his will alone, to prevent a ſudden and capricious uſe of it, which in a ſhort time might ruin the ſtate, it ought to be a maxim eſtabliſhed in this kind of government, that the adminiſtration ſhould be confined to many people, that the departments ſhould be ſeparated, and that the council of ſtate ſhould be numerous, becauſe the government of one man being naturally quick and violent, it requires a number of checks to prevent an improper uſe, or rather abuſe, of ſuch extenſive powers.

As all military operations require vigour and conſtancy, it is evident that a monarchical government is ſingularly adapted to war. Different from deſpotiſm, regular plans and ſyſtems may be purſued, and the government is ſufficiently ſtrong to execute them with the neceſſary vigour. As the ſubjects are attached to the Sovereign chiefly by the idea of glory, they cheerfully concur with him in ſupporting an offenſive war; if ſucceſsful, their efforts

forts increaſe, and therefore are not eaſily checked. Misfortunes, and conſequently a defenſive war, allay their courage. They ſoon perceive they do not fight for themſelves, and feel only the miſeries of the war, which they ſuppoſe is carried on to gratify the ambition and caprice of the Sovereign, or of ſome favourite. Hence it is, that monarchies in general are more adapted to an offenſive than a defenſive war.

Purſuing the metaphor adopted above, I will ſay that a republican government is like a great river, formed by a multiplicity of ſprings and rivulets, different in that from a deſpotic, or a monarchy, which ariſes from one alone. If the compariſon be juſt, it follows, that in this kind of government there ſhould be a ſufficient force to collect and unite the different ſprings, and give the whole that *preciſe direction* which is moſt advantageous. A republican government, however, labours under this very great diſadvantage: It is almoſt impoſſible to determine what degree of power ought to be veſted in the executive part of the ſtate, ſo that it ſhould be ſufficient to anſwer every purpoſe of government, and how to form ſuch checks as may effectually

prevent any abuſe of that power to the danger of the ſtate. Is it too much, liberty is gone; is it too little, anarchy enſues. The very long duration of the republic of Venice would induce one to conclude, that thoſe wiſe republicans had reſolved this very difficult problem.

The extreme difficulty of *collecting*, *uniting*, and *directing* the national forces in a republican government, ſhews that it is by no means calculated for war, and much leſs for an offenſive one. Its principles being founded in equality, it is evident that war of every kind ought to be avoided, becauſe it neceſſarily throws too much power into the hands of one or few men, which finally deſtroy the government. It is alſo from the want of unity and ſufficient force to exert the powers of the ſtate, that all confederacies, however formidable, have failed in their ſchemes, if the war has been of any duration. The famous league of Cambray, the leagues formed againſt France at different times, and againſt Auſtria; that againſt Pruſſia in the laſt war, and a hundred more, were diſſolved without producing any effect proportioned to their forces.

Republics, unleſs formed upon military principles, as was that of the Romans, are totally unfit for action. Nothing could unite the Greek republics againſt Perſia, till the time of Alexander the Great, when they had nearly loſt their liberty; but when attacked, what prodigious efforts did they not make for the common cauſe. It is certainly true, that republics, unleſs forced by the immediate ſenſe of their danger, never have that unanimity and vigour neceſſary to carry on a war with any probability of ſucceſs, and therefore are proper only for a defenſive war. There, indeed, their efforts increaſe in proportion to the danger with which they are threatened; and if the motives ariſe from civil or religious principles, they generally become invincible. When ſuch motives diſappear, and the ſenſe of danger vaniſhes, each party purſues its own intereſt, and the confederacy is diſſolved.

I am ſo convinced of the truth of this reaſoning, that I have not the leaſt doubt, if we could hold New-York, Long Iſland, Rhode Iſland, and Philadelphia, and ceaſe to make thoſe fruitleſs and unmeaning excurſions in the American woods, that the Congreſs and

the rebel people, no longer united by the ſenſe of fear, would ſoon diſſolve their confederacy, and a more favourable opportunity would offer of reſtoring peace and union between them and the mother country. The troops employed on the American Continent might enable us to ſtrike ſome capital ſtroke in the Weſt Indies, which would conſtrain our enemies to bring a part of their forces to that country; for in the Weſt Indies is their weak part, and there they may be attacked with advantage.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the French Invaſion expected: their objects: the difficulties which they have to encounter: and the advantages on the ſide of Great Britain.

WHILE the terrors of an invaſion and its conſequences hang over our heads, it is the duty of every man to contribute with his perſon and advice to the ſupport of the ſtate, and point out the means which appear proper to defeat the deſigns of our enemies. With this view I have wrote the following diſcourſe on the ſuppoſed invaſion, and hope it may ſerve, in ſome meaſure, to render it fruitleſs, and inſpire government, as well as the nation in general, with that confidence which the ſituation of our affairs require. Without confidence, his Majeſty cannot avail himſelf, with any proſpect of ſucceſs, of the national forces.

The enemies, ſuperior at ſea, and moreover, having a land force ſufficient for any purpoſe, may have three objects in view. The firſt and moſt capital would be to land a

powerful

powerful army in England. If ſucceſs ſhould follow their operations, it is evident we muſt conclude a peace on any terms, and the war is ſoon brought to an end. This enterprize is deciſive, and therefore preferable to any other.

Their next object might be to take poſſeſſion of the Weſtern provinces, and to maintain themſelves there for a few months only, without making any further progreſs into the country; then our commerce would be totally intercepted, and our whole attention confined to the immediate defence of the ſtate; ſo that our foreign ſettlements would, in a ſhort time, fall of courſe into their hands. Such an expedition is very bold, but it is equally dangerous, and it might prove fatal to their army. It is poſſible, therefore, that their ſhew and parade ſhould be intended only to keep us at home, and ruin our trade, while, with the reſt of their forces, they attack our colonies, Gibraltar, Minorca, &c.

Finally, to increaſe our diſtreſs, the combined enemies may land fifteen or twenty thouſand men in the Bay of Galway, and

cover

cover themſelves with the Shannon. The inhabitants of Connaught, equally poor and ignorant, might be induced to join them, and it would not be an eaſy matter to drive their army out of that country, if their fleet could ſupport their army with proviſions. Such a ſcheme offers all the advantages of *the* former, without being ſubject to the ſame difficulties as *the* ſecond; the ſeaſon being now far advanced, it is probable they may not think it eligible to attempt an invaſion in England for the preſent, and next year we ſhall be much better prepared to receive them. Perhaps they may then find it too dangerous an undertaking, and without adopting any of the two firſt plans we have ſuppoſed, they will attempt to land in Ireland, or only ſhew themſelves in the Channel. However, as an invaſion of England, with a powerful army, may be attended with fatal conſequences, I ſhall confine my obſervation to that alone, and endeavour to ſhew how it may be fruſtrated.

The appearance and force of the combined fleet prove the intention of bringing affairs to a ſpeedy concluſion, and had they met with us, and fought with ſucceſs, I have not the leaſt

leaſt doubt they would have invaded this kingdom with a formidable number of troops. Every thing was then, and is now prepared for that purpoſe: when I conſider their immenſe ſuperiority, and foreſee the probable event of a battle, I cannot help applauding thoſe councils which tended to avoid it, as well as the prudence with which they were followed. Time and delays, at this moment, and at this ſeaſon of the year, are a victory. Had we beat the combined fleet, little more would have been attained, whereas the loſs of a battle might have been fatal.

While our fleet is entire, though we may, for a time, be forced out of the ſea, yet am I perſuaded that no invaſion can take place. It is always a dangerous enterprize, and not to be attempted while there remains a poſſibility of our appearing at ſea; which may happen from a thouſand circumſtances ariſing from wind and weather, in the winter eſpecially, when the combined fleet muſt ſeparate, and all communication with the army they may have landed muſt be cut off. Our fleet, in the mean time, may intercept their convoys, and block up the harbour when they have eſtabliſhed their *dépôts*; ſo that in a

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ſhort time their troops muſt periſh. It is not enough that they debark an army, it muſt be continually ſupplied and protected from France, otherwiſe, however numerous, it cannot make any progreſs or penetrate into the country.

If, contrary to our hopes and expectations, the Britiſh fleet is beat and drove into ſome harbour, and the enemy does land a powerful army, we muſt not deſpond, nor by groundleſs fears facilitate the ſucceſs of the invaders: a juſt and entire confidence in government is neceſſary to our preſervation, and the common danger ſhould produce an union of all parties in the defence of their country. It is needleſs to trace the cauſes which have brought our affairs to this criſis; ſuch a taſk would only lead to ſow diviſion and diſcontent, when concord and harmony are moſt required. But I would beg leave to recommend to the ſtockholders not to be alarmed, and let their fears prevail over their reaſon. If to ſecure their property, they draw on their bankers, and attempt at once to realize their ſecurities, they will infallibly bring ruin and deſtruction on themſelves and families. For though there be a ſufficient ſum to anſwer

every

every purpoſe of trade and circulation; as well as to pay the intereſt allowed on ſuch ſecurities, ſucceſſively as it becomes due; yet is there not in this, nor in any other country, money enough to pay off all the principals, and if it is attempted, a bankruptcy muſt enſue; the monied men are ruined, and the whole nation is thrown into a convulſion, which may prove incurable, particularly if the enemy is in the country. Whereas if they remain quiet, and repoſe a proper confidence in Government, we ſhall, no doubt, be able to repel the danger which threatens us. The reſources of this country are numerous, they are great, and when properly exerted, will enable us to overcome our enemies, however formidable, and force them to lay down their arms.

Though the frontier of a country, as is that of England, may be very extenſive, and therefore ſeems very difficult to be defended; yet upon a due examination, it will be always found, that ſuch a frontier can be attacked only in few points, and that theſe points are fixed and determined by the nature and poſition of the countries at war. An army, like a traveller, muſt neceſſarily depart from a given

given point, and proceed to a given point in the enemy's country. The line which unites theſe points, I call *the Line of Operation.* It is manifeſt that all deviation from this, and all delays in purſuing the march, are ſo much time loſt; and in the end, will force an enemy to return either for want of ſubſiſtence, or by bad weather, *&c.* To diminiſh the difficulties which oppoſe the progreſs of the main army on the Line of Operation, ſometimes a corps is made to act on another line to create a diverſion; but ſuch a corps can never produce a ſolid advantage, if you attend to the main point, and fruſtrate the deſigns of the principal army.

When the frontiers of the contending powers are contiguous, the magazines formed in the country which attacks may for ſome time ſupply the invading army, until by a victory it is enabled to take ſome capital fortreſs, and ſecure a tract of the enemy's country ſufficient to form a new *dépôt* to ſupport the whole, or a great part of the troops, during the winter. If this cannot be executed, it is evident the attacking army muſt, after a fruitleſs campaign, return to its own country. In

proportion

proportion as an army advances into the enemy's country, new *dépôts* muſt be continually formed, and theſe as near as poſſible; for when they are at any conſiderable diſtance, the convoys arrive ſlow, require ſtrong eſcorts, and are ſo precarious, that the army can neither move nor act, eſpecially if the country is cloſe and the defending enemy active: let him give his whole attention to attack the invading army's communications, and he muſt live day and night on their Line of Operation. In general, commanders miſtake the principles of a defenſive war, and very abſurdly endeavour to check and ſtop the progreſs of an enemy, by oppoſing him in front in ſome advantageous poſt, which method is, for the moſt part, ineffectual or dangerous. You are often forced to a general action, whoſe conſequences may be fatal, as victory will enable your adverſary to fix himſelf in ſome part of the country, from whence, the enſuing campaign, he begins his operations ſooner, and with additional advantages. This cannot be done if you avoid a general action, and employ the greateſt part of your forces on his Line of Operation; which is the only effectual and ſure means to ſtop his progreſs; let

let him advance in front, the length of his line will weaken it, and offer your attacks certain and decisive success.

If the frontiers are not contiguous, and be separated by the territories of other Princes, by forests, deserts, mountains, and above all by the sea; it is clear, that so many difficulties will occur in such an undertaking, as that of an invasion, that it is almost impossible it should succeed.

An army which acts over a branch of the sea, *must occupy some convenient and safe harbour*; gain a great and decisive battle; or by skilful manœuvres force the enemy to abandon such a tract of country as will, in a great measure, support the assailant; for if he depends in the smallest degree on shipping, and a precarious navigation for supplies, he cannot prosecute any solid operation, and successive campaigns will be consumed in fruitless and unmeaning excursions; troops must, however, return to the shore to take up their winter quarters, and at last his men and money being exhausted, he perishes totally, or abandons the enterprize with loss and ignominy.

From hence it appears, that an offenſive war muſt be proſecuted with the utmoſt vigour and activity; for nothing leſs than compleat victories can render it ſucceſsful. Conſequently a defenſive war muſt be carried on with caution and prudence, and above all things, a general action is to be avoided. You oppoſe the enemy in front by occupying ſtrong poſts, and with the remainder of your forces you act on his flanks and rear; which in a ſhort time will reduce him, though much ſtronger, to fall back and approach his *dépôts*. If King Harold had followed this doctrine, it is probable we ſhould have known William the Conqueror by his defeat only.

Let us now apply the principles eſtabliſhed above to the preſent caſe.

It is evident that *Breſt* is the point from whence the French muſt depart; becauſe all their operations, even when they have landed, are connected with and depend upon their fleet. But as all operations which depend on navigation, are, from its nature, precarious, and liable to a thouſand difficulties, they muſt have likewiſe a place of arms in this country, a ſpacious harbour, as near

their

their own coaſt as poſſible, *&c.* and beſides theſe advantages, abſolutely required, the place muſt be ſo ſituated that by marching a few miles inland, they can occupy ſuch a poſt as will render them maſters of a tract of country behind their army ſufficient to ſupply it with ſubſiſtence on their ſtops; without which, no progreſs can be made, nor can they remain for any conſiderable time in any part of the country. The plan which offers theſe advantages, is the moſt eligible of any they can fix upon.

Plymouth anſwers perfectly this deſcription. It is a ſafe and convenient harbour, near the coaſt of France; and by marching only to Chudleigh, the invaders will be maſters of Cornwall, Devonſhire, and part of Somerſetſhire, where they can find proviſions in abundance; which will enable them to proſecute their operations, and penetrate further into the country, or if they chuſe to remain there, it would be a difficult matter to drive them back, as they would have a fleet at Plymouth; and our trade being once deſtroyed, we muſt conclude a peace on the terms they chuſe to impoſe upon us. I am happy to find that ſuch meaſures have been

taken by Government for the defence of that very important place, as leave us no room to fear for it.

When a *coup de main* only is intended, you muſt debark as near the object you have in view as poſſible, becauſe the ſucceſs depends on ſecreſy and ſurprize: but when you propoſe to wage war in a country, you are to land your troops at a diſtance, that you may have time to bring your ſtores on ſhore, fortify a camp, take ſome capital poſition, and then proceed gradually towards the point you have in view. General O'Reilly, in his expedition againſt Algiers, adopted another mode, and failed in the enterprize; he loſt great part of his army, and his reputation as an officer.

Next to *Plymouth*, the only place which can ſerve the purpoſe of the enemy, is *Portſmouth*. It has two fine roads, St. Helen and Spithead, and a very ſafe harbour. The town and the dock on the land ſide are fortified, and cannot be taken without a regular ſiege, the undertaking of which is very difficult, though we had no ſhips to defend it. The iſland of Portſea lies very low, and does

not

not furniſh the neceſſary materials to carry on the works, required on ſuch occaſions. The enemy muſt occupy Goſport with part of his army, while the remainder carries on the ſiege, and if we are maſters of Portſdown, and can confine him to the iſland, we are always able to ſuccour the place, and force him to retire, which he would find no eaſy matter. The lines of Goſport are of no uſe, and thoſe towards Portſdown are againſt us, if the invader is in the iſland, being calculated only to ſtop an enemy coming from Portſdown, which I preſume he never will be permitted to occupy. The lines of Goſport are equally imperfect; a good *fort* ſhould be raiſed on a riſing ground, a few hundred yards off, which would render it impoſſible for the enemy to attempt any thing on that ſide. In caſe he ſhould ever land in the iſland of Portſea, a few redoubts muſt alſo be added before the front of the works which cover the dock, to prevent his approaching near enough to throw ſhells into the dock, which he might now do, as thoſe works are not advanced far enough into the country; an unreaſonable reſpect for private property having occaſioned their being kept ſo far back.

When I conſidered at firſt the poſition of the *Iſle of Wight*, I thought that an enemy might occupy it, and with fifteen or twenty thouſand men keep poſſeſſion of the whole ground; but having lately examined it with proper attention, I believe now that it is abſolutely impoſſible. This iſland runs from Eaſt to Weſt, and is generally interſected with very high mountains, whoſe baſis run quite to the ſhore. On the South ſide of the iſland they riſe by ranges, like an amphitheatre, almoſt perpendicular, forty or fifty feet high, and the ſummits, excepting in a very few places, to above a thouſand; ſo that if any troops are poſted on them, there is no poſſibility of landing. The only place where it is leſs difficult is in Brading Bay, oppoſite St. Helen's Road. This is a ſmall creek between two very high hills, which being occupied, will prevent a landing. On the South ſide is a bay, where the ſhore is low, and very proper for debarking troops; but Sandown Fort defends that bay very well. From thence to the Weſternmoſt point and the Needles, no place is found where a landing can be attempted if there is the leaſt oppoſition: Beſides, the coaſt is ſo open and dangerous, that a boat, much

leſs

leſs a fleet, cannot lay at anchor an hour without the utmoſt riſk of periſhing. From the Needles to Ride you may land any where, and a fleet may anchor in ſafety, there being a ſufficient depth of water for men of war to come through the Needles, and all the way up to Spithead. The channel between the *Needles* and *Hurſt Caſtle* is narrow, but it is ſafe for the largeſt veſſels. The Caſtle does not ſeem ſufficiently ſtrong againſt ſhips of force; but if two conſiderable batteries were erected on the two points which project into the ſea oppoſite the fortreſs, I believe that paſs would be perfectly ſecured.

Though the difficulties which occur in landing on the South ſide of the Iſle of Wight, and indeed of approaching it, ſeem inſurmountable, yet if no oppoſition is made, it might be effected; however, if we conſider the extent of the iſland, the great number of very high mountains, and of places to land from our ſide, it will appear that twenty thouſand men would not be able to occupy it in ſuch a manner as to prevent our taking it from them. They muſt fortify all the ſhore oppoſite the New Foreſt, as well as all the downs or mountains behind them; for

there is no one ſpot on the whole iſland where the moſt extenſive fortreſs could, in any degree, ſecure the poſſeſſion of it to the French. If it is placed on the South ſhore, there is neither bay nor harbour; and by our occupying ſome neighbouring mountains, the garriſon would be ſtarved in it. The ſame difficulty will occur if placed in the centre, or on the Northern ſhore, at Cowes, Yarmouth, *&c.* from whence I conclude, that while England exiſts as a nation, an enemy cannot keep the Iſle of Wight a month, though there were thirty thouſand men in it.

From *Portſmouth* to *Harwich* there is no harbour or road which can, in any degree, anſwer the purpoſes of an enemy, who intends to land a conſiderable army, and make war in the country. The difficulty, though very great, does not conſiſt in debarking forty thouſand men; it is alſo neceſſary, as I have already demonſtrated, that they ſhould have a commodious and ſafe harbour, a place of arms, and be ſo ſituated as to keep a ſure and eaſy communication with France, eſpecially with Breſt. Such a place is not to be found on the whole coaſt, except Plymouth, and Portſmouth, of which enough

has

has been ſaid already. The Dutch fleet, they ſay, came up the river very well; but how long did they remain there? A few hours only. Conſider, beſides, the great difference there is between coming from the coaſt of Holland with twenty men of war, to make a ridiculous bravado, which laſted twenty-four hours, or coming from Breſt with a fleet, and four or five hundred tranſports to invade us, and to carry on a war into the heart of our country. The one is eaſy, the other impracticable.

Though I am convinced ſuch an attempt neither will nor can be made in Suſſex, Kent, or higher up; I do not think it impoſſible, that in order to facilitate the operations of their main army, the enemies may threaten different and diſtant parts of the coaſt; but no ſolid operation can, in my opinion, be executed but in the Weſt.

Upon this ſuppoſition, it appears that our troops are too much ſcattered, and cannot be brought together without a great loſs of time, wherever they may land.

Whenever

Whenever a tract of country is to be defended, reaſon points out the neceſſity of occupying ſome *central poſitions*, with ſtrong corps to the right and left, to ſtop the enemy till the whole can be collected. *The Line we have to defend extends from Plymouth to Dover. Portſdown* is the central point in that line, I would therefore recommend, that a third part of our army be placed there and in the New Foreſt; another third on *Hall Down Hill*, beyond Exeter; and the remaining third *in the limits between Suſſex and Kent*, on that branch of the river Medway, called the Teiſe. If an attempt is made to the Weſtward, the body encamped at Portſmouth will march thither, and join that on Hall Down, which I ſuppoſe inſtantly in motion where the invaſion is attempted. The body placed in Suſſex may remain there, and by a movement to the right or left, be any where, as occaſion may require, and eaſily repulſe every attempt made on that coaſt.

Should the enemy land at Plymouth, which I think moſt probable, for the reaſons already aſſigned, the regiments now there will be able to diſpute the ground, until thoſe on Hall Down can come to their aſſiſtance; and

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it does not require twenty-four hours march. Oppoſed in front by the corps at Plymouth, which is covered by the works now raiſing there, as well as by the natural ſtrength of the country, and attacked in the rear by the troops coming from Hall Down, an enemy, though far ſuperior in number, would find himſelf greatly embarraſſed. Surrounded by the ſea, by ſtrong forts, and a ſtronger country, occupied by fifteen or twenty thouſand men, without ground ſufficiently extenſive to form a line, I do not conceive it poſſible how he could avoid a total overthrow. There is not a ſpot about Plymouth, if properly occupied, and protected by the moſt inconſiderable works, but will require a ſiege to force you, which cannot be undertaken while you have any body of troops in the neighbourhood.

The ſame difficulties, and much greater, will occur to an enemy in the iſland of Portſea; he can neither ſubſiſt there, nor from the adjacent country, if we have a camp on Portſdown, and another in the New Foreſt.

From what we have ſaid, it ſeems evident that no invaſion can take place, until our fleet, intirely drove out of the ſea, is forced

to

to hide itſelf for a conſiderable time in ſome harbour; and that ſuch an invaſion cannot be proſecuted with any probability of ſucceſs, unleſs the enemy is maſter of Plymouth or Portſmouth. Let us now proceed to examine the conſequences, in caſe ſuch an event ſhould happen.

Suppoſing the enemy is in poſſeſſion of Plymouth, he cannot remain there for ever; he will, in a ſhort time, be forced to penetrate further into the country, in order to procure ſupplies of proviſion, or abandon his poſt for want of them. To remain there with any ſafety, he muſt occupy and fortify Mount Edgecumbe, and the ground behind the King's Brewhouſe, as well as all the ground between the Tamar and that branch of the ſea which runs under Mr. Parker's garden to the bridge at the three mile ſtone, coming to London; he ſhould moreover have a body of troops in Mr. Parker's ground. Forty or fifty thouſand men would not be ſufficient for the purpoſe, becauſe theſe being ſeparated from the ſea and the Tamar, could not, in caſe of an attack, ſupport each other; and if one only of them is defeated, the others muſt fall ſucceſſively, and in a very ſhort time. The greateſt

greateſt part of the invader's army will naturally be poſted between the Tamar and the ſea, by the bridge above mentioned, which puts the Docks, Store-houſe, and Plymouth behind them; this diſtance is near five miles, and requires twenty thouſand men to defend it, which they cannot eaſily do, for the ground riſes gradually from the ſhore to Dartmoor, ſo that you have every poſſible advantage in attacking their poſts. The moſt ſure method, however, would be to attack the corps placed at Mount Edgecumbe, which being beat, the others muſt be deſtroyed. *Mount Edgecumbe is the key of Plymouth, and muſt be kept with care.*

Though the enemies are in poſſeſſion of all the different poſts above mentioned, and have thereby a place of arms, and a fine harbour for their fleet, with which, for a time, they may put an intire ſtop to all our trade and navigation, yet it can only be for a time. The *combined fleet* cannot always remain there, and the army conſiſting of fifty or ſixty thouſand men, cooped up in ſuch narrow limits, cannot ſubſiſt by the ſupplies brought from France. They muſt therefore advance into the country or abandon it. The only deciſive

operation

operation they could execute would be, to leave ten thouſand men at Plymouth, and with the remainder proceed directly to Hall Down, between Chudleigh and Exeter, which is about thirty-ſix miles from Plymouth. This poſition is very ſtrong, whether it is taken with the front towards Exeter, or towards Plymouth. There is no paſſing between the enemy's right, and the ſea; and by an eaſy movement on the left, he is in the mountains, through which all the weſtern roads muſt paſs towards Cornwall. By taking this poſition, the enemy would be maſter of Devonſhire and Cornwall, which would furniſh ſubſiſtence in abundance, and having Teignmouth, Torbay, and Dartmouth very near, he would alſo receive from France whatever he wanted. Poſſeſſed of theſe advantages, and having a very ſtrong country eaſily to be defended, it would become difficult to drive him back; and while his fleet, deſtroying our trade, rode triumphant at ſea, we ſhould be reduced to accept of any peace he chuſed to dictate. It is therefore incumbent upon us to poſt ourſelves ſo, that we may be near enough to prevent an invading army from penetrating into the country, if we cannot hinder it from taking Plymouth. The means and method of

doing

doing this (of confining him to the ſhore) depending chiefly on the nature of the country, I ſhall therefore give a deſcription of it, ſo far as it relates to military operations.

All countries are either *open* or *cloſe*. By an *open* country, I mean that where an army, or a conſiderable body of troops, can almoſt any where find ſufficient room to form in, and to act; conſequently, by a *cloſe* country, I mean that where an army, in the courſe of many miles, cannot find room to form and act in. By the word *defile*, I mean a narrow paſs formed by mountains, hills, foreſts, rivers, moraſſes, hedges, &c. where the road is ſo contracted, that few men only can advance in front. In the firſt ſpecies of country, it is evident, that ſuperior numbers muſt prevail, if the troops are equal in goodneſs, and the commander knows how to avail himſelf of that ſuperiority; for this plain reaſon, that he can bring a greater number of men into action at any given time, and at any given point, than his adverſary. Whereas in a cloſe country, number is nothing, and diſpoſition is every thing. In ſuch a country, points only can be attacked, and by a given number of men only. So that if you occupy

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theſe points, though otherwiſe much inferior to the enemy, you may bring more men into action than he, and conſequently prevail: beſides, theſe points may be ſuch as to enable you to attack him in front, flank and rear at the ſame time.

England, in general, is of this laſt kind; the weſtern country is not only very hilly, but alſo for the moſt part full of incloſures. As you come from Exeter towards London, it is ſo incloſed with hedges and ditches, that for many miles together, you do not find ground ſufficiently open to form twenty battalions upon; ſo that the high road, where an army can alone march, is one continued paſs, or defile, winding at the foot of the mountains, or through the incloſures, of which you may ſee the ſpecimen in Plate II. Thoſe mountains and hedges, being properly occupied, an enemy cannot advance a ſtep; and if he is once engaged in them, he can never extricate himſelf out of the narrow labyrinth, and will be forced to lay down his arms.

There are two roads, which may be called military roads, from Plymouth to Exeter; the

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one paſſes by Ivy Bridge, Chudleigh and Aſhburton. The other by Ivy Bridge, Totneſs, Newton Buſhel, and over Hall Down Hill to Exeter. On the firſt road there are but two places, viz. Hall Down, four miles beyond Exeter, and a heath two miles beyond Chudleigh, where any conſiderable body of men can form upon. The remainder of the road is one continued defile, interſected by mountains, rivers, hedges and numberleſs rivulets, beſides the Teign and the Dart, which come from Dartmoor, and fall into the ſea. Though theſe are not very deep, yet being near the mountains, they are very rapid, and when the rain falls (which is frequent in the Weſt) become very dangerous torrents; their beds are full of large ſtones, and the banks high, ſo that you can get over them only at the bridges, where the high road paſſes. The whole country between this road and the ſea coaſt, from Exmouth to Plymouth, is exactly the ſame, ſo that an army can march but in *one column*. If to avoid the difficulties and dangers which ariſe from ſuch a diſpoſition, the enemy ſhould ſeparate his forces, and advance in two columns, along the two roads above mentioned; there being no communication by means of croſs roads, you may attack either or both

columns ſeparately, for they cannot ſupport each other until they come to Hall Down: nor in all that tract of country is there a ſingle ſpot where you may not attack the enemy in front, flank and rear, ſince the road is continually winding round the foot of the hills.

Between the Teign and the Dart the ground is rather more hilly, and more eaſily defended. There is but one narrow road, which goes from Dartmouth to Newton Buſhel, near which the tide flows. A few miles from Dartmouth, a branch of it turns off to Totneſs, and ſeveral paths from towns on the coaſt, as Torbay, Paygnton, *&c.* come into the main road, leading to Hall Down or to Plymouth. However, a body of men landing between Dartmouth and Teignmouth, muſt finally paſs through Newton Buſhel in their way to Exeter, or through Totneſs going to Plymouth. There goes likewiſe from Dartmouth to Plymouth a road over the mountains, by Modbury. All theſe roads are equally difficult, inſomuch that no wheel carriages are uſed by the farmers, who carry in their harveſt on horſes. The only proper places between Plymouth and Exmouth where

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ſhips can approach, are Dartmouth and Teignmouth; but as the entrance is very narrow, and entirely commanded by mountains, a few battalions would eaſily prevent a landing.

From Teignmouth, towards Exeter, there runs a very high mountain called Hall Down or Haldon Hill, already mentioned. The top is a fine plain, where a numerous army might camp and act. All the roads, as I have ſaid, to and from the Weſt, paſs over it; but an army can come upon it only by the two roads, leading from Newton Buſhel and Exmouth, both very difficult. On the South ſide towards the Teign and Newton Buſhel, the hill is rapid. On the Weſt ſide it falls gradually, and forms many ſmall hills, whoſe baſes form very deep ravins: theſe hills project quite into the ſea, which does not admit of any convenient place for landing troops, and is moreover ſo ſhallow that no ſhips of burthen can approach the ſhore. Upon the whole, the country from Exeter to Plymouth is ſo extremely cloſe and difficult, that a few men, properly diſpoſed, will ſtop, and ruin a numerous army.

From Exeter, where moſt of the weſtern roads join, there are but two roads towards Saliſbury, which may be practicable for an army; to Axminſter there is only one. At this place begin the two, one to the left through Yeovil, Sherborne, Shafteſbury, and over the Downs; the other to the right by Bridport, Dorcheſter and Blandford, to Saliſbury. The firſt road as far as Shafteſbury is interſected by numberleſs hills and vallies, extremely cloſe and cultivated, ſo that an army can march only in one column. There is ſcarce a ſpot where you cannot occupy ſome poſt acroſs the road to prevent an enemy from advancing, while the hedges on both ſides, lined with your infantry, would ſo embarraſs him, that he could neither advance or retire, or indeed make any defence on the ground for want of room to form a line. From Shafteſbury to Saliſbury the road paſſes over a narrow down, having on one ſide a high ridge of mountains, which runs towards Blandford, and Cranbourn chace, and on the other a deep and wide valley very cloſe. This down is alſo cut by a great number of ravins, ſo that very often there is not room to form a ſingle battalion. If the ridge of mountains, and the valley are occupied,

occupied, no army can proceed on the high road; nor can it be ſeparated into ſeveral columns, without expoſing them to be beat in detail, as from the nature of the ground they cannot ſupport each other. The road which goes by Bridport is extremely difficult till you are about two miles beyond that place; then the country opening as far as Saliſbury, becomes leſs incloſed, and offers every where ground ſufficient to form a numerous army upon, and very proper for a general action, if you are ſuperior in cavalry.

From Saliſbury two roads go towards London: the firſt by Andover, Baſingſtoke, Bagſhot, Egham, Staines, &c. Near the ſeven mile ſtone a branch goes by Stockbridge over ſome very high hills, and joins it at Baſingſtoke: this branch paſſes through an open country, which however being very high, offers many excellent camps. The firſt is alſo carried for ſome miles through an open country; but about Andover, and from thence to Baſingſtoke, and Hartford-bridge, it is very cloſe. The other road goes by Rumſey, Farnham, &c. through a country which is ſtill more cloſe than the former, and in pro-

portion affords greater advantages in attacking the enemy.

It is needleſs to proſecute this deſcription any further, becauſe I am perſuaded, that no army, however numerous, will ever be able to penetrate forty miles into the country, if proper methods are taken to oppoſe it, and if we know how to avail ourſelves of the numberleſs reſources which may be drawn from the face of the country. And I have no doubt, from the known experience, firmneſs, and abilities of the commander in chief*, but that the event, ſhould an invaſion take place, will juſtify the high truſt that his Majeſty has placed in him, and fully anſwer the expectations of the public.

The deſcription I have given is exceedingly imperfect, as no map, plan, or drawing, can convey a true military, and adequate idea of any country. The eye alone, and a good one, accuſtomed to view ground on a grand ſcale, very different from that of a parade, can do it effectually. I think, however, that what I have ſaid, if read with

* Lord Amherſt.

attention,

attention, accompanied with the map annexed, (*Plate* 1.) will ſhew the lines on which the enemy can act, as well as the advantages or diſadvantages of the country, through which ſuch lines muſt neceſſarily paſs. The commander in chief, and his officers, upon examining the ground, will eaſily fix the particular *points* where to act, while theſe points, and the *motions* of the enemy will ſhew *how* to act, as circumſtances may require.

CHAP. V.

Obſervations on the method of ranging the Troops, and of making War, &c. and additional detail of the Invaders difficulties.

THE French army has, no doubt, ſome advantages over ours at preſent (the veteran regiments being almoſt all in America): it is compoſed of old corps, which have been accuſtomed to exerciſe and diſcipline for many years: the officers of the higher ranks have ſeen ſervice, and many of them have commanded ſeparate corps during the laſt war. The habit of being united for a long time *together*, gives them a facility in manœuvring, a conſiſtency and adherence of parts, if I may ſo call it, not ſo eaſily broke as in new levies; all which muſt inſure them a great ſuperiority in a plain and open country, and in a general action. In a cloſe country, where the combat is partial, and confined to particular poſts, valour and a good diſpoſition will ſupply, in a great meaſure, the defects inherent to new corps.

Though

Though in point of diſcipline, our enemies, at preſent, enjoy ſome advantages over us, we poſſeſs ſo many over them, in every other reſpect, that, if we avail ourſelves of them, there can be no room left to fear the event of the invaſion, with which we are now threatened.

1ſt, The face of the country forces them to march in one column; and this difficulty alone overbalances almoſt every other advantage.

2dly, They have but little cavalry, which from the nature of the country, may not, if we chuſe it, ever have an opportunity of acting.

3dly, They can have no heavy artillery, and not many field pieces, compared to what we can bring into the field.

4thly, They can have no other proviſions but what they bring with them, which, however abundant it may ſeem, will laſt only for a very ſhort time.

5thly,

5thly, They can never have a ſufficient number of horſes and carriages to tranſport their ſtores, artillery, baggage, proviſions, &c. which will retard their march, ſo that they cannot advance above a mile or two in one day.

6thly, When they proceed from the ſhore, they can form no magazines in the country, and muſt be ſupplied from their original *dépôt*; and when their line of communication is protracted to a certain length, half their army will not be ſufficient to eſcort their convoys, which you may, and muſt intercept. This will not only retard their progreſs, but very ſoon ſtop them entirely, and force their army to go back. They have but this alternative, to gain a great and deciſive victory, or abandon the enterprize. They cannot remain on the ſpot, in a cloſe country, ſurrounded by mountains on every ſide, and thoſe occupied by our troops: and we have nothing to do but to profit of theſe advantages, and avoid a general action.

7thly, They cannot ſend detachments, or deviate from the great road, without being expoſed

expoſed to certain deſtruction: whereas we, availing ourſelves of every croſs road and path, can without riſk attack their whole line of march, and ſoon throw it into confuſion. They can act on that only; whereas we can act where, and when we pleaſe.

To theſe natural advantages we may, I think, procure others from a different manner of ranging the troops, and of carrying on the war.

The preſent mode of ranging the infantry three men deep, armed with muſkets only, is ſubject to many and very great defects.

Firſt, The line becomes too extenſive, and is therefore weak; it cannot advance in any ground, particularly in a cloſe one, without the greateſt difficulties and delays, contrary to the very principle of military operations, which ſhould be as quick as lightning.

Secondly, It is inadequate to almoſt every purpoſe of war, as well againſt infantry as cavalry, and proper only for fighting at a diſtance. If you approach the enemy, the line is too weak, the arms too ſhort for a

ſhock,

ſhock, and veteran troops will have a deciſive ſuperiority. Placed behind entrenchments, hedges, ditches, &c. which naturally offer great advantages, you can make no reſiſtance from the moment the enemy attacks them, ſo that unleſs you keep him off by your fire, he penetrates ſomewhere, and you muſt abandon the whole, or be taken in flank, and cut to pieces.

To remedy theſe defects, I humbly propoſe, that the infantry be ranged four deep, and that the fourth rank be armed with a Pike eleven or twelve feet long, two feet of which muſt be made of ſteel, two inches broad, to cut on each ſide, without an hatchet, or croſs bar, that it may eaſily paſs through the hedges. This fourth rank muſt be compoſed of the talleſt and ſtrongeſt men.

This formation will render the line leſs extenſive, ſtronger, and much more active, is proper for every operation, and particularly adapted to our country, every where incloſed with hedges and ditches. In a plain, no infantry formed in the uſual manner can reſiſt its ſhocks an inſtant, or even approach your line, much leſs if this is placed behind an entrench-

entrenchment, or hedge. Moreover, if you form a battalion or two into ſquares, protected by ſome howitzers on the flanks, no cavalry, however brave, can overturn them. The three firſt ranks protected by a row of Pikes, which project before them at leaſt five feet, will feel the advantage, and ſoon find their ſuperiority in whatever ground they are attacked, as well as in attacking the enemy: —*(Plate 3.)*—Let an experiment be made, the event will ſhew the ſuperiority of the method I propoſe over that now in practice. It is a novelty. Very true; and this novelty will not a little diſconcert the enemy.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Order of Battle.

THE order of battle now adopted in Europe is, in many reſpects, defective and abſurd. The infantry and cavalry formed three deep make the line ſo very extenſive, that it loſes all its activity, which is the ſoul of military manœuvres, and alone can inſure ſucceſs: inſomuch that it may be eſtabliſhed as an axiom, that the army which moves and marches with the greateſt velocity, muſt, from that circumſtance alone, finally prevail. Our military inſtitutions exclude every idea of celerity; hence it is that our victories are never compleat and deciſive, and that our attacks are reduced to ſome particular points, which gained or loſt, the battle is over; the enemy retires generally in good order, becauſe from the extent and flowneſs of our motions we cannot purſue him with any vigour; he occupies ſome neighbouring hill, and we have to begin again. Moreover, the poſition of the cavalry in a line on the flanks of the infantry,

is

is ſuch that it retards the motions of the whole, becauſe none can advance unleſs the whole line does; beſides, it cannot from its ſituation there ſupport the infantry, or be ſupported by it: the moment is loſt before you can bring the cavalry where it is wanted. The reaſon aſſigned for placing the cavalry on the flanks is abſurd, *viz.* to cover the flanks of the infantry.—Pray, is not the flank of the cavalry much weaker than that of the infantry? ſince it cannot in any manner form a flank to protect itſelf, much leſs will it protect the flank of the infantry. Three or four battalions, armed with Pikes, and formed into oblong ſquares, are the only flanks which can effectually cover the line againſt infantry or cavalry, and they muſt have, beſides field-pieces, ten or twelve-pounders, and a few howitzers, (*Plate* 3).

Cavalry muſt never appear but in the moment it is brought to action, action being the very eſſence of the cavalry. When the ground, or other circumſtances, do not permit you to bring it to action, it muſt be kept back behind the infantry, whoſe flanks, ſecured as I propoſe, have nothing to fear. If you think your line too weak, though it is

much

much ſtronger than any other formed in the uſual way, let every third or fourth battalion in the line be formed into ſquares, as thoſe in the flanks, and be aſſured nothing can reſiſt their efforts, much leſs overturn and break the line.

In the manner our line is now formed, not a third of the army is engaged, and that ſucceſſively; ſo that numbers are of no uſe, and only ſerve to retard its motions, and increaſe the expence. To remedy theſe defects I would humbly propoſe, that all the infantry be formed in ſuch a manner, that between each battalion, or regiment, an interval of one hundred and fifty yards be left; behind theſe intervals I would have the cavalry placed in two lines at a proper diſtance, each ſquadron ſeparately, with intervals to manœuvre upon. (*Plate* 3.)

The firſt advantage reſulting from this diſpoſition is, that you may extend your line to any length, without any danger. The ſecond, that you bring the whole into action at once, and though the enemy be double the number, you may out-flank him, and are in reality ſtronger than him, for you attack

attack his whole front with ſuperior forces. The third, that the motions of the whole line are more rapid, as each regiment or battalion moves and acts by itſelf; and though ſome may be more advanced than others, no inconvenience can ariſe from it, becauſe if the enemy is imprudent enough to break his line to attack ſuch advanced battalion, upon the right and left, he will find others formed into ſquares to take him on both flanks; and if he advances a certain length out of his line, you order your battalion to ſtop, or even retire *à la débandade*, and in that inſtant you order ſome of your ſquadrons to move forwards through the intervals full gallop, and to charge pell-mell; as one horſeman acting in this manner has more real activity than ſeventy who advance and attack in a line as uſual. I ſaw once three hundred horſe attack a column of ſeven or eight thouſand foot in this way, which they defeated and diſperſed in three or four minutes. The fourth advantage is, that if your line is broke in ſome places, the enemy cannot avail himſelf of the diſorder, becauſe your cavalry advances, and gives the infantry time to recover. The fifth, that if your infantry breaks that of the enemy in any point, then advance

your firſt line of cavalry to attack and diſperſe it, the whole moving forwards rapidly at the ſame time, which will infallibly produce a general ſlaughter, and your victory is complete and deciſive. The laſt advantage of this order of battle which I ſhall mention is, that it is *general, and equally adapted to every ſpecies of country*, when an army can act in the leaſt. In an open country you combine the action of cavalry with that of the infantry, and heavy artillery. In a cloſe country, where an extenſive line cannot be formed, the original formation of the troops enables you to act ſeparately, as the ground may require, by corps, detachments, brigades, or regiments, and that always with ſuperior vigour and activity. *It is peculiarly adapted to our country*; I hope, therefore, it will be received and applied on the preſent occaſion.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the general Method of making War.

OUR armies, however numerous, are united in one body formed in two or three lines. Between this army and that of the enemy, at a certain diſtance, the light troops, very often amounting to twenty thouſand men, form another army, which is called a chain to obſerve the enemy, prevent his coming upon you unawares, and cover the march of the grand army. Sometimes alſo detachments of them are ſent to eſcort your convoys, or to cover a certain diſtrict, while the army acts on another line. Theſe light troops, though very numerous, they conſider only as mere ſcouts to obſerve the enemy, inſomuch that on a day of battle they are not to be found, and ſeldom or ever take part in the action. Whether you advance to the enemy, or the enemy comes to you, the light troops diſperſe to the right and left, and you hear no more of them till the next day. Why on ſuch occaſions they do not form on the right and left of the army, at a convenient

distance, and attack the enemy on the flanks, is to me as inconceivable as the use now made of them appears ridiculous and absurd. Four or five hundred men including one hundred hussars, distributed into small parties in the woods, behind the hedges, near the high roads, would observe the enemy much better than ten thousand men. The motions of such a body as that of an army of light troops, are too slow, and always before the eyes of the enemy, so that he can mark them, and make some capital manœuvres without your knowledge. Whereas a chain of small parties going every where, unite or disperse in a moment, and are always invisible, so that it is impossible for the enemy to make any kind of movement without your having timely notice.

The great defect of the present method of acting is, that however numerous your army may be, if it is formed in one body, your motions are extremely slow. Secondly, the enemy may direct his march so that he outflanks you. Thirdly, you must have a great body of troops between you and him to watch his motions. Fourthly and finally, by marching against him in a line whose direction is perpendicular to his front, you cannot out-

flank

flank him. To remedy theſe very capital defects, I would beg leave to propoſe another mode of diſtributing the troops of which our army is compoſed.

In order to explain what I have to ſay on this ſubject, I muſt premiſe, Firſt, that a man or body of men, as an army, can defend themſelves only in front; conſequently, if you can attack them on either, or both flanks, you will eaſily beat them, and much more ſo if you come upon them in the rear. Hence it is that Nature points out the danger, and raiſes that *panic* with which an army is ſeized when the men apprehend that they are attacked in the rear; conſcious of their weakneſs, they generally fly in confuſion. Sometimes the face of the country obliges an enemy to contract his front, as when he comes upon you in columns: then the moment is favourable to attack him, before he has time to form his line. Sometimes by your throwing up ſome Redoubts before your front, *(Plate 3.)* he is obliged to break his line, and to advance in columns: this likewiſe is an occaſion to attack him with advantage. Both are, however, too generally neglected. Men, for the moſt part, fix on a given ſpot to fight, which

they will not quit, though the enemy in his progreſs gives many opportunities to a ſucceſsful attack. They make their arrangements on paper, and by the ſlowneſs of their movements abide by them, being utterly unable to form and execute new diſpoſitions, as circumſtances may require.

Beſides the circumſtances juſt mentioned, which *force an enemy* to contract his front, there is a method of extending yours, ſo that you may always out-flank him, though he be much ſuperior in number. If you can *form on a portion of a circle*, whoſe branches project beyond his flanks, and the enemy perſiſts in advancing within that circle, or remains in a line as uſual, while you extend yours in a curve, ſo that you come on either, or both his flanks, it is evident that if you attack him in that diſpoſition, he muſt be beat *(Plate 3.)* I therefore propoſe that your army be divided always in five parts, three placed in the centre, one fifth on the right, the remaining fifth on the left, and each advanced more or leſs, as the nature of the ground permits. They muſt not be behind the enemy, and liable to be cut off, as happened to the Pruſſians at Maxen, unleſs the whole of your

army

army is oppoſed to the enemy's flank; then indeed you may place one or both corps nearly behind him, if the ground is advantageous. They muſt, however, wherever poſted, have ſome certain and ſecure retreat, otherwiſe you expoſe them to great riſk, and perhaps to utter ruin and deſtruction.

The advantages ariſing from this diſtribution of the troops are many. Firſt, In whatever ground you act it is equally applicable. Secondly, The motions of the whole army are more ſimple and quicker. Thirdly, The enemy can make no manœuvres without your knowledge. Fourthly, Whether he advances to the right or left, (for he cannot, without expoſing his army to the moſt imminent danger, advance againſt your centre,) your corps which he is attacking may fall back, or be ſupported by the centre, while the other attacks the flank oppoſite to it. If the enemy keeps his ground and waits your attack, then you act againſt both his flanks at the ſame time; or by lengthening your line to the right or left, encloſe his flank while you attack his front. In ſhort, while you can force him to attack within a portion of a circle, the victory is yours. This method, I repeat it,

is general, equally proper for all caſes; but more particularly advantageous, and even neceſſary for a defenſive war.

Every army acts upon two lines, that on which it ſtands, and that which is drawn from the poſt it occupies, to the province it means to cover, or the places from whence it draws its ſubſiſtences. An army acting offenſively, departs from a given point where its *dépôts* are lodged, and goes to a given point in the enemy's country. It is often and indeed generally adviſeable for thoſe on the defenſive to avoid a battle; becauſe the conſequences are, or may be fatal. But it does not follow that you are to remain inactive: what is then to be done? The anſwer is obvious. The centre muſt occupy ſome advantageous poſt, ſtrongly fortified, while the two corps or wings muſt act day and night on the enemy's line of operation. If this is executed with vigour, he will ſoon be reduced to the neceſſity of attacking your centre, which you may avoid by taking a new poſition, and gain time or wait for it, while the two wings attack his flanks during the action; or elſe he muſt fall back to be nearer his *dépôts*, or finally ſend ſtrong corps againſt yours; and as theſe

retire

retire not on your army, he loſes his time and labour. By this diſpoſition of your troops you cover your country effectually, and prevent the enemy from advancing towards your centre. The further he advances the more danger he runs; for his line of operation will be the longer and the leſs eaſy to be guarded. If, on the contrary, you act offenſively, the enemy may find a thouſand ſtrong camps, from whence you cannot force him by any attack on his front; but if you act by corps, as I propoſe, and direct your march on either flank, which enables you to act on his line of operation, you will in a few days force him to abandon his camp, and fight you on your own terms, or abandon the country. If he permits you to approach him, you may not only force him to abandon the country, but oblige him to retire in a given direction. I do not therefore underſtand a General where he ſays, the enemy was poſted in ſuch a manner that he could not be forced. I admit it could not perhaps be done by attacking his front; but unleſs his ſubſiſtence grows under his feet, he may be forced to abandon any camp, if you act on his flanks and line of operation, which he cannot prevent but by taking another poſition.

The

The march of an army is juſtly conſidered as one of the moſt capital operations in the art of war; I ſhall therefore beg leave to point out the principles on which it is to be formed.

Firſt, That it be executed in the leaſt time poſſible.

Secondly, That the columns may be formed into a line with the greateſt facility.

It follows from hence, that if the whole line, or lines, could march in front from one camp to another, this would be the moſt perfect way of marching, becauſe no time would be loſt in forming the columns for the march, or in replacing them in a line. Every officer will conceive that I mean a common march, when you advance in front towards the enemy; for if you move on his flanks, you have nothing to do but to make the army, as it ſtands in two or three lines, march on its right to left; then you are in order of battle, by a ſimple movement to the right or left, on the ground where you ſtand. But as no country is ſufficiently open for an army to advance in a line, for any conſiderable diſtance,

you

you muſt of courſe break that line, and march in ſeveral columns. The more numerous theſe columns are, the better for the reaſons above mentioned. The worſt of all conſequently is, that when you can march in one column only, becauſe it ſuppoſes that the whole army is in a defile, and expoſed to be cut in pieces by very few men, who occupy the ground through which ſuch a column is paſſing. This muſt be the caſe with the French, if they attempt to penetrate into this country, as appears from the deſcription we have given of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Tables of Diſtances.

The MILITARY ROADS *from* PLYMOUTH *to* LONDON, *forming a junction at* EXETER *and at* SALISBURY.

PLYMOUTH	Diſt. in Miles. betw. places	Diſt. in Miles. from Plym.
To Ridgeway	5¼	5¾
Lemin Bridge	2½	7¾
Woodland	2¼	10
Ivy Bridge	1½	11½
Wrangalin	3½	15
Brent	1¼	16
Harburton	2¾	19
Dean	2¾	21¾
Buckford	¼	22
Aſhburton	3	25
Beckington	3¼	28¼
Chudleigh	5	33¼
Stillingford	7¾	41
Exeter	2½	43½
Honiton Clyſt	4	47
Rochbere	2½	49½
Honiton Bridge	6½	56
Honiton	3½	59½
Offwell	3½	63
Axminſter	6	69
Ford	2	71
Street	4¼	75¼
Crewkherne	6¾	82
Haſilbeer	2½	84½
Eaſt Chirnock	2½	87
Weſt Coker	1½	88½
Yeovil	3	91½
Babylon Hill	1	92½
Sherborn	4½	97
Milborn Port	2½	99½
Stour Weſt-over	6½	106
Stour Eaſt-over	2½	108½
Shafteſbury	4	112½
Ludwell	1	113½
White Street Hill	4	117½
Fovent Hut	3½	121
Over the Plain by the Race Ground	5½	126½
Mount Harman Hill	3	129½
Saliſbury to	2¼	131¾
LONDON	82	213¾

PLYMOUTH to	Diſt. in Miles. betw. places	Diſt. in Miles. from Plym.
Ivy Bridge to		
Winton	5¾	17¼
Totneſs	4¼	21½
Newton Buſhel	11½	33
Red Lyon	2½	35½
HALL DOWN	6½	42
Kenford	2	44
Alphington	2½	46
Exeter	1½	48
Exeter to		
Heavy Tree	1	44½
Biſhops Clyſt	3½	48
Newton Poplar	7½	55½
Sidford	2½	58
Cullyford	7½	65½
Lyme	6½	72
Shaderton	2	74
Chidiock	4½	78½
Bridport	2½	81
Stapleton	10	91
Dorcheſter	5	96
Piddle River	4½	100½
Milford	4	104½
Blandford	8	112½
Woodgate's Inn	12¾	125½
Coombe	8	133¼
Saliſbury to	3½	136¾
LONDON	82	218¾

The MILITARY ROADS, TOWNS *and* VILLAGES *on thoſe* ROADS *from* PORTSMOUTH *to* LONDON; *and from* DOVER *to* LONDON.

PORTSMOUTH *to*	Diſt. in Miles. betw. places	Diſt. in Miles. from Portſ.
Portſea Bridge	4½	4½
Coſham	½	5
PORTSDOWN	½	5½
Purbeck's Heath	2	7½
Bere Foreſt	1	8½
Horndean	2½	11
Petersfield	7½	18½
Sheet Bridge	1	19½
Rake	3¾	23¼
Lippock	2¾	26
Over the Heath to Hind Head Hill	5¼	31¼
Milford	6¼	37½
Godalming	1½	39
Catharine Hill	3	42
Guildford	1	43
Ripley	6	49
Cobham Street	4¼	53¼
Eſher	3¼	56½
Thames Ditton	2	58½
Kingſton	2½	61
LONDON.	12½	73½

DOVER *to*	Diſt. in Miles. betw. places	Diſt. in Miles. from Dover
Buckland	¾	
Yowel Turnpike	1½	2¼
Lidden	2	4¼
Halfway Houſe	3	7¼
Barham Down	2½	9¾
Bridge	2½	12
Canterbury	3¼	15¼
Harble Down	1	16¼
Bleane Hill	3½	19¾
Bocton Street	1	20¾
Oſpring	3½	24¼
Green Street	3¼	27½
Radfield Street	¾	28¼
Rapchild	1½	29¾
Sittingbourn	1¼	31
Key Street	2¼	33¼
Newington Street	1	34¼
Raynham	3	37¼
Chatham and Rocheſter	3	40¼
Stroud	2	42¼
Gads Hill	2	44¼
Chalk Street	3	47¼
Northfleet and *Graveſend*	3	50¼
Dartford	5¼	55½
Crayford	1¾	57¼
Wellen	3	60¼
Shooter's Hill and *Woolwich*	3	63
Greenwich and *Deptford*	3	66
LONDON.	5	71¼

Sea-

Sea-port Towns and Villages along the CHANNEL COAST *between* FALMOUTH *and* DOVER, *and between* DOVER *and* SHEERNESS, *with the Diſtances between each, by the Roads, &c. &c.*

Counties.	Towns and Villages.	Diſt. in Miles. betw. places	Diſt. in Miles. from Lond.
Cornwall	*Falmouth*		271
Devonſhire	*Plymouth*	55	216
	Dartmouth	30	204
	Torbay	6	191
Dorſetſhire	Teignmouth	9	183
	Exmouth	7	168
	Sidmouth	9	158
	Lyme	16	143
	Weymouth	24	129
	Poole	31	110
Hampſhire	Iſle of Wight	21	86
	Chriſt Church	10	100
	Lymington	10	90
	Southampton	18	76
	Portſmouth	14	73
Suſſex	Chicheſter	18	61
	Pagham or Selſea	6	67
	Little Hampton and Arundel	18	65
	Worthing	8	62
	Shoreham	15	56
	Brighthelmſtone	7	62
	Rotten Dean	4	55
	New Haven and Lewes	5	56
	Seaford	4	59
	Cockmare	2½	65
	Eaſt Bourne	8	64
	Pevenſey	5	60
	Haſtings	12	64
	Winchelſea	7	67
	Rye	8	63
Kent	Dungeneſs	12	77
	New Romney	4	71
	Hythe	8	63
	Sandgate Caſtle	2	72
	Folkſtone	2	72
	Dover	7	71
	Deal	10	72
	Sandwich	5	67
	Ramſgate	5	73
	Broadſtairs	2	72
	Kingſgate	1½	72
	Margate	5	
	Feverſham	44	
	Sheerneſs		

A TABLE *of the Diſtances and Stages by Sea between* PLYMOUTH *and* HARWICH, *&c. &c.*

	Leagues.	Diſt. by land in miles from Lond.
From Plymouth to		217
Portſmouth	50	73
Dover	40	71
Nore	17	40
Landguard Fort and Harwich	34	58

A TABLE *of the principal projecting Headlands on the Channel Coaſt between* CORNWALL *and the* NORE, *and their Diſtances by Sea from each other.*

	Diſt. in Miles.
The Lizard to	
Brill and Start	69
Portland Point	51
St. Aldan's Head	24
St. Catharine's Point	27
Selſey Bill	22
Beachy Head	42
Dungeneſs	30
South Foreland	24
North Foreland	16
Iſle of Shepey	27

A TABLE *of the Diſtances between Sea-ports in* FRANCE *to Sea-ports in* IRELAND *and* GREAT-BRITAIN.

		Leagues
From Breſt to	Galway	180
	Shannon	150
	Corke	100
	Plymouth	60
	Torbay	70
Cherbourg to	Portſmouth	26
Havre to	Newhaven	29
Abbeville to	Pevenſey	27
Boulogne to	Rye	14
Calais to	Dover	7
Dunkirk to	Deal	14
	Margate	15
	Nore	25
	Harwich	33

Distances by Land, between the principal Sea-ports on the Coast of FRANCE, *from* DUNKIRK *to* BREST, *and from* BREST *to* BAYONNE; *and the Distances of each from* PARIS.

	Miles.	Dist. from Paris in Miles.
From *Dunkirk*		132
to Gravellines	10	130
Calais	10	129
Boulogne	16	120
Montreuil	20	101
Abbeville	25	81
Dieppe	36	83
Fécamp	27	93
Havre	19	96
Caen	30	111
Cherbourg	58	163
Granville	52	157
St. Maloes	16	170
St. Cas	18	186
St. Brieouc	18	200
Morlaix	42	246
Breſt	32	276
Quimper	32	267
L'Orient	34	241
Vannes	25	217
Nantes	55	190
Rochelle	66	220
Rochfort	15	225
Bourdeaux	66	230
Bayonne	88	350

Note. Conſult that uſeful collection (in one Vol. quarto) with deſcriptions and plans, of all the principal Harbours, Soundings, and Coaſts of France, entitled *Petit Neptune Français*, printed by W. Faden, 1793.

PART

PART II.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL LLOYD'S MILITARY HISTORY RESPECTING AN INVASION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND OF FRANCE, AND THE PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSIVE WAR.

CHAP. I.

The difficulties a French army would encounter in advancing from Exeter to London.

WHEN we penetrate with our great and very heavy armies into an enemy's country, it is with a view to conquer ſome provinces, fortreſſes, &c. and finding nothing upon the road to ſubſiſt upon, we have fixed and determined points to lodge our ſtores and proviſions, from whence they are tranſported to the army, which muſt proceed from theſe given points to other fixed and determined points in the enemy's country, if you carry on an offenſive war; or from a given point in your own towards another on the frontiers, if you are on the defenſive. The line which unites theſe points, on which

every army muſt act, is called the *line of operation*, and of all thoſe we have mentioned, is the moſt important; for, on the good or bad choice of this line, the final event of the war chiefly depends: if it is ill choſen, all your ſucceſſes, however brilliant, will in the end be found uſeleſs. Let us illuſtrate this doctrine by an example: (an invaſion of England from the ſide of Plymouth).

We will ſuppoſe an (enemy's) army of forty thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe, beſides thoſe required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers horſes, &c. which will amount to as many more. This army is at *Exeter*, and propoſes to advance to *London*, and has its magazines all at Exeter. I have only thirty thouſand men. I encamp as near Exeter as I can; and by occupying advantageous poſts, I will force him to employ a fortnight in marching to Dorcheſter or Blandford. Till then I oppoſe the enemy in front, with ſmall parties only on his flanks: but when he is arrived thirty or forty miles from Exeter, from which place alone he draws his ſubſiſtence; inſtead of oppoſing him in front with all my forces, I place ten

thouſand

thouſand on his line of march, ten on his left flank, and the remaining ten along his line of operation, which goes from his camp to his depôts at Exeter. The laſt will be diſtributed in four or five corps along that line, and form a chain from one end to the other, ſo that a ſingle waggon cannot paſs unobſerved, and conſequently will be taken or attacked by ſome one or other of theſe parties. A hundred men will deſtroy as many waggons, by diſperſing the drivers, taking away or killing the horſes, breaking the carriages, &c. The enemy muſt, therefore, ſend a ſtrong body of troops, ten thouſand men, for example, to eſcort a great convoy. I then make a motion to the right with my whole army, ſo that my left comes acroſs his left, my center and right go many miles beyond it. In whatever manner the eſcort is diſtributed, as part in the front, part in the center, and part in the rear of the convoy, I ſay that neither ten nor even twenty thouſand can preſerve it; becauſe theſe are chained to their convoy, and cannot quit it, nor the ſtation they occupy; whereas my troops can engage, and attack, how, when, and where they pleaſe: they can attack and amuſe the eſcorts, in a paſs or a wood, which

of courſe obliges the whole to ſtop, while two or three thouſand men, in ſmall parties, attack the chain of waggons from one end to the other. If they ſucceed in ſome places only, the whole will ſoon be diſperſed.

It would be adviſeable to attack that part which proceeds at the head of the convoy, with the greateſt part of your forces, if it goes ten or twelve miles from the camp; becauſe you may then cut it off entirely, and the whole convoy, and the remaining part of the eſcort, unleſs the enemy falls back immediately to aſſiſt them, which is no eaſy matter, as you have the centre and left of your army on his flanks, and rear in his retreat; and moſt certainly he will arrive too late to prevent the ruin of his convoy, which is our object.

If inſtead of being only thirty or forty miles from Exeter, as we ſuppoſe, he is a hundred, at Saliſbury for example; I always ſuppoſe that all his proviſions, without exception, come from thence, or from any where elſe, a hundred miles off. I ſay that ſuch an enemy as we ſuppoſe cannot remain a fortnight in that camp, though the convoys meet

meet with no other difficulties but ſuch as ariſe from the length of the road, bad weather, accidents, &c.

It is impoſſible to collect and maintain a ſufficient number of horſes, carriages, &c. to ſupply an army of fifty or ſixty thouſand men, including thoſe who follow the camp, with proviſions, ſtores, forage, &c. and to ſupply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their journey to and from the camp two hundred miles we ſuppoſe, which cannot be performed in leſs than twenty days. I am ſo convinced myſelf of this, that if you place twenty thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe on any ſpot, ſo that they ſubſiſt only upon what is brought from one given point, a hundred miles off, they muſt in a week go and meet their convoy, diſperſe, or periſh.

Now if to theſe natural and unſurmountable difficulties, you add thoſe which an able leader can create, by acting on the principles we have eſtabliſhed above, it will appear evident, beyond contradiction, that no army, great or ſmall, can act in a line of operation of a hundred miles, provided you can keep

the field; of courſe you muſt avoid a general action.

The more the country is incloſed and interſected by woods, mountains, rivers, paſſes, &c. the more difficulties the enemy will meet with: the more croſs roads the more advantageous for you; becauſe they enable you to act on his line of operation. In ſuch a country you may in almoſt every ſpot lay ſnares for his parties, even for his whole army, with ſucceſs. Whoever weighs what we have ſaid will be convinced that the ideas and fears of a (French) invaſion were vain and abſurd.

If he (the invader) attacks you, he muſt immediately bring you to a general action, that he may be enabled to beſiege ſome place of importance, form new depôts, and advance further into the country, until he forces you to abandon the whole, or make peace on the terms he preſcribes: it is your part to avoid a general action; for while you have an army in the field, and know how to manage it with advantage, he may, though much ſuperior, be forced to abandon his project, and retire with a ruined army. Were

you

you in condition to venture an engagement, with probable hopes of ſucceſs, *you muſt not do it*, becauſe if you are beat, the conſequence may be fatal, and by conquering you only force him to retire, which you may do without any riſk, if you adhere to what I ſhall ſay on the ſubject. When he drives you, retire gradually from one ſtrong camp to another; ſkirmiſh often, but never fight a battle.

A general ſhould ſcarce ever fight, when on the defenſive, but to preſerve ſome important place, and to hinder the enemy from taking winter quarters in his country, or force him to abandon it, if he is in poſſeſſion.

CHAP. II.

Reflections on the Invaſion of the Metropolis of Great Britain, from the Side of France.

ON the coaſt of England there are *three harbours*, where a great fleet may ride with ſafety. The enemy muſt take one of them. Suppoſe it done, and that the Engliſh have not a ſhip left. *Suppoſe farther, that there is a French army of ſixty thouſand men encamped on Blackheath, and off London bridge.*

I ſay there are two hundred thouſand men in England who have bore arms. I will put the half on horſeback, and the other half remains on foot: mix them as circumſtances may require. Then I place fifty thouſand men in Surry and Suſſex, and as many in Eſſex, who act on the enemy's line, which on that ſuppoſition muſt go towards the *Downs; there being no other place where his fleet can anchor.* Such a diſpoſition being made, and only half the number of men we propoſe employed, I aſk any officer, any man of ſenſe, what will become of the enemy's

army

army on Blackheath, or in any other given point, ſixty or ſeventy miles from the coaſt? It muſt periſh; for undoubtedly no army can ſubſiſt on a line of ſuch length, as is that from France to Blackheath, over a branch of the ſea, and penetrate into the country, while we have an army of thirty or forty thouſand men only to oppoſe their ſupplies. No army can ſubſiſt in a country, unleſs it draws all, or the greateſt part of its ſubſiſtence from the country itſelf, and of courſe poſſeſſes a great tract behind it, and on every ſide to the right and left: for if you can act on the enemy's line he muſt retire; and though he ſhould be in poſſeſſion of ſuch a tract of country as we ſuppoſe, he cannot keep it, unleſs he is maſter of one or more ſtrong places, to enable him to ſeparate his troops, and put them into winter quarters.

When the combined fleet (of France and Spain, 1779) appeared on our coaſt, the nation, unaccuſtomed to ſee an enemy ſo near, ſeemed much alarmed. I then thought it my duty to examine the poſſible reſults of an invaſion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy muſt have acted, had

he

he landed, and the different poſitions the Engliſh army muſt have occupied on ſuch lines, to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the poſt he had taken on our coaſt. When I conſider this ſubject in a military light only, I wiſhed almoſt that the enemy had made ſuch an attempt; becauſe once for all they would have ſeen the abſurdity, and danger of it, and we ſhould for ever have been cured of our fears.

The Ruſſians and Auſtrians in 1760, far from being able to keep Berlin, were extremely happy, after two days ſtay, to get away, though they had, undoubtedly, fifty thouſand men. This muſt always be the caſe if you attack an enemy in the centre of his dominions: whence it follows, that you muſt begin at one or other of the extreme provinces.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Reflections on the Invaſion of the Coaſt of France from Great Britain; and from the different Sides of the Continent.

HAVING deſcribed the frontiers of the principal European powers on the Continent, we muſt now return to conſider *that of France on the Britiſh channel.* This frontier extends from Dunkirk to Uſhant, and round that point along the Bay of Biſcay, to Bayonne: in this line however there is but *one harbour*, where a great fleet can be built, equipped, and ride in ſafety, which is *Breſt.* Ships of the line are alſo built at Rochfort, and equipped there; but few in number, and only few can be kept there in ſafety: they ſoon periſh, becauſe the water is ſweet, though the tide runs very high and violent up the Charante.

In ſpeaking of the line of operation, on which an army acts, we have laid it down as an axiom, not to be controverted, that if it is of any conſiderable length, or interſected

fected by mountains, paſſes, rivers, and of courſe, if it goes over a conſiderable branch of the ſea, no ſolid enterprize can be executed on ſuch line, though your forces are much ſuperior to thoſe who oppoſe you. A pirate may land twenty men on the coaſt of France, or any other, rob a hen-rooſt, burn a few houſes, and run away to their ſhip, in ſpite of France, and its two hundred thouſand men, becauſe ſuch an expedition is executed in a few hours.

In the late war, England, at a prodigious expence, made ſeveral attempts on the coaſts of France; the reſult was burning ſome fiſhing boats, and by accident, I believe, ſome houſes, and were happy to come off. Their laſt exploit at St. Cas was, we know, very unfortunate. Whoſe fault was it? No doubt it was the fault of thoſe who planned thoſe fine expeditions. Could we have burnt the enemy's docks, ſtores, &c. at *Breſt and Rochfort*, it would have been of great importance, and worth trying: but every other object was by no means equal to the riſk or the expence, and never ought to be undertaken. No forces the Engliſh can bring on the coaſt will be ſufficient to take Breſt, or any other capital

capital place. But for a moment I will ſuppoſe the French are aſleep; that the Engliſh fleet and fifty thouſand men are at Breſt. What then? Why they muſt, in a ſhort time, return home, if they can: for ſurely they cannot remain at Breſt, which in a ſhort time will be ſurrounded by a French army, who will beſiege you in it: you muſt therefore abandon it, or advance into the country; advance in the name of God! You are at Rennes, the capital of Britany. What then, I aſk once more? Why, you will be ſurrounded, your communication with Breſt and your fleet cut off, and your army periſhes by the ſword, or by famine.

What I ſay of Breſt, which indeed is the only place on the coaſt where a fleet can for any conſiderable time ride with ſafety, is equally applicable to every other point on this coaſt, or any other coaſt whatever; if your army meets with any, though very inconſiderable reſiſtance. For while your enemy can keep the field, and act on your flanks, you cannot remain on any given ſpot; and if you advance, you only precipitate your ruin.

The

The frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Basil in Switzerland, and runs in various directions from thence to Dunkirk, in French Flanders. I shall divide this long line into three parts, and consider each of them separately. The first part goes from Basil to Landau, and covers Alsatia; it is near 130 miles in length. The second part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Meuse, covers Lorrain on the side of the Electorate of Treves, the Dutchies of Deux Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan down the Meuse, to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles; so that this whole frontier is about 470 miles.

The first part of the line is covered by the Rhine, on which are placed Hunninghen, New Brisac, Strasburg, and Landau; all which are very strong. Strasburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on the back part of Alsace runs a chain of mountains, which separates it from Franche Compté and Lorrain; the distance between these mountains is from ten

to fifteen miles. An army encamped near Straſburg, covered by the Rhine, and the fortreſſes above mentioned, could, with eaſe, prevent an enemy from paſſing that river, or at leaſt from beſieging any of them; and without taking them all, he could not poſſibly ſeparate his army, and take his winter quarters in Alſace, while the French have any conſiderable force encamped or cantoned in the mountains above mentioned. I am therefore ſurprized the Auſtrians ever made an attempt on that ſide, and much more ſo, that the French were ſo very much alarmed at it. For my part, I am confident that an able general, at the head of thirty or forty thouſand men, ſo far from being terrified at the approach of an enemy, or oppoſing his paſſing the Rhine, would wiſh to ſee him ſhut up between the mountains, the river, and the fortreſſes; becauſe he would ſee the facility of preventing his repaſſing it at all, and of cutting him off entirely. Look at the map, and judge.

The ſecond part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes from Landau to Sedan, is very ſtrong both by nature and art, having

having feveral ſtrong places on it; and the country before it no leſs difficult, being very mountainous, and conſequently full of narrow paſſes. The direction of this line is concave towards that part of Germany; ſo that an enemy who advances on that ſide muſt have his depôts on the Rhine, at Mentz, or Coblentz, or at Maeſtricht and Namur on the Meuſe; in both caſes the army, which I ſuppoſe encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the Rhine, by acting on his line of operation on that ſide, while another of forty thouſand men, placed on the Meuſe, near Sedan, will prevent any army from advancing into Lorrain, or Champaign on that ſide, as is evident from the inſpection of the map.

Whether we conſider the ſtrength of this line, the direction of it, or finally, the obſtacles which the country before it offers, it will appear that no enemy can approach it, much leſs attack it with any proſpect of ſucceſs. A ſmall corps poſted at Luxemburg might indeed advance from thence, and ravage a few villages in haſte, but no ſolid enterprize can, we think, ever be executed on that ſide.

The

The third and laſt part of the French frontier runs from Sedan down the Meuſe to Charlemont, from thence to Dunkirk, and is 150 miles in length. It has been the ſcene of ſucceſſive wars for near two centuries, the moſt expenſive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals of mankind; of which the author propoſes giving the hiſtory on the ſame plan this work is wrote.

This line is ſtronger by art than nature, having a prodigious number of ſtrong fortreſſes and poſts upon it; moreover, it projects in many places, ſo that an enemy can enter it no where, without having ſome of them in front, and on his flanks; his depôts muſt be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thouſand men placed on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will ſo bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a ſtep without imminent danger: for that army which we ſuppoſe on the Sambre, by maſking Namur, penetrates into the country to Bruſſels, &c. which will force the enemy to retire, and abandon his own frontier. In the preſent ſtate of Auſtrian

Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the above mentioned countries in one campaign.

In the war for the ſucceſſion of Spain, at the beginning of the century, ten ſucceſsful campaigns brought the allies no farther than Landrecy, not thirty miles from the Auſtrian frontiers; a very inconſiderable defeat at Donain obliged Prince Eugene to raiſe the ſiege of that place, and in a ſhort time abandon his conqueſts, the fruits of many victories.

I know moſt people ſuppoſe, that this was owing to the defection of the Engliſh: had this never taken place, perhaps the Allies might in time have advanced to the Marne, and ſent parties to the Soyne: but will any officer ſuppoſe, that an army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could ſeparate and take winter quarters on the above mentioned rivers, while the French were in poſſeſſion of Picardy, Normandy, and Champaign? No, it is impoſſible: the great fault of the French generals, when on the defenſive, was to oppoſe the enemy in front,

whereas

whereas they ſhould have operated againſt their flanks.

The final event of this long and bloody war ſhows the ſtrength of this frontier, and the prodigious reſources of the Houſe of Bourbon.

From the deſcription we have now given of the French frontier, towards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears that an enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine, oppoſite to Alſace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather impoſſible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into Lorrain, &c.

That the ſecond part of the French frontier, from Landau to the Meuſe, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the Moſelle, between the Rhine and the Meuſe, the event of the different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the ſuperiority of the French; I mean the ſuperior advantages they poſſeſs in acting on that frontier, which are indeed ſo very great, that no forces can be collected and ſupported in Flanders by the Houſe of Auſtria, the Engliſh, Dutch, or the

German Princes, which can preſerve that country againſt the efforts of the French: moſt certainly the Auſtrians alone cannot do it.

The French frontiers, towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain, are too ſtrong to be invaded by thoſe powers. The idea of paſſing the Var, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deſerve ſerious diſcuſſion.

THE



A MILITARY SKETCH OF THE LINE TO DEFEND, from PLYMOUTH to DOVER.

GENERAL FACE OF THE COUNTRY

ON THE WESTERN ROADS,

Chiefly between Plymouth *and* Exeter.

Engraved by Wm. Faden.

INCLOSED COUNTRY




MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRY




The PIKE and the PIKEMEN.



The Army formed in a portion of a Circle



The Army formed in a Line,
with Redoubts *and* Epaulements *in Front,*
and Battalions armed with Pikes *on the Flanks.*



THE

SUPPLEMENT

AND

PART III.

CHAP. I.

A Sketch of the ſucceſſive Invaſions of Great Britain, by the Romans, the Saxons, the Danes, the Normans; with Comments.

THERE are no civilized nations on our globe, which have not, at one period or other, been over-run by invaders. If the Northern nations have been leſs harraſſed with theſe tempeſts of human avarice and ambition, they are more indebted to nautical and geographical ignorance, and to their uninviting ſituation and poverty, than to their proweſs or martial pre-eminence. How long

thoſe parents of navigation, the Phœnicians, had exported tin from the South corner of Britain, before the arrival of its firſt conquerors, the Romans, is, I believe, a chronological problem, and as yet unſettled. The probability is, that ſuch traffick had exiſted for ſeveral centuries.

Julius Cæſar provoked, as he pretended, at the aſſiſtance given by the Britons to their oppreſſed neighbours the Gauls, embarked with his victorious legions from the oppoſite coaſt of France, from Calais or Boulogne, or both, and landed, A. C. 54, near Sandwich, in Kent, on the banks of the river Stour, a few miles to the north of Dover. A fair wind tranſported his fleet in nine hours from one ſhore to the other. The ſucceſs of a powerful and martial nation, habituated, during the ſpace of ſeven hundred years, to military diſcipline and victory, may eaſily be anticipated, when oppoſed by a banditti of naked but reſolute ſavages. The military weapons and armour of the Britons conſiſted principally of bows and arrows, ſpears, ſhort ſwords, and ſhields; and like the ancient Greeks and Romans, they fought alternately in chariots or cars and on foot. Internal diſſention ren-

dered

dered them ſtill more unequal to reſiſtance and concert. Their iſland was divided into a rabble of twenty-eight petty ſtates and ſubordinate clanſhips, under the dominion of Kings and Druids, who were prieſts, prophets, and judges. Caſſivelaun was the name of their heroic king and generaliſſimo pitched upon to oppoſe the Romans.

Cæſar in his firſt ſhort expedition, did not penetrate beyond the ſhore, and in his ſecond and laſt, but a few miles to the North of London. Ninety-ſeven years elapſed before a third invaſion was revived under Claudius; and, by the perſeverance of ſeveral ſucceeding Emperors, the reduction of the Iſland to a Roman Province was finally accompliſhed. Whether from the difficulty of acceſs, or the inſignificance of the object in thoſe days, the Romans contented themſelves with the ſubjugation of the ſouth part of Britain. This, however, was upwards of a century conteſted with them, in many bloody encounters, by the natives, conducted by their celebrated leaders Caractacus, Boadicea, Arviragus, Galgacus, &c. To repel the incurſions of the Northern Picts and Scots, the Roman empe-

rors and generals erected, at different intervals, a chain of forts and parapets acroſs the narrow parts of the iſland, extending from the German ocean to the Iriſh channel; one of them between the Firth of Forth and the Clyde, the other between the Tyne and the Firth of Solway. The laſt was ſeventy miles in length, and conſiſted of a ſtrong rampart and ditch, with forts and towers interſperſed, and was guarded by two Legions. More effectually to facilitate and ſecure their conqueſt, the Romans made ſeveral longitudinal and tranſverſe roads, diverging in oppoſite directions from the metropolis, and extending to the remoteſt parts of their poſſeſſions in this iſland. They firſt introduced ſtones and bricks into the Britiſh architecture. Until then the natives were lodged in wretched wooden hovels, collected together in foreſts, ſurrounded with ditches and ramparts, and dignified with the appellation of towns. The principal Roman ſtations were London, Dover, St. Alban's, Colcheſter, Malden, Lincoln, York, Cheſter, Glouceſter, Caer Leon, Bath, and Wincheſter. Under their protection, ninety-two conſiderable cities and towns had proſperously riſen in this iſland; of all which

London

London was the metropolis, and its inhabitants favoured with the privileges of Roman citizens.

From the arrival of the Romans in Britain, to their departure, fills a ſpace of about five hundred years. During that interval, they had greatly depopulated the iſland in the recruit of their armies on the continent, and were under the neceſſity of finally abandoning it, and of recalling their legions for domeſtic defence. The departure of theſe celebrated and enlightened conquerors, and the overthrow of their Weſtern empire, was a calamity which Britain, equally with the reſt of Europe, had great reaſon to deplore. The imperial ſeat of arms, arts, and legiſlation, was ſoon after ſupplanted by ignorance, ſuperſtition, turbulence, and violence.

During ſeveral ſucceſſive centuries, after the downfal of Rome, and the deluge of Northern barbarians, the greateſt part of Europe continued immerſed in anarchy and ſtupidity. In the eighth century a ſimilar inundation of ravage and ruin was ſpread, by Mahomet and the Arabians, over a large portion of Africa and Aſia. Britain was a

ſharer in this general calamity, and chaos of mankind; in this diſſolution of civil ſociety.

Six centuries of the Britiſh hiſtory, after their emancipation from the Roman yoke, is filled with a frightful catalogue of defenſive warfare againſt the Saxons, Danes, and Normans. The iſland, as before obſerved, had been ſtripped, by military levies, and emigration, of its vigorous youth, and left, in a ſtate of debility and conſumption, by the Romans. Under Maximus, one of the Roman generals and emperors, upwards of 200,000 Britons of both ſexes, emigrated by choice or compulſion, to the continent; one half of whom ſeated themſelves on the oppoſite ſhores of Britanny in France. To this abdication of military tyrants ſucceeded civil diſſentions, anarchy, and famine, with predatory incurſions and barbarous devaſtation of the Picts, Scots, and Iriſh. After repeated reſiſtance and revolts, the Romans had been ſucceſsful in their jealous policy of diſarming the native Britons, which gradually rendered them a timid diſorderly multitude, and an eaſier prey to their martial neighbours, to whom the uſe of arms was familiar. Theſe complicated calamities urged the diſtracted

natives

natives of the South to fly from the ſmoke into the flames, to implore aſſiſtance from the Northern parts of Europe, from thoſe daring freebooters, the Saxons, Jutes, and Angles, who, under Hengiſt and Horſa, landed P. C. 458, on the iſle of Thanet and coaſt of Kent, ſome miles north of Dover Straits.

By ſubſequent intermarriages, by the aid of Picts and Scots, by a ſucceſſive influx of ſuccours from the Continent, and by a long ſeries of wars, of barbarous ferocity and maſſacres, the ſouth part of Britain, called England, became gradually partitioned into ſeven independent ſtates. In theſe violent ſcenes of warfare, and exertions of national valour againſt foreign invaders, which continued to rage during one century and a half, Vortimer, Pendragon, Arthur, Cadwallo, and Cadwallador, are enumerated amongſt the diſtinguiſhed princes and heroes of Britain.

The Saxon heptarchy, as might naturally be expected, was not of long duration. Its jarring members, after exhauſting themſelves in mutual carnage and depredation, were by degrees cemented into one monarchy. This union of the mutinous rivals was effected prin-

cipally under Egbert and Alfred, A. D. 827, about three hundred and ſeventy-eight years after the firſt arrival of thoſe foreigners in this iſland. The latter Prince is commonly reputed not only the founder of the Engliſh monarchy, but likewiſe of the firſt Engliſh univerſity, Oxford, and of a more regular ſyſtem of legiſlation, into which was incorporated the meritorious cuſtoms and common law of the Saxons. Britain might then be compared to a ſhattered hulk in a tempeſtuous ocean, and had not time to repair its damages before another hurricane, ſtill more furious, was ready to overwhelm it.

In the ninth century ſwarms of Northern pirates from the borders of the Baltic, compoſed of Danes, Jutes, Norwegians, and Swedes, began to infeſt the coaſts of England, Ireland, and Normandy, which they long kept in terror and alarm. Egbert and his ſon twice defeated their grand army with prodigious ſlaughter. Alfred fought in one year eight battles with them, and in the courſe of his life, fifty-ſix land and naval actions. Throughout the ninth and tenth centuries theſe infernal confederates, in rapine and murder, made irruptions, with a numerous naval

naval and land force, by almoſt every river and creek between Northumberland and Cornwall. By inflexible perſeverance, and a continual ſucceſſion of re-inforcements, by treachery, diſunion, and faction among the Engliſh nobility, theſe vagrant robbers and fiends, theſe deſtructive peſts of ſcience, arts, and civilization, eſtabliſhed themſelves in England, and three Daniſh Kings ſucceſſively domineered over that turbulent monarchy.

It was the misfortune of England to become once more a prey to foreign invaders. About the middle of the eleventh century, Harold, by ſurprize, faction, and audacity, and without proximate pretenſions of birth, had ſeated himſelf on the Engliſh throne, and had, at the ſame time, to contend againſt a freſh irruption of barbarians from the Baltic, and againſt domeſtic inſurrections, when William, Duke of Normandy, laid claim to the Engliſh ſceptre. William was a deſcendant of thoſe Daniſh and Norwegian pirates, who, a century earlier, had ſpread themſelves over Normandy, and into the Mediterranean, as far as Naples and Sicily. Although of ſpurious and mean deſcent by his mother's ſide, William was related by blood to the legitimate Kings

Kings of England, and had been formally adopted, in preference to Harold, by Edward the Confeſſor, the great patron of the Normans. At this period theſe foreigners had attained to an exalted character in the Engliſh church and ſtate, and moſt of the biſhops were William's countrymen.

With theſe important advantages, and the Papal benediction, William embarked, in the autumnal and equinoctial ſeaſon, with a fleet of 3000 ſhips, and 60,000 diſciplined troops, the flower of all the warriors of the Continent, conducted by a martial nobility, incited by military emulation, and the ſtipulated ſpoils of England. A direct and ſhort voyage, of little more than twenty leagues, would convey them from the mouth of the Somme to the oppoſite coaſt of England. Without interruption in their paſſage, this formidable army landed, P. C. 1066, at Pevenſey, in Suſſex, in the vicinity of Haſtings, and a few miles to the north of Beachy-head. Immediately before their arrival, the Danes had been ſtirred up to annoy the north of England; they had debarked in the Humber, Harold had juſt defeated them, with great ſlaughter, when

news

news reached him at York of William's actual defcent in Suffex.

Errors, which in the ordinary occurrences of life admit of excufe and remedy, are in war frequently irreparable and fatal. Harold's plan of operations was rafh and injudicious in the extreme. His army was weakened by the recent encounter with the Danes, and by the difunion of its leaders; he, notwithftanding, rufhed, with headftrong impetuofity, to a general and decifive engagement with his rival; to an offenfive inftead of a defenfive war. After a long and defperate conflict, William's difcipline and generalfhip prevailed, and Harold, with almoft his whole army, were left amongft the flain. The theatre of this important action was about eight miles from the fhore, on the gentle declivity of a range of hills, now called Battle, and a fortnight after the arrival of the enemy, whofe lofs was eftimated at fifteen thoufand men. In reading with attention the difpofition of the two hoftile armies, the military critic will fee, that Harold oppofed the phalanx, hollow fquare, or parallellogram to the order of battle recommended by General Lloyd, which is exactly fimilar in every re-

ſpect to that adopted by the Norman Conqueror; and that the impetuoſity of the Engliſh in breaking their line, and falling into the ſnare of the enemy who counterfeited flight, was the primary cauſe of their overthrow. The ground was in their favour, and ſo was the battle for ſeveral hours.

William, though victorious was cautious in advancing to the metropolis: he judged it prudent to turn conſiderably aſide, to march along the coaſt, and to attack Dover, in order to ſecure a retreat in caſe of adverſity, together with a landing place and depôt for freſh ſupplies. It, indeed, contributed not a little to his future ſucceſs, that the ſtrong garriſon of this ancient key of England, and natural fortification, immediately ſurrendered. London, after a faint reſiſtance, followed the daſtardly example. But notwithſtanding this career of victory, the inhabitants of Kent continued intrepid and unſubdued. They briſtled in armour and defiance to oppoſe the uſurper, and unanimouſly gave him choice of immediate battle, or a compact and confirmation of being governed by their ancient laws. With theſe favourable terms the ſubtle tyrant was glad to feign compliance, and ſoon after,

by

by the influence of the clergy, and defection of their leaders, the whole nation peaceably acquiesced in the change of Kings. Indeed the Engliſh had been early accuſtomed to the depoſition and change of monarchs; and in many preceding and ſubſequent reigns the lineal ſucceſſion was trampled upon, and decided by the ſword.

Happily for Britain, this is the laſt ſucceſsful effort of foreign uſurpation. The maſk of moderation and juſtice was ſoon thrown aſide; and never was conqueſt more humiliating, nor King more abſolute, than this ſpurious Norman. With him the feudal ſyſtem was introduced, in tyrannic pomp; and the people became alternately oppreſſed with either monarchial or ariſtocratic tyranny: or with theſe double ſcourges of feudal juriſprudence. He degraded all the ancient nobility of England, and confiſcated their eſtates, in order to provide for his military followers. During ſeveral generations after him, no Briton nor Saxon was promoted to offices of rank or truſt. He laid waſte many towns and villages in Hampſhire, to make a foreſt for game and deer, which were guarded with diſtinct and ſanguinary laws; and the hunting

hunting and ſhooting of which was then the principal amuſement of an illiterate nobility. In the neighbourhood of this foreſt, Winchester had been the principal reſidence and alſo the mauſoleum of royalty, from the union of the Saxon heptarchy, until ſome reigns after the firſt Norman.

Throughout theſe four ſucceſſive conqueſts, the firſt and the laſt of which were one thouſand years diſtant from each other, we may remark, that the ſouth of Britain was uniformly the conteſted prize of the invaders; that the firſt deſcent of three of theſe aſſailants was either on the Kentiſh coaſt, or very near it; and that by the Danes both the channel and eaſt coaſt were expoſed to a wider ſcope of inſult and deſolation. It alſo appears in all thoſe invaſions and conqueſts, eſpecially of the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, that the ſurvivors of the native Britons of the ſouth were, without diſtinction of rank or ſex, deprived of liberty and property, degraded to the condition of ſlaves and cattle, and many of them expoſed for ſale. The faſtneſſes of Wales were the principal aſylums of the ſurviving wreck; and even at this day the deſcendants of thoſe Britons ſeem almoſt

a diſtinct

a diſtinct nation. Finally, that the indiſcreet expedient of bribing the Danes, with large ſums of money, to deſiſt from their depredations, had a contrary effect, and encouraged them to a renewal of ſimilar outrages.

France, during the ſame period, cannot boaſt of any pre-eminence over Britain, in her infant reſiſtance againſt foreign uſurpers. Her annals equally proclaim her involuntary ſubmiſſion and ſervitude to the Normans, and to the northern barbarians.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Engliſh Cruſades againſt France, and againſt the Infidels in Paleſtine. The Incorporation of Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, with the Engliſh Monarchy. Curſory reflections on the Political and Military State of England during the laſt 700 Years. Of the modern and remote Acquiſitions to the Britiſh Empire. The comparative Growth of France.

AFTER the Norman invaſion, a conſiderable portion of the ſeven following centuries of the Britiſh hiſtory, at leaſt ſo far as it relates to our ſubject, is filled up with a turbulent narrative of cruſades againſt France; with religious cruſades againſt the infidels in Paleſtine; with various acquiſitions of internal and external ſtrength; with domeſtic factions, plots, conſpiracies, and executions; with papal and clerical uſurpation, bigotry, and fanaticiſm; and from the rude ſtate of agriculture and medicine, with frequent viſitations of famine and peſtilence. The ſcourges of Aſia, Zingis, and Tamerlane, who triumphed during this period, did not extend

their

their ſavage hoſtilities to the weſtern nations of our hemiſphere.

In the Norman invaſion, and the unprofitable appendages in France thereby added to the Engliſh monarchy, we may trace the firſt ſeeds of thoſe fatal animoſities and bloody conteſts, which have continued to waſte their reſpective inhabitants and treaſures during a ſeries of ſeven hundred years. In Edward the Third's reign, and fourteenth century, theſe national prejudices and jealouſies were rekindled with freſh fuel and conflagration. From this reign down to the end of Henry the Fifth, who, and his ſon after him were crowned at Paris, the Engliſh continued throughout one entire century, to acquire the aſcendant, and to maintain their dominion over many provinces in France. It is alſo worthy of remark, that during this victorious career of England, when ſhe conquered many weſtern and ſouthern provinces in France, and held her principal ſea-ports on the channel coaſt, when Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, were amongſt the catalogue of her trophies, that ſhe was not only unſupported by Scotland, but had, at the ſame time, to defend herſelf againſt that brave northern neighbour, whoſe

imperious nobles were penſioners and partizans of France. England might then be ſaid to encounter France with her right hand, and Scotland with her left. Nor ſhould we diſguiſe that a ſimilar miſchievous policy of ſupporting adherents in France was ſucceſsfully practiſed and cheriſhed by the Engliſh monarchs.

After Henry the Fifth's brilliant reign, we may date the declenſion of the Engliſh power over France. This reverſe of fortune was not a little promoted by the latter declining to riſk any general action: a wiſe military maxim inculcated by dear bought experience, and which in the end preſerved them from ſubjection. About one century after, that is, about the middle of the ſixteenth, in Mary's odious reign, the ſurpriſe and capture of Calais compleatly emancipated France from the uſurpation of Britain, which ſhe had been compelled to ſubmit to during five hundred years. Calais, whoſe memorable ſiege, two hundred years before, had occupied Edward the Third eleven months, was now by ſtratagem taken in eight days. It had been an annual expence to the crown of 190001. which was then one-third of the charge of government in time of peace. It was of no uſe to the defence

defence of England, except perhaps as a military ſchool, and as a convenient door and acceſs into France; and probably Havre de Grace, at the mouth of the Seine, would have been a more important ſtation, to a maritime invader.

On the other hand we may remark, that there are few inſtances in this whole interval of five centuries, after the Norman invaſion, wherein the French ventured to ſet foot in England: one of theſe was by the expreſs invitation of the Engliſh nobles, and mandatory anathemas of the Pope, during the turbulent reign of John; another during the civil wars of Henry IV. when they plundered and burnt Plymouth; and in the next year landed 12,000 men at Milford Haven to aſſiſt the rebellion of Owen Glendour and the Welſh: in the weak calamitous reign of Henry the VI. they pillaged Sandwich: they renewed theſe tranſient inſults in the unfortunate reign of Edward VI. and once in an unſucceſsful expedition againſt the Iſle of Wight, in the reign of Henry VIII.

The Romans acted with far ſuperior policy and judgment to the Engliſh, in not ventur-

ing upon any foreign invaſion before they had reduced all Italy under their dominion. They ſpent five centuries of inceſſant domeſtic war in laying the foundations and platforms of their internal ſtrength and ſolidity, before they embarked in the conqueſt of the adjacent ſmall iſland of Sicily. England, on the contrary, was hurried, with premature and fruitleſs ambition, into wars againſt France, and into religious cruſades againſt the infidels of Paleſtine. In this epidemical fanaticiſm, our anceſtors acted a conſpicuous part, and ſome of our monarchs were at leaſt ſignalized for exploits of valour.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, two domeſtic acquiſitions, of immenſe moment in their future conſequences, were made to the Engliſh crown and ſtrength; and two centuries later, a third and precious diadem was added to theſe. The reader will perceive that I allude to *Ireland*, *Wales*, and *Scotland*.

The Iriſh, like the Engliſh, had ſmarted under the incurſion of the Northern pirates from the Baltic. After theſe, Henry II. 1172, was invited by ſome of the diſcontented princes

princes of Ireland to invade that iſland, which was then ſunk in extreme ignorance, and poverty, and diſtracted with public diſcord. Similar motives had induced the Engliſh to invite the Saxons into Britain; and in both inſtances the auxiliaries became maſters. There were then three principal ſovereignties in Ireland, beſides many ſmall independent ſtates, tribes, and clans, who, like all hords of barbarians, were conſtantly exerciſing rapine and violence againſt each other. In conſequence of theſe civil diſſentions, and probably an inferiority in military tacticks, Ireland ſeems to have ſubmitted almoſt without reſiſtance, to a handful of private adventurers from England. Dermot, King of Leinſter, gave his daughter in marriage to one of the leaders of this expedition; and his ſubmiſſion was ſoon after more generally acquieſced in, and voluntarily ratified to Henry in perſon, who, beſides the Engliſh monarchy, held extenſive, hereditary, and acquired poſſeſſions in France.

Edward the Firſt was aſſiſted by both the Iriſh and the Welſh in his conqueſt of Scotland; and Edward the Third had ſix thouſand Iriſh in his army at the battle of Crecy in

France. The vaſſalage, however, of Ireland to England was long merely nominal, and even unprofitable to the invaders. During five centuries after the 2d Henry, the Iriſh remained ſavage, untractable, and rebellious; and ſcarce a reign elapſed without an inſurrection in that iſland. In many of theſe inſtances, however, they were the ſtupid inſtruments and dupes of a faction in England. Hume obſerves, "that the horrible and abſurd "oppreſſions which the Iriſh ſuffered during "many centuries, under the Engliſh govern-"ment, had fired them with indignation and "the ſpirit of reſiſtance. From this ill-"judged policy, the natives were treated as "beaſts, and became ſuch. They were often "excluded from law, juſtice, and protection, "and joined the rancour of revenge to un-"tamed barbarity." Henry the Eighth, about three centuries ago, was the firſt who added the title of King of Ireland to the other Engliſh titles of ſovereignty. But it was not until the latter end of Elizabeth's reign, that this fertile iſland was reduced into legal ſubordination; nor until that of her ſucceſſor, James the Firſt, that it gave hopes of becoming an uſeful acquiſition to the Engliſh nation. Elizabeth founded a ſumptuous Univerſity at

at Dublin; and James the Firſt, with meritorious ſagacity, contributed to its civilization, by the introduction of Engliſh laws, agriculture, and arts, together with colonies of Proteſtant ſubjects from the ſouth and north of Britain.

The infamous confederacy of the natives in the maſſacre of forty thouſand of theſe coloniſts, during the civil wars of Charles the Firſt, originated from papal intrigues, bigotry, and oppreſſion, and their apprehenſions of total extermination. The Engliſh had been exaſperated, by cruel treatment, to act the ſame vindictive tragedy againſt both the Romans and the Danes. Afterwards, under the inſolent uſurper, Cromwell, moſt of their lands were wantonly confiſcated out to thoſe Engliſh, who had advanced money to his parliament, ſome amongſt his ſoldiers in lieu of arrears, and ſome ſold to the rich corporation of London. In truth, until the preſent century, Ireland, was governed by a ſpirit of rank folly, arrogance, and tyranny, to which nations, as well as individuals, are too prone. It was a leaky ſhip, an ignorant crew, and ſteered by unſkilful pilots. In the wild projects and prejudices of the Engliſh

monarchs for conquering France, they neglected infinitely more ufeful occupations of domeſtic union, induſtry, and improvement. The ſame error or infatuation has continued in ſubſtance though not in form, down to the preſent day, to infect the Britiſh cabinet; and is one, amongſt many other proofs, that habit, more than reaſon, governs mankind and ſtateſmen.

Wales until the firſt Edward's reign, had been, in a great meaſure, defended by its innacceſſible mountains and defiles againſt the Saxon, Daniſh, and Norman invaders. It had, throughout many ages, remained a diſtinct and independent principality of the ancient Britons, and had frequently moleſted the Engliſh borders with predatory incurſions. But after various repetitions of reſtive homage, and ineffectual ſtruggles againſt Edward the Firſt, it was finally incorporated, 1272, with the Engliſh monarchy, accepting as its nominal prince, the heir apparent to the Engliſh throne.

The Scotch hiſtory is a doleful repetition of predatory warfare and domeſtic faction. Throughout almoſt every reign, from the Norman

Norman invaſion to the ſixteenth century, the Scotch had infeſted the Engliſh frontiers with rapine and devaſtation. The Northern and Southern inhabitants of the ſame iſland were inceſſantly occupied, like ferocious ſavages, in tearing each other to pieces. They might be compared to two nations of rival gladiators, who made fighting their amuſement and trade. The Scotch King and Parliament, as well as the Iriſh Chieftains, had been forced to do homage to Henry the Second. In the thirteenth century, Edward the Firſt again reduced Scotland under the Engliſh ſubjection; and it was re-conquered by Edward the Third: but in all theſe inſtances, it found means ſoon after to revolt, and to ſhake off the yoke. Scotland, in its reſiſtance againſt Engliſh encroachments, had pre-eminent advantages over Ireland, by being combined into one monarchy; and afterwards in being aſſiſted by France, with whom ſhe was long united in an offenſive and defenſive league. Without this extraneous aſſiſtance, Scotland could never have ſo long maintained her barbarous independence againſt her more powerful neighbour. After Edward the Firſt's encroachments, a war with France generally

generally produced hoſtilities with Scotland, and invaſion of the Engliſh frontiers.

So late as Elizabeth's reign, in the ſixteenth century, the Scotch had very little to boaſt of their attainments in law or order, in arts or commerce. Their ruling conſtitution conſiſted, in fact, of an ignorant and turbulent ariſtocracy, and belligerent clans of ſubmiſſive vaſſals. It was, ſays Hume, of little conſequence to them how their laws were framed, while their exorbitant ariſtocracy had it ſo much in their power to prevent their execution. The beginning of the ſeventeenth century, when the union of the crowns of Scotland and England commenced, in the perſon of James the Firſt, forms a moſt important and happy epoch to all the inhabitants of this iſland. It was indeed time for thoſe ſhocking ſcenes, which pollute every page of Britiſh hiſtory, to terminate; thoſe bloody encounters by which more than one million of lives were ſacrificed in battle. The union of the two Parliaments, at the beginning of the preſent century under Queen Anne, drew into a focus the united ſtrength and reſources of the whole iſland. Until this complete aſſimilation and coaleſcence

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with England, the government of Scotland had, from the beginning, been expoſed to inceſſant ſedition and convulſion; and after groaning for ages under a factious nobility, it was, in the laſt century, infected and debaſed by a diſmal fanaticiſm.

Let us next ſurvey, with equal brevity, the political and military ſtate of England during this period. Some reigns after the Norman invaſion, the kings of England were more abſolute than thoſe of France, who were kept in ſubjection by a powerful and mutinous ariſtocracy: but in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the regal ſcale ſunk in England, and ariſtocracy reached its ſummit. The confederacy of a few powerful barons was then capable of ſhaking and overturning the throne. Between theſe conteſts of king and barons, and of pope and clergy, England was long agitated, and plunged headlong from the extremities of one faction into another. The feudal ſyſtem was every where productive of diſcord and civil war. The great Charter, extorted from John in the thirteenth century, and other old ſtatutes and privileges were all ſufficiently clear in favour of liberty, but they were inceſſantly violated.

violated. Voltaire, however ironically, might with truth ſay that ſome centuries of the Britiſh hiſtory ſhould be written by the hangman. It is notorious, that in the contentions for the throne, between the York and Lancaſter factions, the greateſt part of the ancient nobility were exterminated in the field, or on ſcaffolds. Theſe long and bloody wars, which continued throughout ſix reigns, from Henry IV. to Henry VII. were at length healed up by the union of the contending families. But other diſguſting ſcenes of domeſtic calamity were impending.

During the Saxon Heptarchy, the Chriſtian ſyſtem of religion which had been firſt imported into England, by the Romans, was again eſtabliſhed, and had ſupplanted the groſs idolatry of the Saxon oracle Woden. After the Norman invaſion, England was, for many centuries, the moſt ſuperſtitious of all the remote provinces under the papal hierarchy. Cruſades, and intrigues with the court of Rome, continued throughout many ages the principal occupation and policy of our own and of all the other European courts. But, about four hundred years ago, Wickliffe, an Oxford prieſt, the parent of the Lollard

Lollard ſect, ſounded the alarm of clerical impoſture, profligacy, and uſurpation. This reprehenſion of papal arrogance and rapacity, both in theory and practice, was revived with more aſperity by Luther and Calvin; and ſoon after the diſmemberment of the Engliſh church and nation from the papal yoke was effected under a bigotted and tyrannic monarch Henry VIII. By this great event, by the revival and diffuſion of literature, and above all by the important invention of printing, a general ſpirit of reſiſtance and reformation, both civil and religious, was excited throughout England.

The religious caſuiſtry and factions, to which this innovation gave birth, continued to ferment during ſeveral generations, and to produce ſad ſpectacles of fanaticiſm and animoſity. The infernal plot in James the Firſt's reign, to blow up the king and parliament with gunpowder, is one amongſt many other inſtances of this miſchievous frenzy. Puritanical fanaticiſm, the oppoſite extreme, which, in Cromwell's time, had caſt a diſmal ſhade over the nation, on the Reſtoration of Monarchy fell into diſcredit. But the Calviniſt and other Proteſtant ſectaries, however ridi-

culous

culous and diſguſting in their manners at that period; have the merit of kindling the firſt ſparks of liberty againſt the exorbitant prerogatives of Monarchy. A conſiderable part of the ſeventeenth century, from Charles the Firſt to the Revolution, is ſtained with civil wars between prerogative and privilege, whoſe ravages were ſpread throughout Britain and Ireland.

The era of the external and remote additions to the Britiſh empire are poſterior to the diſcovery of the loadſtone and mariner's compaſs, of America, and of the paſſage to Aſia by the Cape of Good Hope, the two laſt of which are not far ſhort of three hundred years. Theſe diſcoveries uſhered Britain and France into a variety of remote and expenſive poſſeſſions in both theſe hemiſpheres; and form a new epoch in navigation and naval hiſtory. So early as James the Firſt's reign, colonies from Britain began to be ſettled in the continent of America, and in the iſland of Barbadoes: and during the civil wars of Charles the Firſt, New England and Maryland received Britiſh coloniſts from the wrangling ſectaries of Proteſtants and Catholics. During the uſurpation of Cromwell, Jamaica was wreſted from Spain;

and

and in the beginning of the preſent century Gibraltar. Although an Engliſh commercial company had traded to India from the beginning of the ſeventeenth century, yet the principal part of the vaſt dominions of Britain in Hindooſtan was acquired during the preſent century, and even in the preſent generation.

In the courſe of the laſt few years, an erroneous ſyſtem of policy, and the natural cravings of independence, have, with the aſſiſtance of France, ſevered the greateſt part of her tranſatlantic empire from Britain. In conſequence of this diſaſter, I leave it to others to decide, whether, in ſtating the balance of emigration, of waſte of men and treaſure by reiterated wars, of the galling load of taxes, of the neglect of domeſtic improvement for foreign colonization and commerce, Great Britain is, upon the whole, a gainer or loſer by her rapacioufneſs of dominion in the Weſtern hemiſphere; eſpecially of dominion on the continent of North America. I feel equal diffidence and averſion to hazard any predictions on the fate and duration of her Aſiatic empire in Hindooſtan. I do not recollect that Athens was long enriched by her diſtant colonies; and many reaſons induce me

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to think, that they ſhould be conſidered not as principal, but as ſubordinate pillars in the architecture of the Britiſh empire. Spain, with the moſt precious poſſeſſions of the new world, has from that epoch been verging towards decay. The Romans in the decline of their domination, inſtructed their barbarian auxiliaries and vaſſals to contend too ſucceſsfully with their military preceptors: and it is an axiom, that the increaſing circle of conqueſt embroils ſuch nations in a larger ſphere of hoſtilities. Legiſlators ſhould extend their views to theſe natural conſequences, to diſtant ages of futurity, and infinitely beyond the contracted ſpan of the human generation.

France, during the period now under review, kept pace with, or rather out-ſtripped England in acquiſitions of internal ſtrength and ſolidity. By conſent, force, or fraud, ſhe added a number of large provinces, excluſive of thoſe wreſted from the Engliſh, to all ſides of her vaſt empire. At the ſame time, by the humiliation of her mutinous and overgrown vaſſals, her monarchy became infinitely more compact, formidable, and vigorous. Spain, by its ſudden and immenſe aggrandizement in Europe and in America,

between

between two and three centuries ago, although a more diſtant power, became the chief object of jealouſy to the Engliſh. This coloſſus of empire had ſo far intoxicated their haughty monarch, as to prompt him to an invaſion of England; and, with the deluſive hopes of its eaſy conqueſt, Spain became a ſacrifice to her own ambition. Theſe apprehenſions of Spaniſh greatneſs had ſtifled and ſuſpended, during one century, the ancient animoſities between England and France, until the towering grandeur and ambition of Lewis the Fourteenth again revived thoſe deep-rooted jealouſies, and filled not only England, but Europe with alarm. In the beginning of his reign, France had attained to its higheſt pinnacle of exaltation ſince the era of Charlemagne. This imperious career was, however, checked at ſea by the Britiſh navy; and on land by Marlborough and Eugene.

I am willing to indulge the pleaſing hope, that many ages will yet elapſe before it can with truth be ſaid that Great Britain has paſſed her meridian: or that ſhe will ever be degraded to the ignominy of ſubmitting to terms dictated by France. But ſhould ſuch an awful event ever occur, I truſt that the miniſters

who are guilty of proſtituting the public character, honour, and intereſt of this renowned nation, and of miſmanaging its reſources, will expiate their crimes on a ſcaffold, and that their names will be conſigned to the records of infamy. I agree with an aphoriſm of General Lloyd, " That in wars, campaigns, and " battles, *in general*, few or no enterprizes " fail but by ſome errors which might have " been foreſeen, and conſequently avoided." Ignorance and miſcarriage attempt to find ſome ſupernatural excuſe in chance or providence.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

A Chronological Sketch of the Navy, Militia, Army, Fortreſſes, and Marine Arſenals of Great Britain.

AT the Roman invaſion, the ſhips of the Britains were little ſuperior to the canoes of the modern ſavages of America, and far inferior to thoſe of the new diſcovered iſlands in the Pacific. Their foreign commerce from Cornwall had been carried on for centuries in Phœnician and Greek ſhips, and their voyages acroſs the ſtraits of the channels to Gaul and Ireland, did not require extraordinary dexterity in ſhipbuilding or navigation. After the departure of the Roman legions and navy, and the union of the heptarchy, neceſſity, ſelf defence, the example and terror of the the Baltic pirates, would prompt the poſſeſſors of England to exert their ſtrength on ſea as well as on land. Even in the earlieſt period the Britons had demonſtration of the ſuperiority of a naval force in protecting their independence. This was the ſucceſsful revolt of Carauſius the Roman

admiral in the Britiſh channel, who for ten years braved all the power and reſentment of that mighty ſtate, and during that interval, ſevered this iſland from their dominion, notwithſtanding their poſſeſſion of Gaul, and all the other countries ſouth of the Rhine.

Alfred, a wiſe and patriotic monarch, was vigilant to provide, againſt the Northern pirates, a reſpectable naval force, the natural defence of every iſland. He increaſed the ſhipping of the kingdom, both in number and ſize, and trained his people in the practice of navigation and naval evolutions. By theſe precautions the Danes were often intimidated, defeated, or intercepted in their predatory retreats. Athelſtan purſued the example of his illuſtrious grandfather, and enacted the following law, for the encouragement of navigation and commerce: "That any merchant, "who made three diſtant voyages to the Me-"diterranean or Baltic, with a ſhip and cargo "of his own, ſhould be advanced to the rank "of a Thane," or Earl. Edgar, *ſtiled the honour and delight of the Britiſh nation*, was alſo particularly attentive to maritime affairs. In the courſe of his flouriſhing reign, he built and maintained a reſpectable navy, which was divided

divided into three ſquadrons, and by that diſpoſition, effectually ſecured the coaſts and commerce on the three ſides of England, from piratical inſults. It is recorded by ſome of our hiſtorians, that Earl Goodwin preſented to Hardicanute, the laſt of the Daniſh Kings, a ſhip richly gilt, and manned with eighty mariners in handſome uniforms.

During many centuries after the Norman invaſion, England ſeems to have been ſuperior, both on ſea and land, to France. In John's reign, and thirteenth century, the Engliſh engaged the French fleet on the coaſt of Flanders, taking and deſtroying four hundred of their ſhips, and the remainder were burnt to prevent their capture. By this deciſive blow they put an end to an intended invaſion. In the ſame century, in the reigns of Henry the Third, and of Edward the Firſt, the French were twice defeated in the channel by the Engliſh. In the fourteenth century, the moſt brilliant ſea victory that this iſland can boaſt of, was gained by Edward the Third on the coaſt of Flanders; in which, according to ſome writers, thirty thouſand French were killed and drowned, and two hundred and thirty ſhips captured. Two naval vic-

tories were gained over the combined fleets of France and Genoa, in Henry the Fifth's reign, who had three large ſhips his own property. Many centuries, however, after the Norman invaſion, moſt of the Kings of England hired and preſſed ſhips, on emergencies, from the merchants, and with theſe they engaged the French. Some were alſo furniſhed by the Cinque Ports of Kent and Suſſex, as a kind of naval militia. Theſe amounted to fifty-five, and the complement of each was between twenty and forty ſailors. Edward the Third's army was conveyed to France in 1200 ſhips. Henry the Seventh expended 14000l. on one ſhip, the largeſt that had been launched from the Engliſh docks. It was in the firſt Edward's reign, that the *Society of Merchant Adventurers* was inſtituted, for the double purpoſe of exporting woollen cloths to Antwerp, and increaſing the marine. But two centuries after, ſo late as Henry the Eighth's reign, the foreign commerce of England was confined principally to Flanders, where their woollen goods were dyed; and which then greatly excelled our iſland in mechanical arts, commerce, and navigation.

That

That patriotic Queen, Elizabeth, encouraged the Engliſh merchants to build ſhips for commerce, and to depend leſs for freight in foreign bottoms, and foreigners; who, for many centuries, had engroſſed a conſiderable ſhare of the mercantile tranſactions of this iſland. At the period of the formidable invaſion, during her reign, the Engliſh were far inferior to the Spaniards, both in number and ſize of ſhips. All the ſailors in England amounted then to about fourteen thouſand, the royal navy to twenty-eight ſail, and few of theſe exceeded the bulk of our largeſt frigates. The merchant veſſels were all of ſmall ſize; the largeſt of which, in caſes of emergency, were converted into ſhips of war. To repel the invaſion of this boaſted armada, the metropolis, the ſea ports, the nobility and gentry, all fitted out ſhips at their own expence: London alone equipped thirty. Two thirds of the commerce of England, then centered in London, and was in the hands of a few merchants. The largeſt ſhip that had ever came from the Engliſh docks was built in James the Firſt's reign. She was 1400 tons, and carried 64 guns. The Engliſh had

then become celebrated in ſhip-building, and in the foundery of iron cannon.

During the uſurpation of Cromwell, the Engliſh navy began to aſſume a formidable aſcendant. The act of navigation, enacted, or rather revived and improved at that period, was a wiſe regulation for the increaſe of Britiſh commerce and ſailors. This and the vaſt increaſe of the coal trade from Newcaſtle to London, which commenced in the thirteenth century, made important additions to the naval reſources of our iſland. Under the banners of the common-wealth, and alſo, in Charles the Second's reign,. a multitude of deſperate battles were fought in the narrow ſeas, between the Engliſh, Dutch, and French. At the Revolution, and towards the end of the laſt century, the Britiſh navy amounted to 133 ſhips, of all ſizes, and required forty thouſand men to man them. During the preſent century, the Britiſh navy has been augmented, both in number and in ſize, to a tremendous catalogue; to between four and five hundred ſail, which, in extraordinary danger, they are able to man with one hundred thouſand ſeamen and marines. This navy, throughout the laſt

laſt ninety years, has, in moſt inſtances, carried the flag of Britain triumphant over France; and ſometimes over France and Spain united. It is by this Navy alone, like the golden chain of Jove, that the remote ſatellites of Britain can be held ſuſpended to its centre. Had our miniſters kept this maxim conſtantly before their eyes, and not acted like blindfolded Gladiators, North America would probably at this hour, and in ſpite of France, have continued a member of the Britiſh empire.

The Militia and Army are the next objects of comparative gradation to the navy. In the rude and uncultivated ſtate of ſociety and nations, every man, on the alarm of danger, is a ſoldier; and the firſt honours are decreed to him who excels in military courage or conduct. "Amongſt nations of hunters, the loweſt and rudeſt ſtate of ſociety, ſuch as we find it amongſt the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior as well as hunter. Amongſt nations of ſhepherds, a more advanced ſtate of ſociety, ſuch as we find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every male is in the ſame manner a warrior." On the arrival of the Romans, the Britons had

not

not emerged from this firſt ſtage of ſocial barbariſm. But in a ſtate of civilization and refinement, arts, ſciences, and occupations are immenſely multiplied; the duty of war is delegated into the hands of a few; and the number of thoſe who can go to war in proportion to the whole number of the people, is neceſſarily much ſmaller than in a rude ſtate of ſociety. In ancient Egypt, the military claſs was diſtinct and hereditary; it is ſo at this day in Hindooſtan.

The Roman legions in Britain conſiſted principally of foreigners, and the natives were drafted to recruit their armies in different parts of the Continent. Amongſt the Anglo Saxons all the freemen and proprietors of land, the clergy excepted, were trained to the uſe of arms, and were always prepared for war. The good and wiſe Alfred, after repelling the Danes, took care that all the nation, capable of bearing arms, ſhould be regiſtered and formed into militia, who had a regular routine of duty, and who were an excellent ſecurity on land, againſt the deſcent of the Northern pirates. During the feudal ſyſtem, land armies were ſuddenly raiſed and maintained by the military vaſſals; and often

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as ſuddenly diſbanded. In Henry the Second's reign all able houſeholders, and others, of ſufficient property, were obliged to put themſelves in military array, and to be provided with a ſuit of armour, and military weapons, for the defence of the kingdom. Henry the Fifth, before he embarked in hoſtilities againſt France, empowered commiſſioners to take a review of all the freemen in each county capable of ſervice, to divide them into companies, and to keep them in readineſs for reſiſting an invaſion. In Henry the Eighth's reign, the free inhabitants throughout the kingdom were obliged to provide themſelves with bows and arrows, pikes and halberts, armour and harneſs, and were frequently muſtered. In the ſame reign ſome laws were alſo enacted, and revived for the encouragement of *archery*. That execrable bigot Mary, determined to diſable the nation from reſiſtance, by ordering general muſters of the militia, and directing her commiſſioners to ſeize their arms, and to depoſit them in forts and caſtles. But in Elizabeth's reign there were frequent reviews of the militia. The city of London alone then muſtered fifteen thouſand militia and artillery, which were much patronized and reſpected by Henry

the

the Eighth, and by his daughter Elizabeth. In James the Firſt's reign, the militia of this iſland amounted to one hundred and ſixty thouſand. The trained bands of London were then as reſpectable as they are now contemptible and uſeleſs. In Charles the Second's reign, a formidable and diſciplined militia were eſtabliſhed in both iſlands: Scotland and Ireland had each twenty thouſand. During the preſent century, neither Scotland nor Ireland have had any regular militia: but within the preſent generation, the militia of England have been new modelled and improved. A finer and more athletic body of ſoldiers, nor a more reſpectable corps of officers cannot be found thoughout Europe. The principal defect now is, that inſtead of thirty, the whole iſland ſhould, *in war*, muſter ſixty thouſand militia.

It has been alledged by ſome writers, not ſufficiently informed, that no veſtiges of a ſtanding army can be traced in England before the era of Henry the Seventh; but the foreign conquerors are an exception to this ſtatement. The Romans kept a ſtanding army of between twenty and thirty thouſand men in Britain upwards of three centuries. In ſeveral in-

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ſtances alſo, the Saxons and Danes were hired for the purpoſes of plunder or butchery; and before the Norman invaſion, ſome Daniſh troops were maintained, as a ſpecies of ſtanding army, and as body guards to their kings. After the Norman invaſion, Henry the Second, introduced a practice of making a commutation of the baron's feudal ſervice for money, and enliſted, during a ſtated contract, ſome of thoſe diſciplined adventurers, and predatory vagabonds, with which Europe ſwarmed. Afterwards, in Edward the Firſt's reign, it was cuſtomary with him, and ſome other ſovereigns of Europe, during actual hoſtilities, to commute the perſonal feudal ſervice for money, and with this to enliſt troops.

Henry the Seventh is the firſt who maintained, during peace, one hundred yeomen as the royal guard of his perſon and palace, who were all expert *archers*; but in whom, at preſent, it would be difficult to diſcover any other qualification, except ſize. Charles the Firſt maintained a ſmall ſtanding army in Ireland; and during the hurricane of civil war between him and the parliament, troops were enliſted on both ſides. Under Cromwell's commonwealth, a large ſtanding army amounting

amounting to upwards of fifty thouſand men, were kept up in Britain and Ireland. On the Reſtoration, Charles the Second was permitted to retain only a ſmall ſtanding army of five thouſand men in Britain, and ten thouſand in Ireland; and this is uſually called the epoch of the firſt regular ſtanding army during peace, under the Britiſh monarchy. When the Prince of Orange, afterwards William the Third, landed in England, James the Second had thirty thouſand regular troops on foot to oppoſe him, and the projected reformation in government. After the Revolution it is notorious, that William was ambitious to exceſs of military fame, and of being at the head of armies on the Continent. From that period, and throughout the preſent century, Britain has been involved in a labyrinth of Continental quarrels; in fruitleſs military parade and extravagance. The ſcene has been merely ſhifted from France to Flanders, and Germany, where three long and expenſive wars have ſucceeded each other, by which, and the late American war, the nation was reduced to the brink of bankruptcy. The conſequences muſt be dreadful and fatal, if our ſtate pilots do not yet ſee the impolicy and folly of either rivalling or imitating

tating the Continental powers in ſtanding armies of land forces. Let our ſtateſmen take the illuſtrious Alfred for their model, and they never can err. Let them read Hiſtory and they muſt admit that all the attempts of England againſt the frontier of France on the ſide of Flanders, from the days of Edward the Third to the prêſent moment, have been as unſucceſsful in the end as they were ruinous in the expence. Edward and Henry's ſucceſsful plans and line of operation was on the ſide of Normandy and Brittany, and which ultimately gave the former the poſſeſſion of Calais.

Laſtly, I cannot ſuppreſs my doubts reſpecting the propriety and policy of the preſent Britiſh mode of enliſtment for life, inſtead of a limited period of ſervice; (ſeven years) at the expiration of which, war alone ſhould poſtpone the ſoldier's diſcharge if demanded by him.

The continent of Europe is now crowded with innumerable ſtrong and expenſive Fortifications. Mankind, like animals of prey, are conſtantly on the watch, and guarding againſt the rapacity of each other. Happily for Britain, and for all other iſlands of ſufficient

ficient magnitude and population, they do not ſtand in need of ſuch an extravagant circumvallation of artificial ramparts and ditches. There are very few places in Britain wherein it is neceſſary to erect expenſive monuments on the modern ſyſtems of Vauban and Cohorn.

We have already obſerved, that on the arrival of the Romans, the Britons were collected into foreſts, and their congregation of huts ſecured with ramparts and ditches; and that London, St. Albans, and Malden were three of their principal cities. During the reſidence of the Romans, the natives could not fail to learn ſome of their ſyſtem of tacticks, architecture, and fortification, many ruins of which remain at this day; and an infinitely greater number were wantonly laid in aſhes by the illiterate barbarians from Germany and the Baltic. After the Norman conqueſt, William and his barons were anxious to ſecure their ſpoils by a multitude of forts and caſtles. In Henry the Second's reign, the ſtately Gothic caſtles of the king and barons had multiplied to upwards of eleven hundred; many of which were filled with troops of licenſed robbers, and a banditti of

diſſolute

diſſolute vaſſals. The Tower of London, built or perhaps rebuilt by William Rufus, and Dover Caſtle, then enlarged, was long conſidered as two of the moſt important fortreſſes in England. Within the laſt three centuries, Portſmouth and Plymouth have, in ſucceſſive reigns, received important additions to their docks and fortifications. Cromwell erected a chain of Forts in Scotland to curb the inhabitants, which were afterwards demoliſhed; and ſome towards the Northern extremity have ſince been added. Indeed moſt of the fortreſſes in Scotland and Ireland are not calculated to reſiſt a foreign enemy or invaſion; and at preſent it would be folly and inſanity to cover a whole kingdom with fortifications, which can be protected with far more effect, and infinitely leſs expence, by ſhips.

The Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland will not diſcharge their duty to the publick, if they longer poſtpone a critical ſurvey and report of the great and ſmall Forts in both iſlands. Let thoſe that are judged indiſpenſibly neceſſary to repel invaſion or depredation be repaired or rebuilt; and let the penſions and ſinecures attached to thoſe of a contrary de-

ſcription be aboliſhed, or converted to ſome better uſe. On the fortifications and harbours, between Portſmouth and Harwich, I ſhall ſoon have an opportunity to animadvert; and alſo on the barracks now erecting throughout this iſland. At preſent, I ſhall ſimply tranſcribe a well known ſtate aphoriſm; "That the moſt effectual way to pre-
" ſerve peace is by a conſtant preparation for
" war."

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the preſent relative, and abſolute Force of Great Britain and France, reſpecting Invaſion and Defence. Various Improvements ſuggeſted.

IT is only within theſe few centuries that the modern nations of Europe have taken their political rank and ſtation, and have emerged from ruſticity and barbariſm. But the comparative ſcale and barometer are varying every generation. Nations and empires, like the human race, are a moving picture, and in perpetual fluctuation. The modern free cities on the Baltic, German Ocean, and Rhine, as well as Venice, Genoa, Portugal and Spain all preceded Britain and France in maritime renown. Somewhat more than one hundred years ago, in the minority of Lewis the 14th, the naval force of France was far inferior to that of England. But during a few years only of that reign, a patriotic miniſter raiſed France to be one of the firſt maritime powers in Europe, at leaſt in force, though perhaps not in reſources; and on land

it was ſuperior in numbers to every other. The Engliſh and Dutch in their different alliances at that period with the French, had taught them naval evolutions and tacticks; and the profligacy of that agreeable, but inglorious monarch Charles the Second, gave them many advantages of maritime aggrandizement.

Since the beginning of the preſent century, not only the external, but alſo the internal ſtrength of Britain had, until lately, prodigiouſly increaſed. The jarring intereſts, prejudices, and jealouſies of both iſlands, together with their civil and religious diſſentions have been gradually ſubſiding, an event in which all ſhould equally rejoice. For it is not improbable, had not England, Scotland, and Ireland been united under one crown, and incorporated into one compact government, one people, and one intereſt, that, ſooner or later, they might have ſhared the fate of the Greek republicks. Some enterprizing ſtate of the Continent, like the crafty Macedonian, would not have failed to take advantage of their civil diſſentions and weakneſs, and in the end, would have cruſhed them into tributary provinces. Such fortunate union of

government

government and intereſt, authorizes me, in contradiction to the lofty inſinuation of French rhetoricians, " that Britain and Ireland retain " their liberty, property, and political rank, " at the diſcretion and forbearance of France," to ſay, that the Britiſh empire is not inferior to France in abſolute, and is ſuperior in relative ſtrength. At the ſame time we admit, that by the late violent diſmemberment of North America, and more eſpecially by the conſequent load of national debt, Great Britain has been hurled from a ſummit of power, magnificence, and ſtrength.

If France, merely from the impolicy, negligence, and ignorance of our Legiſlators, has double the population of Great Britain and Ireland, the latter have more than treble the extent of ſea coaſt and harbours, a circumſtance ſo tranſcendently eſſential to maritime ſuperiority. Great Britain and Ireland, in point of ſituation, have ſome prominent advantages, as durable as the globe, and of which no human power or malevolence can deprive them. An iſland in war has the advantage over a continent. The firſt has but a ſmall extent, and a few ſpecific points to defend, and is acceſſible but by one draw-

bridge, a navy; whereas France has ſeveral avenues by which an enemy could enter, and an extenſive line of fortreſſes to garriſon: more than one half its circumference is a land frontier. As to this menaced invaſion, which is to put an end to our exiſtence, it would puzzle the projector to ſatisfy his ſober readers, how that is to take place, before the Britiſh fleet is defeated. How are thoſe French grenadiers to be exported hither; by wings, balloons, or cork jackets? Is France ſuperior in ſhips, or in ſailors? The heroic writer ſhould know, that it is an axiom of Great Britain, and deeply engraved on the heart of every inhabitant, never to deſert the dominion of the channel, nor to drop the trident, until ſhe has encountered a ſeries of naval ſhocks and diſaſters, and is driven from the laſt plank. The hiſtory of Athens under Themiſtocles, furniſhes her with a conſpicuous precedent of the inefficacy of the moſt formidable invaſion on record, when diſabled by defeat at ſea: and the Britiſh hiſtory furniſhes many more of a ſimilar tendency. Every man and boy capable of handing an oar and a rope would be forced to lend his aſſiſtance. The extra ſailors employed in commerce, fiſheries, coal trade, packets, ferries, and the Eaſt India Company's ſhips and offi-

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cers would make a formidable augmentation to the marine.

Great Britain and Ireland not only outſtrip France, on the true element of dominion, in maritime ſtrength and numbers, but they can even bring as many fighting men into the field as France can ſpare to invade them. Amongſt the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed that no more than one hundredth part of the inhabitants (including all ages and ſexes) can be employed as ſoldiers by profeſſion, without ruin to the community which pays the expence of their ſervice. France cannot poſſibly raiſe during war above 300,000 land forces; at leaſt ſhe cannot, for any conſiderable time, maintain more without crippling her marine. One third of theſe, however, are indiſpenſable, merely for ſtationary guards of her frontiers, and foreign poſſeſſions. Her offenſive land army, therefore, cannot, at the extremity, exceed 100,000. Let us ſee what our two iſlands have to oppoſe this invading force.

If the Northern part of our iſland was to raiſe a militia in proportion to that maintained by the South part, which is both rea-

ſonable and equitable, then the united militia of Great Britain might, with very little additional difficulty, be augmented to 60, or, during an actual invaſion, and inferiority at ſea, to 100,000 athletic men. It was by a feudal militia that England gained moſt of her victories and conqueſts in France. The legionary ſoldiers of Rome, during many centuries, conſiſted of militia; and at this day the Swiſs and Pruſſian armies are a mixture of militia. The metropolis, and the riches on the Thames, would be far more effectually ſecured againſt foreign or domeſtic depredation, by ſubſtituting ten thouſand periodical militia, in lieu of the preſent rabble of trained bands and night watch. Great Britain can alſo, in a ſhort time, make a ſufficient augmentation to her regular forces in both iſlands, to her artillery, infantry, and cavalry. Ireland with eaſe could, and ſhould be encouraged, in peace as well as in war, to raiſe a militia, in the proportion of one third to that of Great Britain. Her patriotic army of diſciplined volunteers would then be ſuperfluous, except in very extraordinary emergencies*. The two iſlands

* The Editor has the ſatisfaction to add, that ſince the publication of the preceding Edition of this work, a Militia

iſlands are ſo happily ſituated, that they could not be prevented, by any foreign foe, from mutually co-operating with, and aſſiſting each other, according to the exigency, and the movements of the invader. By Wales, and by Scotland, there are a variety of ſhort, and eaſy channels of communication. Even Plymouth is but thirty leagues from Cork: Breſt is one hundred.

Marſhal Saxe, G——l L——d, and the beſt modern writers agree that 50,000 men are ſufficient to decide the fate of any battle on land. Indeed there are few places in England where ſo many troops on each ſide could be brought into action: ranged in line, with proper intervals, they would extend above ſix miles. Beſides, an army acting on the defenſive, and in their own country, particularly if that country is full of defiles and paſſes, is equal to double or treble the number of aſſailants. The former having the choice of ground, could to its natural ſtrength add artificial; in other parts they are defended by regular fortifications, and have the collateral aſſiſtance of

litia of 16,000 men has been eſtabliſhed in Ireland, and an eſtabliſhment of the ſame kind is in agitation for Scotland.

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an armed nation. If the French, as their volunteer herald, Mr. Dupont, ſeems to threaten, ſhould come over with all the pomp and number of Xerxes, and with all the fanaticiſm of Cruſaders, in all probability they muſt ſpeedily return, if they can, or periſh by famine, diſeaſe and the ſword. In truth, conqueſt is neither a neceſſary conſequence of ſuperior number, nor of revenue. If ſuch was the inevitable reſult, Greece ſhould have been but a morſel to Xerxes, and China ſhould be able to ſwallow up Europe.

Nor is this one half of the effective force with which Great Britain and Ireland could burſt indignant upon their invaders. A large auxiliary reſerve of militia or volunteers might be conveniently diſciplined throughout all the cities and towns of Britain and Ireland, to ſupply the emergencies of the field. It is alſo acknowledged that no nation in Europe has the materials of an equeſtrian force, equally numerous and formidable. The natives are half trained to horſemanſhip; and all the eſſentials of the equeſtrian exerciſe can be acquired in three months, without much trouble or expence. Indeed it would be rather an agreeable and manly amuſement, and a meritorious

ritorious revival of the ancient tournaments. Volunteer aſſociations of the above deſcription could not fail to call forth a tremendous ſtrength againſt invaders. Should they land near Cornwall, that county boaſts of a hardy and rugged race of 80,000 tin miners. Are our enemies aware what ſtrenuous efforts could be made by rich companies, corporations, cities, and individuals, to aſſiſt their country both by ſea and land; that theſe alone are capable of equipping and maintaining a powerful navy and militia? A free and brave nation, like an individual rouſed into indignation, is capable of the moſt deſperate acts, eſpecially when contending "pro aris & focis," and would either prove victorious, or bury themſelves in the ruins. Thoſe noblemen and gentlemen of property, who conducted themſelves with kindneſs and friendſhip towards their tenants and domeſticks, might then depend on their gratitude and zeal.

As it would be incumbent on Great Britain, in ſuch a criſis of her empire, to exert every ſinew, and nerve of ſtrength, it may not be improper to point out another eaſy method of rendering her much more formidable on land. For a defenſive war of poſts, he who

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can expeditiouſly load, fire, and hit his mark, is an excellent ſoldier. What a formidable corps might be collected from the gamekeepers and other deadly markſmen throughout this iſland, to act as chaſſeurs on horſeback and on foot? The rifle gun and blunderbuſs, the air gun, the long and croſs bow, or deadly arbalaſter, and the long pike, ſeem extremely well calculated for ſuch irregular combat, and are ſuited both to infantry and cavalry. At the battle of Naſeby, between King Charles and the parliament army under Eſſex, the latter preſented an invincible rampart of pikes againſt the furious ſhock of Prince Rupert's cavalry. A ſpear or lance was one of the principal weapons of the feudal cavalry and of the Cruſaders. The Arabians, and the Uhlans have all long pikes. The preſent cavalry of Egypt, called Mamalukes, have each flung round them a blunderbuſs, or ſhort gun, which diſcharges twelve bullets, two ſhort piſtols in their waiſt belt, and a crooked ſword; and are conſtantly exerciſed in firing at marks, and in the practice of the ſabre.

G——l L——d, in his military hiſtory, calculates that, on an average, one only of four hundred ſhots takes effect in land battles; and

and perhaps the odds is greater in ſea fights. Saxe and Lloyd both cenſure the impotent noiſe of cannon and muſquetry, and eſpecially of platoon firing: they prefer the firing by files or by ranks, beginning with the rear. It is a fact, that during all the laſt German war, there were not two thouſand Britiſh troops in the liſt of killed. Hiſtory inſtructs us that in former ages the *Engliſh Archers*, by the wiſe policy of our forefathers, were trained with peculiar diligence to become expert markſmen, and were of infinite ſervice in the wars and victories in France: their arrows penetrated the ſtrongeſt armour. The celebrated Lawyer, Sir John Forteſcue, emphatically ſays, "That the might of the realm of England ſtandeth upon Archers." Was not the ſtern diſcipline of the Roman legion, often compelled to yield to the ſuperior dexterity and agility of the Parthian archers? The bullet diſcharged from the North American Indian ſeldom fails to carry death, and terror amongſt their foes. Lord Anſon found markſmen equally ſerviceable in ſea actions. The immortal Homer, whom all military men ſhould learn by heart, and whoſe Iliad the Macedonian hero always laid under his pillow, points out the vaſt importance of dex-

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trous markſmen. Theſe military eſſentials are now ſhamefully neglected by us, and are ſacrificed to empty parade. There ſhould be aſſociations and clubs throughout the Iſland, for the practice of the rifle and air gun, the long and croſs bow, and perhaps to revive the uſe of ſome of the ancient artillery.

But it is not alone the degeneracy of our modern military inſtitutions, which renders us leſs formidable on land to an invader; our imperious ſyſtem of Game laws is calculated to ſuppreſs the uſe and exerciſe of fire arms amongſt our yeomanry, to expoſe and enervate a brave people in the day of national danger, and to pave the way for the introduction and ſucceſs of a more ſagacious antagoniſt. It is one of the firſt badges of a conquered and enſlaved nation to be deprived of the uſe of arms. We have ſeen the fatal conſequences of that regimen in the hiſtory of our own Iſland, when abandoned by the Roman Legions. Would thoſe who are obliged to buy annual licences to ſhoot partridges, be the defenders of Britain againſt a foreign enemy? Is it politic to ſacrifice the deareſt intereſt and ſecurity of the nation to ſuch a paltry revenue, and to all the other wretched chicanery of the game

game ſtatutes? On the contrary, would it not be prudent to encourage dexterity in the rifle gun, in the modern air gun uſed by the Imperial chaſſeurs, in the long and croſs bow, equally with horſe racing, by lucrative and honorary rewards? In certain ſeaſons of the year, thoſe employed in agriculture can perform periodical military duties, paſtimes and evolutions, with little detriment to themſelves and to the public; manufacturers and artificers, alſo require occaſional recreation. A Proclamation of Edward the Third contains the following curious paſſage. " In former " times the people of our kingdom, at their " hours of play, commonly exerciſed them- " ſelves in *Archery*, from which we derived " both honour and advantage; but now that " art is neglected for more uſeleſs and diſ- " honeſt games."——" No improvement in arts, nor increaſe of wealth can compenſate for the loſs of national ſpirit, and the power of ſelf defence." I ſhould here add that the jealous rigour of the Laws enacted, ſince the Reformation, againſt the proſelytes of Popery, and, ſince the Revolution, againſt the proſelytes of the Pretender, have both contributed to circumſcribe the uſe of fire arms throughout Britain and Ireland.

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" The ancient inſtitutions of Greece and Rome, ſeem to have been much more effectual and ſimple, for maintaining the martial ſpirit of the great body of the people, than the eſtabliſhment of what are called the militias of modern times. When they were once eſtabliſhed they executed themſelves, and it required little or no attention from government to maintain them in the moſt perfect vigour. Whereas to maintain, even in tolerable execution, the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government; without which they are conſtantly falling into total neglect, and diſuſe. The influence, beſides, of the ancient inſtitutions, was much more univerſal. By means of them, the whole body of the people was completely inſtructed in the uſe of arms. Whereas it is but a very ſmall part of them who can ever be ſo inſtructed by the regulations of any modern militia, except perhaps thoſe of Switzerland. In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome to learn his military exerciſes, was a neceſſary part of education impoſed by the ſtate upon every free citizen. Each, ſo long as he remained at home, ſeems to have practiſed his exerciſe

exercise separately, or with such of his equals as he liked best; and not to have been attached to any particular body or troop, until he was actually called upon to take the field." (Smith's Wealth of Nations.)

Mr. Hume, the British historian, makes the following remark:—" It is observable, that " though the military profession requires great " genius, and long experience in *the principal* " *commanders*, all its subordinate duties may be " discharged by ordinary talents; and from " superficial practice, citizens and country " gentlemen soon become excellent officers. " The generals of greatest fame and capacity " happened all of them to spring up on the " side of parliament, during the civil wars of " Charles the First. The courtiers and great " nobility, in the royal party, checked the " growth of any extraordinary genius amongst " the subordinate officers; and every man " there, as in a regular established govern- " ment, was confined to the station in which " his birth had placed him."

All the essentials of military institutions for real action, and the great moment of engagement, are very few. Two thirds of the pa-

rade evolutions are then ſuperfluous. Six or eight manœuvres, ſays G——l L——d, are ſufficient for all caſes. To preſerve order and regularity in the ranks and line, whether it moves ſlow, quick, or oblique, and eſpecially when advancing with rapidity; to front forwards, and to both ſides; to form the line expeditiouſly from the columns, and, *vice verſa*; to load and fire with expedition and effect; to be obedient, ſilent, brave; and to have regularity and velocity in every action and motion: theſe are the fundamental qualifications of the militia, and of every other ſoldier, when brought face to face with the enemy.

I cannot ſubſcribe to an aſſertion of Mr. Hume's "that ſo late as James the Firſt's "reign, two thouſand cavalry could not be "properly mounted throughout England, ſuch "was the ſcarcity of good horſes." We know that much earlier, in Edward the Third, and in Henry the Fifth's wars, that each had a conſiderable body of cavalry, from two to four thouſand, in their army when they invaded France; and that Queen Elizabeth had two thouſand cavalry mixed with infantry to oppoſe the Spaniſh invaders. It is equally notorious

notorious that a horſe was part of the paraphrenalia of the reigning paſſion, chivalry and knighthood; and that it compoſed the principal force of the cruſaders. The Swiſs and Spaniards, ſome centuries ago, excelled in diſciplined infantry; and ſince that, the proportion of cavalry, more eſpecially of the unwieldy ſquadrons, has been abridged. It is an obſervation of G——l L——d, "that new raiſed cavalry generally behave better in action, than new raiſed infantry; the former being carried on at full gallop, without having time to reflect on their danger. In the modern hiſtory of our own, and of other continental armies, we have many proofs of this propoſition. We know that velocity will compenſate for weight; and that light cavalry can baffle heavy, even in line. But if ever an actual invaſion ſhould render it neceſſary, there is now in this iſland an ample ſelection of weight and velocity united, ſufficient to mount two hundred thouſand men.

Homer's heroes moſt frequently deſcended from their chariots to cloſe encounter on foot. Centaurs or men on horſeback do not ſeem to have been in uſe at this ſiege. He, in many places, extols to the ſkies the ſwiftneſs and

beauty of the immortal courſers. The Greeks and Macedonians excelled in infantry; Philip, and Alexander performed miracles with the Phalanx. Hannibal's army conſiſted principally of cavalry, and under the conduct of that celebrated General, ſhook Rome to its foundation. The Roman legion contained a moderate proportion of cavalry mixed with infantry and artillery, and during many centuries overcame all its enemies and rivals. The Germans, who waged war againſt them, were not deſtitute of cavalry, but their principal ſtrength conſiſted of infantry. On the contrary moſt of the Aſiatic nations have been renowned, time immemorial, for the number and force of cavalry in their armies. The Perſians excelled in horſemanſhip and archery, and were always formidable to the Romans, even in the moments of rapid and diſorderly flight. They were trained to dart the javelin and ſhoot their arrows at full ſpeed, and in every direction. It was a cuſtom with the Sarmatians for their expert warriors to lead one or two ſpare horſes, which enabled them to advance and to retreat with rapid diligence. The Huns, Tartars, and Arabians all brought immenſe armies of cavalry into the field. At the memorable battle of Angora, between Tamerlane

merlane and Bajazet, the two armies muſtered upwards of five hundred thouſand cavalry. The native ſluggiſh breed of Europe has been greatly improved by that of Aſia, and eſpecially of Arabia.

It is the juſt and important obſervation of Vegetius, that both the Roman infantry and cavalry was invariably covered with defenſive armour, ſuch as helmets, breaſtplates, greaves, &c. from the foundation of the city to the reign of the Emperor Gratian: that in the decline of the empire and military tacticks, their enemies profited by their fatal omiſſion and negligence in protecting the vital parts by the uſual military accoutrements. For this purpoſe G——l L——d ſtrenuouſly recommends cuiraſſes and caps of the ſtrongeſt leather. I am ſorry that in this and many other inſtances, his advice is not more attended to by Britiſh ſtateſmen.

On the Navy I propoſe to offer a few hints, calculated to two objects: the increaſe of the nurſery of ſailors, and of the actual marine force of the nation. As to the firſt, I believe that the moſt certain and durable recruit of ſailors muſt be ſought for from our domeſtic

and foreign fiſheries, and from the coal, and coaſting trade; and that it would be politic and practicable for the legiſlature to give more encouragement to the conſumption of fiſh and oil. Again, from the parochial charity ſchools of England, and from the neceſſitous poor of the metropolis, many thouſand ſturdy boys, might be annually ſelected, and ſent, at the expence of their pariſhes, or other public inſtitutions, on board of ſhips, to be ſtationed, for that purpoſe, in a few convenient ſea-ports. By one or two years training, they would furniſh a conſtant recruit both to the royal and mercantile ſervice; and would, in a conſiderable degree, alleviate the rigours of the impreſs duty, and the teazing interruptions of commerce. Theſe are truly the children and property of the ſtate; and in no other mode can ſo effectually recompenſe their benefactors. I could even wiſh them to be nurſed on the ſea, and to regard it as their native element.

The peace eſtabliſhment of the infantry of Britain is not too numerous, conſidering the diſtant ſettlements and garriſons which they are alſo obliged to guard: I ſpeak of numbers, not of regiments. But this I maintain, and I could quote not only the written authority of

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G——l L——d, but alſo of the late celebrated Marſhal Keith, to the ſame effect, that it would be infinitely more advantageous for the nation, if at leaſt one half of the ſtanding army of the empire was converted into Marines. All our military operations on land ſhould have a connection with the fleet, conſequently, ſhould be principally reſtricted to iſlands, and the ſea coaſts. It is to be hoped, that the Britiſh nation will never hereafter ſuffer themſelves to be miſled and inveigled into Continental quarrels, except where they can act on their proper element, the ocean. But ſhould this ſyſtem of folly, ignorance, and corruption, be perſevered in, let them, of two evils, chuſe the leaſt: they can hire land armies of diſciplined ſoldiers, at one third the expence of their own, from ſeveral German potentates, and from the Swiſs, and can ſubſidize them ſtill cheaper. As to cavalry, half of the thirty regiments, and eſpecially the heavy ones, might be diſbanded, without any public loſs or regret. The men, horſes, and accoutrements are an enormous expence. They never can be wanted to guard our diſtant poſſeſſions, nor to attack thoſe of the enemy. Before any invaſion could take place, ſufficient time would intervene for raiſing and

training a competent force of cavalry. In preventing ſmuggling, the Navy and Marines will be more effectual; and for quelling accidental riots or ſedition, a better national police, with the militia, will inſure the execution of all wholeſome laws. The enormous extra train of horſes, carriages, baggage, attendants, ſtaff, &c. and the neceſſity of frequently recruiting the ranks in a land army during war, is ſufficient to impoveriſh the richeſt ſtate—and of all the European armies that of England is by far the moſt expenſive.

Beſides converting half the Britiſh ſtanding army of infantry and cavalry into Marines and naval Artillery, I ſubmit to more experienced judges, whether it would not be more beneficial to the public, and to the uniformity and harmony of the naval ſervice, if the officers of marines were to be drafted from the corps of midſhipmen and lieutenants. At preſent, during peace, this junior claſs of ſoldiers are turned adrift on the world without pay: too many of them muſt then become burthenſome to their families, or muſt ſeek for employment in foreign countries, amongſt our open or ſecret enemies, or ſtarve in gaols. Or ſuppoſe them, at length, promoted to Lieutenants in the navy, how few,

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without intereſt, can riſe above that rank? By this intimate incorporation of the naval and marine ſervice, there would, in extreme danger, be a double ſtrength of officers, ſufficiently expert in both naval and land evolutions. It can never be too often inculcated, *that the ſtanding army of Britain and Ireland ſhould be principally, if not wholly, amphibious.* In many arts and ſciences almoſt one third of life is obliged to be ſpent in acquiring the rudiments: and will any one have the folly to aſſert, that intereſt or money ſhould be the ſole recommendation to military promotion? How many expeditions have failed, from the reciprocal ignorance and bickerings of the commanders of the ſea and land forces, and from their ſuperficial knowledge of the duty of each other.

By the tranſmutation of half the ſtanding army into marines and naval artillery, a force of thirty thouſand men, could be added to the navy, without a ſhilling extra expence to the nation. Fleets then could be fitted out at a ſhort notice, inſtead of delaying to ranſack the iſland for raw recruits, and the ſcourings of gaols, and ſquandering the CRITICAL moments for action, in dilatory and inefficacious preparation. A ſtanding

army

army would then be an excellent nurſery for the navy; and wars might be brought to a ſpeedy termination, without harraſſing commerce ſo oppreſſively, and without draining to the dregs the revenues and reſources of the nation. The ſcandalous traffick in commiſſions would thereby be prodigiouſly checked, and the influence of the executive government would ſuffer no diminution. It is in truth a cruel hardſhip and injuſtice upon the officers in general of the naval profeſſion, that ſuch multitudes of them are diſmiſſed to pine on a niggardly half pay, until their country ſhall be again in danger. The preceding regulations would alſo render our employment of many thouſand foreign ſailors, during war, unneceſſary*.

From the compariſon of the ſea and land forces of the invaders and defenders, and of their reciprocal difficulties and advantages, we come to ſay a few words only on another important ſubject of national ſtrength, and which is emphatically termed, the ſinews of war, on Revenue. The relative and ab-

* See Sir William Temple's works on the mode of increaſing the Navy of England: and Lord Hawkſbury on the true Conſtitutional defence, a Militia. See alſo Petty, Davenant, Deſlandes.

ſolute power derived from revenue, will be very different in different countries, and in the ſame country in different centuries. It is by no means a ſubject of which we can boaſt that Great Britain and Ireland, with not half the population, now raiſe an annual revenue not inefrior to France; including in the general eſtimate, as is done in France, the parochial, and other extraneous ſubſidies and contributions. The laſt Revolution, however meritorious and indiſpenſible for the ſecurity of civil and religious liberty, engrafted and entailed a new diſeaſe into our Conſtitution; the ſyſtem of national debt, of borrowing, mortgaging, and devouring the revenues of poſterity. The cup of good is ſeldom dealt to man unmixed. This conſumption and canker has continued, throughout the preſent century, to prey upon the vitals of the nation. It proceeds gradually in ſapping the foundation of liberty, property, and ſocial enjoyments. Taxation is now to Britain one of the ſevereſt calamities and ſcourges of war. Who can, with truth, deny that it is not in ſeveral inſtances ſtretched to oppreſſion? "Sunt "certi denique fines, quos ultro citraque "nequit conſiſtere rectum," is juſtly applicable to the modern financeering ſchemes of Britain,

Britain, Holland, and France. They have long been running races of prodigality and extortion, and have depended as much upon the weight of gold and credit, as upon iron and lead in ruining one another. By ſuch profuſion, two of thoſe powers have become nearly exhauſted. One of them lingers in an incurable decline. The other has lately made a daring effort to diſburthen herſelf and poſterity of this load. Let us alſo hope that Britain will be able to extricate herſelf in ſufficient time, ſo as to meet her rival on terms of equality. Promiſes and proteſtations of diſintereſtedneſs, would be but a ſlender ſecurity againſt future moleſtation from that quarter.

Since the firſt edition of this work and of heſe obſervations, we have become engaged in another war with France; and moſt unfortunately and indiſcreetly are plunged over head and ears in the old vortex of Continental quackery. Without ſome ſpeedy reform in our political and military ſyſtem, it requires not the gift of prophecy to foretel the fatal conſequences. Should this war of extravagance and miſconduct continue but another year, I really cannot diſcern any permanent ſources of taxation, in the uſual mode, which will

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not excite univerſal murmurs and diſcontent. Palliatives will not long avail in ſo deſperate a diſeaſe. Church tythes ſeem to me the only radical reſource: theſe to be gradually aboliſhed at the death of each incumbent, and an additional land tax levied for the public uſe. Probably in Britain and Ireland this tax would produce an extra annual revenue of three millions ſterling. On a ſimilar equitable principle, the ſuperfluities of ſome Biſhopricks and Prebendaries ſhould be transferred to the preſent ſcanty pittance of the labouring clergy, the Curates. With this additional revenue, with that of the French ſugar iſlands, together with proper economy and reform, *a naval war*, the only war in which this Iſland ſhould ever perſonally engage, may be maintained "ad infinitum" againſt the conventional and democratic malice of that outrageous nation. We might then even permit the militia, during one third of the year, to retire from the channel frontier and to reſide with their families.

What parricidal propenſity or fatuity can have ſo long influenced our miniſters and legiſlators, as not to promote the production of a ſufficient ſtock of Hemp and Tallow at home, inſtead of ſending annually, one million

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and a half ſterling, in hard caſh, without any adequate recompence, for theſe two articles to Peterſburg*? If they mean to make a proper uſe of the late captured French iſlands, excluſive of their prodigious additions to the revenue and marine of Britain, another million ſterling of ſpecie, annually buried in China, may be retained at home; coffee being a more cheap, agreeable and wholeſome ſubſtitute for thoſe foreign leaves called tea. We might then barter on terms of equality with thoſe ſelfiſh Aſiatics. The revenue of the Eaſt India Company is now ſuperior to that of the vaſt Ruſſian empire. From this another million might be tranſmitted annually to the Britiſh treaſury, by reduction of the eſtabliſhments and peculations, and by the introduction of a more impartial ſyſtem of juſtice and lenity amongſt the mild natives of Hindooſtan.

Turn our eyes next to Gibraltar, Spain, and the Mediterranean; and I think we may find other productive ſources of revenue, opulence and naval ſtrength. Firſt, I wiſh our politicians

* See a comparative eſtimate of the advantages Great Britain would derive from a commercial alliance with the Ottoman, in preference to the Ruſſian empire. Sold by Debret, Piccadilly.

would

would decide, by fair argument and proof, whether it would not be prudent to ſurrender the expenſive rock of Gibraltar to Spain, for a reaſonable equivalent in money or barter. Until this transfer takes place the Spaniſh cabinet never will be reconciled to Britain, nor admit either her or Ireland into a ſhare of her tranſatlantic commerce, which would prove to the merchants and manufacturers of both a mine of wealth. Beſides, the ſum ſpent in retaining this ſouthern paſs of Spain would man and maintain a reſpectable ſquadron in the Mediterranean, without which we can neither hope to defend our recent acquiſition of Corſica, nor to rival France in the lucrative Levant trade, and eſtimation with the Turk. Would not ſuch a ſquadron command more reſpect even from the piratical ſtates of Barbary, Algiers, &c. than a ſtationary barren rock? In the preſent improved ſtate of navigation, Britain, Liſbon and Corſica are not too diſtant ſtages for commercial voyages to that quarter. We have much longer ſtages acroſs the Atlantick, and to Indoſtan, without a baiting place of our own to refreſh at. Perhaps by ſome compound barter between Spain and Portugal the Iſland of Madeira might be obtained in lieu of Gibraltar. Our Eaſt and Weſt India

fleet

fleet would find every convenience in this Iſland, and our troops a preparatory ſtage for ſeaſoning. I wiſh alſo our legiſlators would direct more of their exertions to the improvement and extenſion of domeſtic agriculture, fiſheries and the uſeful arts, and that they would abandon to poſterity the premature projects of remote colonization in every corner of the globe.

The aggregate additions of gain and ſavings which I have here barely glanced at, unleſs I miſtake, might be eſtimated at ſeven or eight millions ſterling annually. With theſe freſh reſources, I ſhould not deſpair of both repelling and chaſtiſing the moſt gigantic efforts of French hoſtility and malice, nor of eſtabliſhing ſuch a ſubſtantial Sinking Fund as would lead us to expect, in the ſhort period of one generation, if not an abolition, at leaſt a conſiderable diminution of the public debts and burthens. All the plauſible projects hitherto ſet on foot for this laſt purpoſe, are, in the preſent ſtate of Britiſh finance and mortgage, temporizing palliatives; they are wretched manœuvres of fatal procraſtination. Since the firſt edition of this ſupplement, the ruling factions of France, after ſubverting all legal government

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and order, have, by ſucceſſive proſcriptions, murders, and robberies, converted the principal part of the property of that great nation into a military and naval fund; conſequently the hackneyed recipes and "re etaturs" of our political doctors, muſt, to be effectual, undergo ſome alteration. The ſyſtem of St. Grado will in time exhauſt the moſt robuſt political conſtitution and ſtrength. It is too notorious that modern wars whether offenſive or defenſive, require a large extra revenue, as well as ſailors and ſoldiers to proſecute them with ſucceſs. I am truly ſolicitous that the ſtate phyſicians of Britain ſhould not accelerate its diſſolution or decay by injudicious or corrupt practice; or to uſe a legal phraſe, that they ſhould not be content in prolonging its exiſtence by temporary reſpites. With ſuch profuſe and everlaſting drains from the purſe and induſtry of individuals, it is certainly incumbent upon them to ſupply the dam, and to prevent all unneceſſary and profligate waſte*.

* One per cent. deducted from the annual intereſt of the Stockholders would raiſe between two and three millions ſterling.

The laſt ſubject reſpecting revenue which I ſhall notice, is that appropriated to the Civil liſt, and to the other branches of the royal family, the probable increaſe of which I pretend not to calculate. It is not clear to me but that the true dignity and comfort of thoſe perſonages and the intereſt of the nation would be better conſulted by permittting them, under certain reſtrictions of prudence and decorum, to intermarry and aſſimilate with natives; and to acquire hereditary property and independence, inſtead of continuing a ſort of ſtate penſioners upon the public. Is it for the ſolid advantage of that family or of the nation, that they alone ſhould be condemned to retain any of the abſurd and unnatural veſtiges of the monaſtic inſtitution, or that they ſhould be ſevered from the ſociety in which they live, as a ſolitary caſt or tribe? And if in the race of ambition, their connection would be courted and eſtimated as a prize of fortune, why are our nobility and gentry ſo mean and ſtupid as to ſurrender the whole monopoly to foreigners?

To my comprehenſion there is not a clearer demonſtration in Euclid than this; that to maintain with vigour, reſolution, and perſeverance,

ſeverance, the preſent deciſive war with France, and to terminate it with final honour and ſucceſs, very few more taxes, in the old ſyſtem, ſhould be laid upon the public. The impartial reader will decide whether or not I have pointed out the means of accompliſhing this important object. I have endeavoured to make it manifeſt, that Great Britain is far from being exhauſted of energy and reſources to combat France, provided they are properly exerted, diſcreetly managed, and judiciouſly directed. The economical retrenchments in the expenditure of Britain, not long ſince recommended by a traitorous projector and exile, whoſe writings have excited ſo much clamour and declamation, no honeſt and judicious man can applaud: becauſe they are built on the deſtruction of our navy, our ſecurity, and our conſtitution.

The Editor cannot forbear taking the preſent opportunity to remark, that upwards of a year ago, and immediately after the unfortunate ſiege of Dunkirk, of which he was a ſpectator, he ſent more than one memorial to the Britiſh miniſters intreating them, for reaſons therein ſtated, to withdraw the whole of the Britiſh troops from Flanders, to ſend a much ſtronger

force againſt the French ſugar iſlands, and to diſpatch the remainder together with the Prince of Conde's army, and all the other French emigrants able to bear arms, to the aſſiſtance of the Royaliſts in Brittany, to endeavour to ſecure the navy in Breſt for their uſe; and to harraſs the enemy from the ſea. The projected expedition to France with a handful of men under a gallant Earl he reprobated as a deſperate enterprize. He hinted his diſtruſt about the propriety of an *Engliſh Generaliſſimo* in rendering the cauſe of royalty patriotic or triumphant in France, and the tragical abandonment of Toulon ſoon after verified this part of his prediction.

As to our Northern and Continental allies, in general, in the preſent war, my prognoſticks, in theſe memorials, reſpecting their conduct have all been confirmed. The uniform hiſtory of the laſt hundred years ſhould have taught our miniſters never to truſt to the Dutch as active or zealous coadjutors. Pruſſia's crooked policy, profligacy, and venality was notorious even at the outſet of the preſent hoſtilities. As to Ruſſia, every unfledged apprentice in politicks ſhould have known that cabinet is a ſecret and ſyſtematic enemy both

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to Britain and France, and indeed to the majority of the human ſpecies. Their object is to diſtract and weaken both nations. The Hanoverians and Heſſians will fight with fidelity and bravery ſo long as Britain can furniſh them money. Theſe memorials repreſented and urged to Miniſters the policy of ſubſidizing the Emperor, and of ſtipulating with him inſtantly to ſet about the neceſſary repairs in the fortifications of Nieuport and Oſtend, in order to exclude the French from the maritime coaſt and ports oppoſite the Thames.

Note. I received the preſent proof ſheet for correction, from the Printer, when a pamphlet *On the Naval Strength of Britain*, written by Sir J. Sinclair, Bart. fell into my hands, for the firſt time: amongſt a variety of judicious obſervations, this reſpectable author and legiſlator recommends a diſtinct *Order of Merit* to be inſtituted for the Officers of the Britiſh Navy who ſhall diſtinguiſh themthemſelves, and render important ſervices to their country. I moſt heartily ſecond this hint to his Majeſty's miniſters, for many reaſons ſufficiently obvious. Sir John recommends a white ribbon; but perhaps a ribbon compoſed of white, blue, and red, the three cardinal colours of the Britiſh flags, would be preferable. As he has not ſuggeſted any name for this new Marine Order, I take the liberty of ſubmitting that of *Neptune*, or of *Alfred*.—I likewiſe recommend more care and ſelection in giving names to our ſhips of war.

CHAP. V.

Of the parts of Great Britain and Ireland moſt expoſed to Invaſion. A Military Sketch of the Suſſex and Kent Coaſts.

IT is of importance to be able to predict, and with tolerable certainty, by what nation, and in what part of our coaſt we are moſt expoſed to invaſion; and at the ſame time to determine the moſt judicious diſpoſition of the defending troops. If we look round the different nations of Europe, or of the globe, for a probable invader of Britain or Ireland, we ſhall find very few capable, or whoſe intereſt it would be to make that experiment. The Mediterranean powers (France excepted) are too remote or weak. From the nations on the Baltic, which is frozen up half the year, there ſeems little danger, and the eaſtern coaſt of Britain, which is many hundred miles diſtant from them, would there be principally expoſed. Ireland on one ſide is ſcreened by Britain, and its invaders from the north of Europe, muſt either ſail round Scotland, or run the gauntlet along two

faces

faces of Britain. But if, from the lethargy or imprudence of other ſtates, Ruſſia ſhould reach the goal of her ambition and politics, the expulſion of the Turk from Europe, an event not improbable, nor the attempt diſtant, all the enlightened and leading powers of our hemiſphere muſt then ſhrink, both by land and ſea, into inferior ſatellites. Againſt this rapid and ruinous deluge of French anarchy and Ruſſian deſpotiſm, the civilized nations of Europe cannot be too vigilant, guarded and united. In the latter caſe Egypt would follow the fate of Conſtantinople, and the Eaſtern poſſeſſions and commerce of Britain and Holland would be held by a very precarious tenure.

During ſeveral centuries, England continued to invade France, principally by the narrow paſſes of the channel; from whence we might, "a priori," ſuppoſe, that France would purſue a ſimilar ſyſtem. But the immenſe improvements and revolutions, during the three laſt centuries, in naval architecture and tacticks, in fortification and engineering, require harbours more deep and convenient to inſure an invader's footing and progreſs. Cæſar ſailed from Boulogne or Calais to-

wards Deal and Sandwich, and on his firſt attempt to land was encountered by the natives. The Saxons ſailing from the ports of Germany and the Baltic, firſt eſtabliſhed themſelves a few miles farther north on the Kentiſh coaſt. The firſt Norman landed his army on the Suſſex coaſt, and afterwards marched into Kent. Henry the Second, in his frequent expeditions to and from Normandy, generally embarked and landed at Southampton or Portſmouth. Edward the Firſt embarked with his army at Winchelſea, and ſteered to Flanders. Edward the Third embarked from the coaſt of Suffolk and landed in Flanders, and afterwards from Portſmouth and landed at La Hogue in Normandy. His ſon, Edward the Black Prince, conducted another expedition from Plymouth to Bourdeaux. Henry the Fifth embarked at Southampton, and landed likewiſe at the mouth of the Seine.

It is obvious, from the relative geography alone of great Great Britain and France, that the maritime and channel counties of Cornwall, Devonſhire, Somerſetſhire, Dorſetſhire, Hampſhire, Suſſex, Kent, Eſſex, and Suffolk, and the counties in the rear and contact with

theſe,

theſe, all of them comprehended in an arch from Plymouth to Harwich, and from the Thames to the Severn, as they have hitherto been, ſo they would in future be the principal theatres of invaſion; and unleſs from our ſupineſs or treachery, the enemy can penetrate by the Medway or the Thames, the *neareſt* approaches from moſt of the convenient landing places on this coaſt, to the Metropolis, are little ſhort of ſixty miles. The Eſſex and Suffolk coaſt are, at preſent, however in leaſt danger from that quarter; and further north on the German Ocean, it is not probable that the French will ever venture, at leaſt for the purpoſe of effective invaſion, but only as a diverſion from the grand object, and to plunder, or extort contributions. Throughout this extent of frontier, which is nearly equal to the north frontier of France, the defender has but a few fixed points, or poſts of peculiar conſequence on land to contend with the enemy; theſe are Plymouth, and Halldown, Portſmouth, and Portſdown, ſome parts of the Iſle of Wight, and the paſſage of the Needles, Dover, Deal, the Forts, Docks, and ſhips on the Medway, and the Thames, the Metropolis, and Landguard Fort. Would they attempt to penetrate through the inter-

vals,

vals, towards the Metropolis, and leave thoſe garriſons on their flanks and rear? A ſuperiority at ſea, and groſs miſconduct on our part, could alone give encouragement to ſuch a daring project. The enemy ſhould not be emboldened, by their weakneſs, to take any of theſe by a "coup de main;" nor until after obſtinate ſieges. At the ſame time ſuſpicions might be entertained, that the two great commercial cities on the Weſtern coaſt of England, Briſtol, and Liverpool, would be included in the collateral objects of depredation, or conflagration.

If ever a Northern maritime nation ſhould invade England, of which there is no inſtance during the laſt ſeven centuries, ſuch invaſion would probably be to the North of Dover, and perhaps in a line between Harwich and the Downs. Indeed it is not improbable, notwithſtanding the perils of the navigation and coaſt, that they might attempt to moleſt Hull, and the Humber, and alſo to cut off the principal magazine of fuel from London, and an important nurſery of the Britiſh marine. France might alſo think this an important object. Part of theſe inconveniences might be prevented by an additional ſtock of fuel in reſerve.

reſerve. Beſides, an enemy would have ſome danger to apprehend from 100,000 ſturdy colliers, who might be aſſembled in the neighbourhood of Newcaſtle, Shields, and Whitehaven. Edinburgh and Aberdeen are expoſed near the ſhores of the German ocean to inſult, and contributions. Glaſgow and the Weſtern coaſt of Scotland are more remote and ſecure. But if two Forts were erected on the two towering eminences at the Eaſtern extremity of Edinburgh towards the ſea, and the circumference of that city connected and ſecured by a ditch, rampart, redoubts, &c. with the Caſtle hill and fort on the Weſt ſide, I apprehend a very obſtinate reſiſtance might be then made by its numerous inhabitants alone, againſt a beſieging army; and more eſpecially ſo by having recourſe to the collateral aſſiſtance of the waters of two adjoining lakes, and to the ſea. Moſt of the principal manufacturing cities and towns of England, are without the reach of ſurprize or pillage, by being placed at ſome diſtance from the ſea coaſt, with which, however, they have an eaſy communication by rivers or canals.

As

As no foreign invaſion for the ſubjugation of England had been attempted, during five centuries, until the reign of Elizabeth, it may be both curious and uſeful to examine the diſpoſition on each ſide, and the preparations of defence againſt ſuch malevolence. The Spaniſh plan was, that the Armada ſhould ſail unmoleſted cloſe along the French ſhore, as far as Dunkirk, and having chaſed away all the Engliſh cruiſers, ſhould there join the Duke of Parma. 34,000 troops were aſſembled under him in Flanders, and kept in readineſs to be embarked in flat bottomed boats. Theſe added to 20,000 from Spain, made the land army alone of invaders 50,000; with which united, they had orders to ſail up the Thames, and to attempt at one deciſive blow the conqueſt of England. Plymouth and Portſmouth had not then riſen to be marine arſenals of ſuch immenſe importance as they are at preſent, and were not included in the ſcheme of attack.

The principal fleet of England was ſtationed at Plymouth, and a ſmall fleet off Dunkirk to awe, and intercept the auxiliary debarkation of troops from Flanders. The land forces

forces were diſpoſed as follows: 20,000 militia were diſtributed along the channel coaſt where any landing was practicable, and directions given them, if they could not hinder the invaders from gaining the ſhore, to retire backwards, to waſte and drive the country around, and to wait for reinforcements from the neighbouring counties, before they oppoſed the enemy a ſecond time: 22,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry were ſtationed at Tilbury and Graveſend, to cover the Thames and the metropolis: beſides theſe 34,000 foot, and 1000 horſe were appointed as a reſerve, and to march under the Queen wherever the enemy ſhould appear in force.

In ſailing up the channel, this invincible Armada was infeſted with inceſſant ſkirmiſhes of the light Engliſh fleet which hovered in their rear, and which, though much inferior in ſize and number, after ſeveral ſharp engagements compelled them to fly round the North of Scotland, half of them being previouſly captured or deſtroyed. How dear ought its marine ever to be held by Britons, which has ſo often repelled invaders from the ſhores? Theſe are our ſea Gods to whom we muſt look for protection in ſimilar perils.

In

In the ſubſequent project of the Duke of Norfolk, in order to liberate Mary Queen of Scots, then confined in England, it was intended by Spain, to land from the ſide of Flanders, 10,000 men at Harwich, and from thence to march to the metropolis. At the Revolution, William, Prince of Orange, landed his friendly army at Torbay. Within the preſent century, France ſeveral times meditated and attempted, from Dunkirk and from Breſt, an invaſion of Great Britain and Ireland; eſpecially when ſhe had hopes of profiting by the civil diſſentions of the nation, and of impoſing an exiled tyrant. Three attempts of this ſort were fruſtrated by the Britiſh navy, in the ſucceſſive reigns of William, Anne, and George the Firſt. Her reiterated projects, in 44 and 54, wherein G——l L——d bore a part, have been already noticed. In the late war it appears that the object of the combined fleets of France and Spain in 1779, was Plymouth; and a recent publication by one of the ſpies or incendiaries of France, expoſes ſtill more glaringly their inſidious ſchemes againſt that naval arſenal. Had they ſucceeded againſt this Fortreſs, and the Britiſh fleet, it is not improbable that their

land

land army, then in readineſs on the channel coaſt, might have afterwards attempted Dover, Chatham, and the metropolis.

During the two laſt wars, Coxheath, near Maidſtone in Kent, and Warley, contiguous to Brentwood in Eſſex, were the principal camps for the defence of England. Their ſituation is more healthy than that of Tilbury Fort, from which they are diſtant but a few hours march. A few regiments of cavalry were alſo aſſembled on Saliſbury Plain: but Plymouth and Portſmouth had neither fortification nor garriſon adequate to their defence, and were excluded almoſt without the pale of ſuccour. G——l L——d's diſtribution of the defending troops has been laid before the reader, and there is no neceſſity to repeat it.

The General having accurately ſurveyed the Channel coaſt from Plymouth to Portſmouth, and directed the proper modes of defence, I ſhall, from my own obſervations, add a few hints reſpecting the invaſion and defence of the frontier included between Portſmouth and Sheerneſs, beginning at the projecting point oppoſite St. Helens, called Selſea Bill.

Suſſex,

Suſſex, Kent, and Surrey are the bulwarks of this frontier of Britain. Cherbourgh and Dunkirk are the two extremes of the oppoſite frontier of France.

Without a ſuperior navy, as G——l L——d has already obſerved, I cannot diſcern how France can attempt, with reaſonable hopes of ſucceſs, any ſerious invaſion in the heart of Britain. But ſhould ſhe ever, by the miſconduct of Britiſh miniſters be ſuffered to attain ſuch naval ſuperiority, ſhe might ſelect any part of this frontier for attack; or it is not improbable but ſhe might practiſe her preſent too ſucceſsful ſyſtem of land tacticks, and aſſail the whole ſea line of the Channel, at the ſame inſtant, with feints and real attacks. On this portion of the frontier ſhe would have a ſhort line of operation, and many good roads penetrating to the metropolis.

The ſeveral and principal noxious objects that an enemy ſuch as France might be ſuppoſed to entertain in invading this frontier are, I believe the following: to burn and ſack the towns, houſes and craft on the coaſt; to exact contributions, eſpecially of cattle, corn,

corn, forage, money; to cut the embankments of Pevenſey and Romney, and drown theſe extenſive and fertile vales with the ſea; to ſubſiſt their army at the enemy's expence, and to occupy a tract of country ſufficient for that purpoſe; to gain a convenient port and depot near the ſhore, and their own coaſt, from thence to ravage the neighbouring country, and perhaps penetrate to Chatham and the metropolis; to harraſs and intercept the regular ſupply of the metropolis from this quarter, eſpecially of the neceſſaries of life; to interrupt agriculture, commerce, fiſheries, induſtry in general, and to foment inſurrection, and anarchy.

From Dover and Calais the ſhores of Europe and Britain mutually and gradually recede from each other, both to the north and the ſouth, and the partition by ſea becomes wider. From Cherbourgh to the Iſle of Wight is 63, from Boulogne to Rye 40, from Calais to Dover 25, from Dunkirk to Margate 50 miles. This may be called the ſtraits of the Channel. The ramparts of Britain bordering on theſe ſtraits we are now to comment upon.

The ſea frontier of Suſſex and Kent may be divided into two parts, that from Portſmouth to Dover, and from Dover to Sheerneſs; the firſt is 120, the latter 36, and the whole is 156 miles in length. The diſtance from this ſhore of Britain, or arc of the circle, to the metropolis is throughout from 70 to 56 miles; and to Chatham in ſeveral places, from 30 to 25 miles only. Along or near the ſhore there are about 27 towns and villages; very few of them however (at preſent) diſtinguiſhed by their ſize, population, opulence, or ſymmetry; although ſeveral contribute members to the legiſlature. Some are ſupported chiefly by bathing viſitors during the ſummer. Grazing, agriculture, and fiſheries are the principal occupations and riches of the inhabitants of this frontier, and are ever tempting baits to an invader. (See the tables and maps.)

Between Portſmouth and Sheerneſs we perceive five conſpicuous projecting headlands, ſome of them remarkable for their ruſtic grandeur, and between them nine bays or indentations of the ſea into the land, excluſive of ſeveral ſmaller intermediate projections and bays. *The flat ſhore of this frontier is nearly*

nearly equal to that of the towering cliffs; the latter of which are in moſt places inacceſſible to an enemy from the ſea, except by a few chinks and paſſes natural and artificial. Some miles behind the ſhore a chain of hills, aſcending nearly to the dignity of mountains, run from Portſmouth in the rear of Shoreham and Brighton, and as far as Beachy Head. Behind Pevenſey and Romney Vales the ground riſes, but not in bold hills until near Hythe. In the rear of Hythe and Folkſtone there is a romantic girdle of circumvallation, formed into natural baſtions and curtains.

Beſides the general face of the ſhore and country behind, the coaſt towns, paſſes, &c. a conſideration of the longitudinal and tranſverſe roads, and lines of operation on which armies muſt act, is equally indiſpenſible in forming judicious arrangements of defence. From the ſouth point of Suſſex there is a circular or coaſt road to Margate, and connecting with each town. In winter this road, particularly along the flats, is very bad, but upwards of a dozen direct and convenient military roads lead from the towns on the coaſt to the metropolis, coaleſcing as they approach the center to half that number. Some, as for inſtance thoſe from Dover, Deal, Sandwich,

Ramſgate, Margate, form a junction in Canterbury, which is but ſixteen miles diſtant from each place, and the ſea. The tranſverſe roads and lines, through which the preceding or longitudinal neceſſarily paſs to the metropolis, are not above one third that number. It would be an additional ſecurity againſt the progreſs of invaders, if all the roads immediately leading from the ſhore were carried through defiles.

From theſe general preliminaries, I proceed to a more ſpecific ſurvey of the ſea frontier, outworks, and covert way, if I may uſe the metaphor, of the channel ſtraits. *And as I conſider Dover and Deal, the two principal and joint keys of this portion of frontier and of the channel ſtraits,* I begin with them. *They may be termed the Thermopylæ and Dardanells of Britain. Between Deal and Harwich is alſo the maritime baſis of a triangle, of which the Nore is the acute point.*

It is evident of what conſequence William the Norman thought the poſſeſſion of Dover. Its diſtance from Battle is little leſs than from Battle to London; (56 miles) yet notwithſtanding the total overthrow of Harold and his army, the conqueror choſe rather to make

this

this circuit, which added 70 miles to his march to the metropolis, in order to ſecure a ſafe harbour, and fortreſs, contiguous to France, before he ventured into the country.

Dover town cannot be taken, by force, by any direct attack from the ſea, having five or ſix miles of ſtupendous precipices on each ſide to ſecure it: that narrow chaſm on which the town and harbour lay, is protected by ſeveral batteries, and ſeveral more might be erected on each ſhoulder of the two hills over-looking the town and the entrance from the ſea. It muſt therefore be aſſailed by the eaſt or weſt flanks of Deal and Folkſtone, or by the north and rear from Canterbury. Three princi-pal roads lead into Dover from Deal, Folkſtone, and Canterbury. The town lays in a hollow between two mountains: towards the ſhore the tops of theſe mountains are probably a mile diſtant from each other, and at the op-poſite extremity half that diſtance. Theſe two gigantic hills, like Mount Edgecumbe at Plymouth, may be truly called the keys of Dover. Whoever is in poſſeſſion of either of them may lay the town below in aſhes, pre-vent all intercourſe by the harbour, and com-mand the batteries erected on the verge of

the ſea, beneath that hill which they are in poſſeſſion of. Let us firſt inveſtigate the defences of the north-eaſt hill, on which the ancient Caſtle is built.

The Lord Warden and Guardian of the Cinque Ports may refute me, if he can, but I have no heſitation in declaring that I think Dover, in its preſent ſtate, is not tenable for any time, provided an enemy in force, and protected by a ſuperior navy, could effect a landing and poſſeſs themſelves of the ſummit of the hill on the Deal road, overlooking the Caſtle, and within muſket ſhot of its north-eaſt face. Between Deal and this hill, which are but eight miles diſtant, there is no natural obſtacle on land to overcome; and "vice verſa." Before the invention of gunpowder and cannon, ſtone walls might be ſufficiently ſtrong: but ſince theſe tremendous inventions it has been found neceſſary, both for ſecurity of the defenders, and the Fort, to add ramparts of earth from fifty to one hundred feet thick behind the walls, to enlarge the towers into baſtions, and to add outworks. Dover Caſtle labours, notoriouſly, under all theſe imperfections. It is by no means indebted for its ſuppoſed ſecurity, to

either

either its artificial ſtrength or form, but to its natural ſituation and elevation. The form is a parallellogram, or nearly ſo, the two ſides eaſt and weſt being double the length of the other two ſides to the ſea and the north. The whole circumference I conceive to be about three quarters of a mile. With very little exertion of art, two ſides, a ſhort and a long, might be rendered impregnable: very few men would be required for their defence, which could therefore be ſpared to the two weak ſides, and the neceſſary outworks which I am about to recommend. The ſhort ſide to the ſea is ſecured by a perpendicular precipice far higher than any effort of human architecture. The other long ſide towards Dover town is ſecured by a ſteep declivity and chaſm. One half alſo of the eaſt flank of Dover Caſtle ſkirting the ſea is protected by a broad and deep valley. It follows that the weak faces of the Caſtle are north and north-eaſt, fronting the Deal road.

To render Dover Caſtle tenable, I apprehend there ſhould be erected a *ſtrong Fort*, on the line of high road to Deal, within muſket ſhot of the north-eaſt face or angle of the Caſtle: alſo a *Ravelin* on the north ſide nearly

oppoſite to the gate, and extending beyond the barn; one half of it flanking the north, the other face the hollow way and eaſt ſide of the Caſtle. The road to Deal to be carried round it, and afterwards more to the right along the margin of the Fort and ſlope of the hill, ſo as to be better enfiladed by the Caſtle guns. Another ravelin might, with little difficulty or expence, be formed from that mound of earth before the extremity of the Caſtle ditch contiguous to the ſea. Theſe two ravelins in conjunction, and connected by a ſecond ditch, would interrupt approaches to this vulnerable face. Perhaps, it would alſo be prudent to ſink a well in the hollow interval between them, for the more certain and plentiful ſupply of the garriſon, which has now but one well: and to theſe may be added ciſterns for catching rain. The whole ditch round the Caſtle ſhould be cleared out and paliſaded, the glacis ſcarped, the high towers lowered to the level of the ramparts; becauſe their repair is a fruitleſs expence, and they would be injurious in a ſiege to the defenders, both by the ſplinters, and by their ruins filling up the ditch, and forming a bridge for the aſſailants to paſs over. The old moat or exalted mound of earth within the Caſtle, might

be

be converted into a Citadel. The barracks would be more ſheltered in a ſiege along the ſide of the Caſtle towards the town; there ſhould be caſemates, and bomb-proof magazines, ſcooped into the rock; the walls ſhould be lined with ramparts of earth interſected with traverſes, and the ſurface of the naked ground within the Caſtle levelled.

The reader will now pleaſe to accompany me to the oppoſite weſtern hill. Should an enemy be permitted to gain the ſummit of the paſs or gaut above Folkſtone on the road leading to Dover, the table land from thence preſents no material impediment until about halfway, when this oblong weſtern hill ſeparates the road into two, which run at the bottom of it to each extremity of Dover, that to the right being within muſket ſhot of the cliffs, and ſea. This naked mountain is extremely ſteep on three ſides: towards Dover there is a perpendicular precipice of chalk ſtone, and the other two long ſides going from this at right angles, might be ſcarped ſo as to render them much more difficult of aſcent. The moſt remote or weſt ſide is naturally the weak and vulnerable part, becauſe it extends a mile beyond the fartheſt guard houſes, and

cannot

cannot all therefore be brought within the lines of defence. But this weſt face, though naturally weakeſt, is fortunately the narroweſt of all the ſides, requiring, probably not above four hundred yards of rampart, and conſequently would ſeem to be well ſecured by two baſtions, a ditch, rampart, ravelin, and covert way. The north and ſouth faces having natural defences, may, by every maxim of fortification, be prolonged to double or treble the length of the former. The whole would form an oblong Fort or parallellogram, correſponding with the ſhape of the hill, the area of which would be double to that of the oppoſite ancient Caſtle: it would command, not only the two roads running beneath it from Folkſtone to Dover, but alſo the entrance from the Canterbury road. A wet ditch acroſs the narrow valley would be an additional ſecurity to this northern entrance into Dover; from which to Barham Down there is a chain of defiles. The ſurface of this hill within the ramparts ſhould be levelled. The ſteep brow towards Dover ſhould be ſloped off into a gentle deſcent, like the oppoſite hill, which would enlarge the too narrow dimenſions of the town in that part: and the fragments of this chalk ſtone could

be

be uſed to form a high and broad rampart at the North extremity of the town, connecting both hills, and a road carried along its ſummit. Immediately within this rampart, I think, would be a proper central ſituation for barracks and caſemates: through the gate in the center the high road and river to be carried, the latter of which ſhould there enter the acute point or cone of the new harbour, as I ſhall hereafter explain, and recommend.

Upon the whole, I conceive that to make the two hills or flanks of Dover capable of effectual reſiſtance againſt a formidable invader, and to improve its harbour, would require the united labour of twenty thouſand men during five or ten years: and that when theſe works are compleated, from ſix to ten thouſand men would be ſufficient to defend them againſt an enemy of one hundred thouſand.

Deal, and the Downs on which the former lays, being by ſituation, depth of water, anchorage, ſhelter, &c. a naval rendezvous, ſtage, and reſting place of ſuch ineſtimable importance to this iſland, it will not be thought ſuperfluous that I devote a few lines

to

to this neglected aſylum of our marine of every deſcription and burthen. The ſhore and coaſt between Dover and Deal becomes flat near the latter, and continues ſo many miles round the bay of Sandwich to near Ramſgate, when the chalky cliffs recommence along the front of Thanet as far as Margate. Along the ſhore of Deal there are three ancient ſtone works, called Caſtles, Walmer, Deal, and Sandown; the firſt and the laſt being upwards of two miles diſtant from each other. I am not ſatisfied that theſe paltry caſtles could make much reſiſtance againſt even a vigorous attack from the ſea; but as an acute enemy would, no doubt, endeavour to land at ſome diſtance on the naked ſhore, and come on their rear, they muſt then, like all batteries not included in forts and flanked on every ſide, ſubmit. I therefore take the liberty of ſuggeſting whether two ſquare Forts, arched or caſemated in front, ſomewhat ſimilar to that lately erected oppoſite Spithead, (called Fort Monckton) and a floating battery ſtationed in the centre would not be of more utility in affording ſecurity to the ſhips anchored in the Downs, and in repelling an invader who ventured in front or flank? He may and ſhould be excluded

cluded from penetrating on the right of Deal, and forced to encounter a more dangerous navigation lower down. Deal Town ſhould alſo be made more regular, enlarged towards the rear, and all ſorts of naval manufactories eſtabliſhed there: its police alſo requires amendment.

From Deal, Dover, and Folkſtone let us return back along the ſhore towards Portſmouth. From Folkſtone the cliffs continue bold to Sandgate: a flat ſhore ſucceeds to Hythe, Romney, Dungeneſs, Rye, Winchelſea; and an extenſive luxuriant vale covered with ſheep. Between Winchelſea and Haſtings ſteep cliffs front the ſea, to which ſucceeds another fertile level of paſture land as far as Eaſt Bourne, called Pevenſey Marſh, appropriated to the fattening of bullocks. Theſe two vales, Romney and Pevenſey, reſemble Flanders and Holland, and revive pleaſing ideas of the paſtoral ages. To them London is indebted for a conſiderable ſhare of her weekly ſupply of two important neceſſaries of life, ſheep and bullocks. From Eaſt Bourne and Cockmere which lay on each ſhoulder of Beachyhead, tremendous cliffs extend to Seaford: between this and Newhaven,

haven there is a ſmall bay and flat ſhore: from the latter perpendicular cliffs continue to the Weſt of Brighton, when the ſhore becomes flat and tame to Shoreham, the Arun, and South point of Suſſex.

Having now glanced at the *natural*, I ſhall, with equal brevity, notice the *artificial* defences along this frontier, interſperſing and ſuggeſting ſome improvements. About a dozen of batteries, and upwards of one hundred cannon are erected on the line between Folkſtone and Portſmouth. Sandgate old Caſtle is a diminutive pile of ſtone walls and towers on the verge of the ſea. As there is a conſiderable elevation of ground within muſket ſhot behind this fort, I do not ſee the neceſſity of either repairing or rebuilding it: and a floating battery there would propably be more uſeful. Between this and Hythe the ground riſes behind the ſhore and the road into a ſort of natural baſtion, on which cannon are judiciouſly enough placed: on the ſhore, to the weſt of Hythe, two new ſquare redoubts are erected near a mile diſtance from each other, with cannon flanking the intervals, and others pointed to the ſea. The fort of Dungeneſs has all the imperfections


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of that at Sandgate. Rye and Winchelſea ſtand about a mile from the ſhore on natural mounds riſing out of an extenſive plain. The former has ſome imperfect batteries, and cannon pointed to the harbour. The poſition of both towns is ſtrong, and the approaches difficult, rivers, canals, and marſhes ſurrounding three ſides of them. It appears, by the Saxon Chronicle, that a large army of Danes, under Haſtings, landed near this place, and another column, at the ſame time, landed on the oppoſite ſide of Kent at Milton in the Swale, a branch of the Medway: that Alfred poſted his army in the centre of Kent between that of the invaders, to check their depredation and prevent their junction. At Haſtings a ſmall battery is erected on the ſhore: beyond this there is a natural rampart of five or ſix miles in extent in the rear of the road, which there runs along the ſhore. Pevenſey Vale is interſected by numerous drains and canals, but has no cannon. If the walls of that majeſtic Roman ruin, Pevenſey Caſtle, were lowered one half, and a ditch dug round the outſide, a ſtrong inner rampart might be formed of theſe materials, which with the addition of four baſtions would, in that flat ſituation, and ſo near the

ſea,

ſea, admit of conſiderable defence, and connect the chain of poſts on this frontier. For better ſecurity againſt an enemy and the ſea, there ſhould be along the ſhore of both Romney and Pevenſey Vales a ſtrong double embankment, at ſome diſtance from each other, the road carried along the ſecond, which might be conſtructed with projecting redans, like lines of countervallation. Nature has fortified the interval between Beachyhead and Seaford. Between Seaford and Newhaven a battery is erected on a natural promontory near the ſhore, and another on the ſhoulder of the cliff at Newhaven, where the river Ouze enters, and purſues its courſe through Lewes. This populous town lays central on the frontier between Portſmouth and Dover, environed on three ſides by very high ground, a few miles diſtant from Newhaven and the ſea, to which it is connected by a navigable river. I recommend a barrack, a poſt, and port here. At Rotten Dean there is a narrow landing place, but no cannon. Brighton has two ſmall batteries on each ſide upon the brow of the cliffs. But, for reaſons before ſtated, and obvious, neither Brighton nor Haſtings could be defended, by theſe batteries, againſt aſſailants once landed in force.

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The ſummits of the two hills on each ſide of them are the only poſts for reſiſting and repelling an attack on land. The Devil's Dyke behind Shoreham, with a few redoubts, could be made a difficult paſs. There are ſeveral other ſtrong poſitions along this ſecond line.

It is generally admitted that maritime towns ſhould be built near the entrance of navigable rivers, of eaſy acceſs for ſhips, free from rocks and ſhoals, ſecure or capable of being made ſo againſt an enemy, and ſtorms. Rye, Newhaven, Shoreham, and Hampton are the only four harbours of this deſcription between Dover and Portſmouth. Moſt of the other towns and villages lay on the open ſhore, without back water, and conſequently cannot be improved but by projecting piers or moles, as at Gibraltar and Cherburgh, or by inland docks. But the former admit of eſſential improvement both to their harbours and inland navigation. The Ouze might be joined to the Medway, the Arun to the Thames. Rye, Winchelſea, Pevenſey, and Cockmere might all be made very convenient and capacious both for commerce and fiſheries, and a new town rebuilt

at Pevenſey. As to the abſurd idea that by there being few convenient ports on this coaſt an enemy will have fewer openings to invade us, it is mean, wretched, and ruinous policy: as well might it be urged that by turning the whole frontier into a deſert, they would be deterred from doing us miſchief*.

As to fortifications I admit that previous to erecting them there ſhould be clear demonſtration of their utility, importance, expence, the number of troops requiſite for their defence, and the capability of the nation, both as to men and money. I alſo admit that in all fortifications and lines, if they are not equally ſtrong by nature or art, in every part, they are imperfect: and in ſuch an extent of frontier this is impracticable. But this argument of imperfection would bear equally againſt all the actions and offices of human life. What fortreſſes, towns, bridges, roads, did the Romans conſtruct in this Iſland? In the ſhort ſpace of two years two Roman legions compleated the ſtately and ſolid rampart of ſeventy miles acroſs the north part

* See Campbell's Political Survey of Britain and its Harbours.

of

of England. Trajan's roads and bridges were infinitely more uſeful to the Roman empire than the moſt ſplendid victories. After the era of Dioclefian the chain of fortifications along the Roman frontiers were ſome thouſand miles in extent. What rendered Conſtantinople ſo many generations impregnable againſt the northern barbarians? The north frontier of France has between twenty and thirty regular fortifications on it; and all Europe are long witneſs to their importance in repelling invaders. Are the *public works* erected in this Iſland ſuch as the nation has a right to expect in return for their enormous burthen of taxes?

Velocity of correſpondence between the ſeat of government and the channel coaſt would always in war be of the firſt importance, and ſtill more ſo when an invaſion is meditated, or attempted. Mr. Gibbons in his Roman hiſtory, and Kempfher in that of Japan mention the celerity with which theſe nations communicated to a great diſtance the alarm of an enemy on their coaſts. Teleſcopes though recommended many centuries ago by an Engliſhman, have been but lately introduced for the conveyance of military correſ-

pondence. A telegraphe erected on the top of the Treaſury, might convey in two branches and in a few ſtages, inſtructions and orders to Chatham and the Downs, and to Portſmouth; and from theſe laſt along the Channel frontier, and alſo acroſs the mouth of the Thames to Harwich. In this way intelligence and diſpatches could be carried forwards and backwards with extreme rapidity. Perhaps our merchants and inſurers would benefit by adopting ſome ſyſtem of this ſort.

Should an invaſion, in force, of Great Britain be ever ſeriouſly apprehended, probably, it would be prudent to erect temporary *redoubts*, or ſquare forts, with flank baſtions, oppoſite ſeveral other naked landing places, eſpecially along the channel and Eaſt coaſt, and near commercial towns ſituated on navigable rivers, and arms or bays of the ſea, and in particular paſſes by which an enemy from the ſhore could ſuddenly enter the country, or ſeize upon a ſtrong poſt; to which troops forced back from the ſhore could retreat, and await ſuccours; and to prevent the invader from advancing in ſeveral columns. Theſe redoubts would ſerve to pro-

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tect the defenders, the ſhips, and houſes, from fire and ſhells, from ſudden predatory incurſions and coup de mains. The parapets to be made of earth, and faced with green ſod, old bricks, or timber; without this the ditch, a covered way and glacis, paliſadoes, loop holes, ſtakes, crows feet, men traps, ſpring guns and carronades, &c. and when narrow harbours and rivers are to be defended, chains, boombs, gun boats, flat barges, floating batteries. Within the redoubt and its outworks, cannons, howitzers, mortars, carronades, air guns, long and croſs bows, furnaces, ſhells, grenades, ſhot, grape, fire engine. Temporary caſemates or cover for the troops and ſtores may be formed of ſtrong timber planks leaned ſloping againſt each other, like ſheds, covered with faſcines, and a thick layer of moiſt clay and cow dung, and over all a wet ſail or winnow cloth: and the troops may fire between baſkets or ſacks of earth or ſand laid on the parapets. Muller and Belidor may be uſefully conſulted on ſtructures of this ſort; which ſhould be erected under the inſpection of ſkilful engineers and naval officers, and at the expence of each county, city, and town where they

are wanted. A well of good water, within, or under the fire of the redoubt will alſo be a valuable addition.

In ſudden extremities, where there is not ſufficient time to erect ſubſtantial redoubts, or breaſt-works, and where there is no natural or artificial cover between the defenders and the invaders, ſuch as ditches, hedges, fences, trees, holloways, banks, precipices, walls, houſes, moraſſes, rivers, brooks, and ſo forth; perhaps, this end might, in ſome degree, be effected, by a number of ſtuffed mattraſſes of wool and horſe hair, ſix inches in thickneſs; and faſtened by a few poſts, ropes, and chains. They would ſerve, like the hammocks and bedding of ſailors, a double uſe; to repel grape or muſket ſhot, or to deaden its force, and at other times as beds. Such matraſſes being light, could be always carried about in the different waggons, covered with canvas or oil cloth, and without embarraſſment or expence. Neceſſity and invention might ſuggeſt a variety of other temporary materials for parapets, as gabions, baſkets, barrels, hogſheads and ſacks filled with earth, ſand, faſcines, or faggots: poſts

and

and planks with boards nailed againſt them, or iron bars: willows and oziers platted into a thick fence: poſts with chains, cables or ropes: paliſadoes of wood or iron: feather-beds, woolpacks, ſtraw, ruſh or junk mats, raw hides, ſheep ſkins, winnow cloths, carpets, ſacks, ſails, chair and ſofa ſeats: reeds, bull-ruſhes, broom, ſtraw and hay tied firm in bundles. Waggons might alſo be better conſtructed to ſerve, occaſionally, as parapets.

In artillery, the defenders may always be ſuperior to the invaders; and it is generally admitted, that raw infantry ſhould, on that account, be provided with more artillery and cavalry. Each maritime county could, in times of impending danger, provide themſelves with a ſmall train of iron ordinance, of light conſtruction, from the Carron foundery, at a moderate expence, and for real uſe, not inferior to braſs. They could alſo have in ſtore gunpowder and ammunition, of every ſpecies, ready prepared in cartridges, proportioned to different diſtances, and marked; and it will be an error on the ſafe ſide, to diminiſh conſiderably the powder in the

ordnance charges. The inhabitants can alſo render important aſſiſtance to the regular and armed forces, by providing an aſſortment of other inſtruments and machines, of which a brief enumeration may not be ſuperfluous: the principal of theſe are ſaws, hatchets, adzes, bills, augurs, bits, gimblits, chiſſels, planes, pickaxes, cranes, forks, ſpades, ſhovels, mallets, hammers, nails, pins, bolts, ſcrews, hooks, chains, horſe ſhoes; wheel and hand barrows, baſkets, gabions, faſcines, chevaux de frize, paliſadoes, ſtakes, pickets, hand-ſpikes, ladders, gins, cranes, buckets, fire engines, grindſtones, ſacks, mattraſſes, mats, blankets, tents, cords, lanterns, flambeaux, harneſs, carts, tumbrils, waggons, panniers; travelling forges, kitchens and ovens, canteens, and leather bottles. To this ordnance liſt may be added certain artificers, as farriers, gunſmiths, wheel wrights, carpenters, maſons, harneſs makers, waggoners, labourers. And, by providing coaches, chaiſes and horſes, infantry can be conveyed, with more celerity, along the frontier.—A few good teleſcopes and maps of the country and roads will alſo be uſeful. A conſtant ſupply of generous nouriſhment to the troops will likewiſe

likewiſe be of infinite benefit, and more eſpecially ſo againſt the preſent ſyſtem of French tacticks. Homer, in his Iliad, has beautifully illuſtrated this ſubject.

Note. Whether Guernſey and Jerſey might not be preliminary ſteps of invaſion by France is problematical; but at all events they ſhould be well provided and prepared in every reſpect.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Additional remarks on the importance of Dover and Milford Haven: on the Tower of London. Animadverſions on the Barracks now erecting throughout Great Britain.

I Proceed to a further illuſtration of what G——l L——d has not thought proper to diſcuſs in his Rhapſody, but on which, I have an opportunity to know, he could have communicated much uſeful and original information. I allude to *Dover*, and the whole range of coaſt from thence to the Thames.

In all that extenſive ſea arch, of fifty leagues, between Portſmouth and the conflux of the Medway, and the Thames, there is not a harbour, port, or aſylum, convenient for admitting, ſheltering, and repairing large ſhips, when endangered or damaged by ſtorms or an enemy. One half of the Britiſh commerce muſt inceſſantly paſs and repaſs this tract of coaſt and channel, expoſed in war to the cruizers and privateers of France, eſpecially between Dunkirk and Cherbourg. Na-

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ture has made the ſtraits of Dover the principal maritime paſs and defile of Britain, through which the reſpective commerce of the Northern and Southern nations of Europe is conveyed, and through which France muſt tranſport her naval ſtores from the Baltic. Art, therefore, ſhould be employed in the aſſiſtance of nature, ſo as to conſtruct a harbour, capable of receiving ſhips of war and commerce when in danger or diſtreſs. They cannot often, without great riſk, lay in the Downs during the equinoctial gales, and winter ſeaſon, and therefore without a convenient, and ſafe port in the vicinity, there is neither ſecurity againſt ſtorms, and ſtill leſs againſt a ſuperior enemy, nor a convenient ſtation for interrupting their commerce and convoys. Dover is an intermediate ſtage between Portſmouth and the Nore; it ſeems a moſt important barrier to the Medway and the Thames; and a hoſtile debarkation on the part of France, north of Dover, might in a variety of ways be annoyed from that projecting poſt. One half of the frontier roads of Kent leading to Chatham and London, unite but fifteen miles in its rear, at Canterbury. Theſe narrow ſtraits, a dangerous coaſt, and a ſecure harbour would even

compenſate

compenſate for a conſiderable inferiority of maritime force, both in naval action, and as laying ſo advantageouſly for the interception of naval ſtores. Multitudes of ſhips and materials of commerce would then be preſerved, which are annually wrecked in that tract of channel, excluſive of the loſſes by inſurances and captures in war. What dreadful havock has France made in the narrow ſeas amongſt our merchantmen? Nor can we retaliate, with equal facility, as the rich commercial ports of France lay at a greater diſtance from our coaſt and reach.

Within the laſt hundred and thirty years, Dunkirk, and lately Cherbourg, have been conſtructed, at an enormous expence, notoriouſly, as a Scylla, and Charybdis, to devour the Britiſh commerce. We ſhould be unjuſt to ourſelves, were we to neglect the means of counteracting theſe ambuſcades, and ſtratagems of a reſtleſs and an inconſtant enemy. It is to me aſtoniſhing that no Engliſh miniſter has yet ſeen the immenſe importance of theſe narrow ſtraits; that they might compel all the maritime powers to court the friendſhip of Britain, and to dread hoſtilities with her.

But

But if the arguments I have here uſed, in favour of Dover, ſhould fail to impreſs conviction, I have many more in reſerve, and weighty authority to ſupport me. It is a ſecret lodged in the French cabinet, and known but to very few perſons in England, that ſome years after the late rebellion in Scotland, G——l L——d was employed by the French miniſtry, together with five other engineers and pilots, to ſurvey the harbour of Dunkirk, and to determine whether it could not, by art, be made a complete marine arſenal and deep harbour. At that time the French king and miniſtry had it in contemplation to attempt the next invaſion of England, in concert with the exiled family of Stuart, from Dunkirk, and to ſtrike, if poſſible, by the narrow ſeas, directly at the Britiſh metropolis; or, at all events, to be enabled, from thence, to commit greater depredations on the Britiſh commerce, in its flux and reflux by the Thames. I have peruſed a copy of theſe engineers' report and memorial to the French cabinet, which is now in the poſſeſſion of G——l L——d's friend. The plan, the number of convicts, ſoldiers, and ſailors, neceſſary to complete

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the works, the expence and time, are all ſtated.

Dunkirk, together with part of French Flanders, when taken from the Spaniſh and Auſtrian monarchy by the joint arms of the Engliſh and French in 1658, was ſurrendered into the hands of Cromwell. Four years after it was ſold to the French by Charles the Second, as a temporary ſupply for his profligate expences. In the poſſeſſion of that rival it was calculated, during war, to be an extreme annoyance to the Engliſh commerce. But it was Lewis the Fourteenth who, by the unremitting labour of ten thouſand men during thirty years, made it a renowned ſea port and fortification. Afterwards, at the end of two ruinous wars to France, in the reigns of Lewis the Fourteenth and Fifteenth, it was ſtipulated, as an indiſpenſible article of peace, that the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk ſhould be demoliſhed and filled up, within four months at the expence of France, and never to be repaired. Scandalous conceſſion! Why was it not reſtored back to Auſtria, and guaranteed to that crown? It ſhould have been a fundamental axiom of Great Britain, never to permit France

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to extend her Northern maritime frontier beyond the harbour of Calais. Liſle ſeems alſo indiſpenſible for the ſecurity of the Imperial poſſeſſions in the Netherlands; and until that transfer takes place, Britain and Holland will have expended enormous ſums in that quarter to very little national benefit.*

When G——l L——d had ſurveyed the channel coaſt of England a ſecond time as a friend of France, he could not ſuppreſs ſarcaſtic remarks upon the ſtupidity, or ——— of the Britiſh miniſters and engineers who never had endeavoured to render all theſe inimical projects, from the ſide of Dunkirk, abortive, by means of Dover. This he termed, emphatically, the counter plan of England. The old town of Dover lays in a valley, on part of the foundation of which, and of the preſent narrow harbour G——l L——d, and his military friend at that time, recommended one far more capacious in depth, breadth, and length, to be ſcooped out, and a new regular town to be built on the baſe and declivity, on each ſide of this harbour. There would be ſufficient depth of water, and a current

* See a late Hiſtory of Dunkirk with plates by Diot: publiſhed by W. Faden.

behind

behind to clear out the ſand; and the fortifications on every ſide, might be rendered as impregnable as thoſe of Gibraltar. It was alſo recommended to make it a free port, ſo as to rival Dunkirk in commerce and population. I conceive that our convicts would be much more profitably employed in ſuch labour, in clearing harbours, in adding to the defences of our dock yards, in forming embankments on the ſea coaſt, erecting moles, piers, &c. than in diſtant and extravagant voyages to Botany Bay.

Every unprejudiced judge will, I believe, admit, that in the preſent century immenſe ſums, upwards of one million Sterling, have been ſquandered, to very little purpoſe, on the harbour of Ramſgate, and on the fortifications of Chatham. In the opinion of ſkilful engineers, the laſt is a flagrant impoſition and public robbery. Sheerneſs and Upnor, the barriers of the Medway, were forced by the Dutch in Charles the Second's reign; but they were repulſed on the Thames at Tilbury Fort. If however, France ſhould revive her project of invaſion againſt the head and heart of our iſland, *all* theſe different forts and landing places, as far as Harwich, would,

would, require previous additional ſecurity, eſpecially *Dover*, and *Deal*, *Sheerneſs*, and *Tilbury*. Or, what I think, more adviſeable is, to demoliſh both theſe laſt defective barriers of the two moſt important rivers in Britain, and to erect regular and ſubſtantial fortreſſes in their place. Some harbours on the Eaſt coaſt are too naked of defence. *Newcaſtle* requires particular attention.

It ſhould always be remembered, that as yet, in modern fortification, even in works thought perfect, the ſcience of attack is more improved and certain, than that of defence. It ſeems however probable, that when the theory and practice of inundation, of mines, and counter-mines, of ricochet firing, when various intricacies reſpecting the compoſition and conſtruction of artillery, reſpecting gunpowder, charges, projectiles, pneumaticks, &c. are better underſtood, that the beſieged, under the conduct of a ſcientific and reſolute governor, will be enabled to make a more obſtinate and reputable reſiſtance.

Turning our attention next to the Weſtern coaſt of England, we perceive *Milford Haven*, a convenient, capacious, and ſafe harbour,

ſituated on the projecting coaſt of Wales, in a central ſituation between Britain and Ireland, and between Briſtol and Liverpool. From its ſituation and port, it ſeems admirably calculated to protect and promote the whole commerce of the weſt coaſt of Britain, of the oppoſite coaſt of Ireland, and of the intermediate channel. It has many recommendations to render it a principal rendezvous of domeſtic and northern fiſheries, and a nurſery of ſailors. It is out of the reach, or at leaſt eaſy acceſs of any Southern, and ſtill more, of any Northern foe. Nature too has been bountiful in conſtructing it, with very little addition of art, an aſylum and retreat with difficulty aſſailable. There is no harbour in the whole weſtern coaſt of Britain, to be compared to Milford Haven, and none is ſo ſhamefully neglected. It is well entitled to become the metropolis of Wales, a naval nurſery, and depôt; a convenient ſtage, of mutual intercourſe between both iſlands. I could point out many ſerious inconveniences in leaving it open for the accommodation of a maritime invader.

Tower of London. Muller juſtly obſerves, " that when a town is large and wealthy, and

" has

" has little or no fortification, and where it
" would be too expenſive to fortify the town
" itſelf, that there a citadel is often built,
" which ſerves as a place of ſecurity to
" carry in the moſt valuable effects of the in-
" habitants, when the approach of an enemy
" is apprehended; and if the place is a ſea-
" port, to protect ſhips laying in it."—In the preſent enlarged ſtate of London and the vaſt increaſe of ſhips to the eaſt of the Tower, this diminutive Gothic ruin is a mere burleſque againſt external and internal enemies, provided with the proper implements of war. I therefore ſubmit to public and parliamentary diſcuſſion, the propriety of erecting, for the above mentioned purpoſes, a regular fortreſs, at leaſt ſix times greater in dimenſions than the Tower, excluſive of outworks. The moſt eligible ſituation ſeems to me that extenſive projecting flat, between Limehouſe and Blackwall, which is ſkirted on three ſides by the Thames. It might, in a great meaſure, be executed by convicts, ſuperintended by the Artillery Corps, and who, on its being finiſhed, might transfer their laboratory and arſenal from Woolwich to this tenable ſpot.

Whoever examines, with a critical eye, the environs of London, will perceive that it preſents many natural obſtacles to the progreſs of an enemy, which we ſhall ſuppoſe landed and victorious, and aiming, either by the ſide of Kent and Eſſex, or of both, at the poſſeſſion of the Metropolis. This acceſs might be made conſiderably more difficult: and were the inhabitants able to bear arms, animated with ſufficient reſolution and patriotiſm to unite in its defence, an enemy, however formidable and preſumptuous, could not march into it with the ſame eaſe as into a ſheep-fold, and they could have no hopes of ſucceeding by blockade. The whole iſland would fly to its ſuccour, and to aſſail the enemy's lines of operation. In ſuch an emergency, the active influence and exertion of the female ſex could never have a more glorious opportunity of diſplaying itſelf, than in rouzing their protectors to act the part of men and Britons. Homer's Iliad furniſhes ſome inimitable ſpeeches and arguments in diſaſtrous circumſtances of this nature. The obſtinate reſiſtance made in ancient and modern times, by ſeveral large cities, for inſtance, by Jeruſalem, Rome, Alexandria, Conſtantinople, Vienna, Turin, &c.

&c.

&c. are additional incentives to a nation ever celebrated for its determined valour. It is about eight centuries ago that Canute the Dane, with a formidable army, was in one year three times repulſed by the citizens of London, and compelled to raiſe the ſiege of that Metropolis.

Barracks. Since the late popular uproar and phrenzy in France, the Britiſh Miniſtry have thought it neceſſary to order barracks to be erected throughout various parts of this iſland, inſtead of quartering the troops as before on the publicans. It is not the principle, but the plan that I think moſt faulty; and I lament that in this project, as well as in the late precipitate fortifications of Chatham, more diſcuſſion, deliberation, and judgment were not previouſly exerciſed and courted.

My objecttions to the preſent barracks are, that *they are not on the frontier oppoſed to the principal enemy of Britain;* conſequently are not diſpoſed for prompt attack or defence, by ſea or land, at home or abroad. Becauſe they ſcatter the ſmall Britiſh army into diſtant fragments, inſtead of collecting the troops into a few frontier poſts, where they would have the

advantage of manœuvring in conſiderable bodies; a circumſtance which G——l L——d and other intelligent military judges principally complain of, as giving the French army a ſuperiority over ours. Becauſe, in peace as well as in war, much depends on the judicious diſtribution of the troops; and in getting the ſtart of the enemy before he is prepared. Were not the ſtrength of the Roman legions always ſtationed along the frontiers and verge of their moſt formidable enemies, eſpecially along the Rhine and the Danube?

With great ſubmiſſion to the preſent military directors of the Britiſh Cabinet, *London*, *Dover*, *Portſmouth*, *Plymouth*, and *Milford Haven*, ſeem to me the moſt eligible ſtations for barracks for the Britiſh ſtanding army, and eſpecially the infantry, both in peace and in war. *Lewes* and *Hall Down* ſeem alſo proper intermediate ſtations. They cover the dock yards and ſhips, the metropolis, the frontier principally expoſed to invaſion; they preſent an inſtantaneous reinforcement for Ireland, for the remote colonies of the empire, or to attack the enemy unprepared in his own ports. As to *Chatham* it can neither be

be fortified nor defended, except by the approaches of the Medway, and the frontier lines of Kent and Suſſex; and its barracks are extremely unhealthy by being expoſed to the adjoining marſhy effluvia. There is no doubt had they been erected on the ſummit of the hill, inſtead of the declivity, they would have been more beyond the reach or uſual aſcent of thoſe noxious vapours: or the river might be embanked, and the marſhes converted into dry land. But in their preſent ſtate they can neither claim the merit of policy or humanity.

Had the Britiſh army been placed in thoſe frontier ſtations of the channel coaſt, ready at the commencement and critical moment of the preſent hoſtilities with France, in all probability the greateſt difficulties of the war would by this time have been overcome, to our honour and ſatisfaction, and we ſhould have been now looking with pleaſing confidence, to the ſpeedy termination of hoſtilities and expences. It is time to put an end to the ruinous ſyſtem of carrying on wars as we do ſuits in Chancery. Celerity and activity is the ſoul of warfare. From want of barracks in ſuch proper ſtations, ſee how the inhabitants of the channel coaſt are now tor-

tured and oppreſſed with troops for defence and embarkation; and how many have ſickened and died in conſequence of being too long confined in the foul air of tranſports. Of Dover and Milford Haven, I have already ſuggeſted many favourable circumſtances to recommend them to public and parliamentary notice. Milford Haven would be, of all others, the moſt convenient link and laſt ſtage between Britain and Ireland, for embarking and diſembarking marching regiments in their annual rotation of quarters from each iſland into the other, and for tranſporting and receiving mutual ſupplies and ſuccours, in caſes of neceſſity. It was from this port that Henry the Second embarked with his army for the reduction of Ireland. The ſoldiers would have another advantage in being quartered along the ſea coaſt, they could be better fed with fiſh, and more eſpecially ſo if a few boats were provided for each regiment: they would, at the ſame time, be inured and habituated to the ſea and navigation. Between theſe principal ſtations and baſtions of the channel coaſt, the ſmaller barracks already erected along the curtain of that frontier might be ſuffered to remain.

As

As to the defence, during peace, of the internal and northern parts of Britain, which are far ſeparated from all external enemies, I conceive that ſhould be conſigned to the militia in rotation, and a few of the cavalry regiments. If one fifth of the militia, or about 8000, were annually called out and diſciplined, ſuch duty would not reach each individual and regiment but once in five years. I truſt it cannot with truth be maintained that it is neceſſary to ſpread a permanent ſtanding army throughout this iſland, merely to promote ſubordination, to enforce the collection of taxes, or to bridle the inhabitants. It is a ſerious and alarming misfortune if our conſtitution and morals have fallen into ſuch decay as to require theſe deſperate remedies. But if ſuch is the fact, it would ſurely be wiſdom and policy to explore, without bias or faction, the diſeaſe and remedy. I never will admit that it can be neceſſary to ſcatter barracks throughout this iſland, like the ancient Barons caſtles, for purpoſes of the above deſcription. Beſides, if any ſerious inſurrection is or ſhould be hereafter intended, is it clear that ſuch ſubdiviſions of a ſmall army into ſo wide a

ſpace

ſpace would be a prudent meaſure? And would not ſhips carry them more expeditiouſly than they could march near the ſcene of action? Let our officers learn the buſineſs of war, and not the petty duties of conſtables and exciſemen. From London, Dover, and Portſmouth the troops could conveniently aſſemble at Coxheath, Barham Down, or Brighton, and alſo at their reſpective barracks in rotation, where they might annually practiſe all the poſſible evolutions of war, in ſufficient bodies, and under the eye of majeſty. A few practical military ſchools of this ſort are much wanted to render our officers more ſcientific and reſpectable in their profeſſional duty; and to be on a par with the enemy. An eminent writer has well obſerved, that a Roman review, and a battle differed in no reſpect but the ſhedding of blood.

Were I, in like manner, to ſuggeſt barracks for Ireland, and upon the ſame principle of attack, defence, and co-operation with Britain, I ſhould point out *Dublin*, *Waterford*, *Cork*, *Limerick*, and *Galway*, as the principal ſtations of the ſtanding forces of that Iſland.

To

To render theſe *Barracks* ſtill more beneficial and comfortable to thoſe who devote themſelves to the military profeſſion, and to the nation likewiſe, I beg leave to ſuggeſt the following improvements. Near each of the principal Barracks in Britain and Ireland, I propoſe that a ſufficient quantity of land be purchaſed for raiſing *Garden Vegetables*, eſpecially Potatoes, Cabbages, Carrots, Onions, Turnips, Beans, Peas, and ſome other of the eſculent tribe; to be cultivated by the ſoldiers, their wives, and children, for the uſes of each regiment. The officers to have a ſeparate garden. And it would not add to the expence were they to rear hogs, and poultry. That, in the herring and pilchard ſeaſon, the boats of each battalion be ſent out to catch theſe nutritive fiſh, which ſwarm periodically, on our coaſts; to cure them with ſalt, and theſe to be ſerved up during the winter, as one weekly meal for the whole barracks. If there ſhould appear any overplus after the public magazines are filled, ſuch overplus to be ſold for the benefit and encouragement of the captors. Probably, in this mode, a conſiderable ſaving might be made in the annual proviſions of the navy.

I propoſe

I propoſe that in each of theſe principal barracks, *Military Schools* be inſtituted, with competent profeſſors in *all* the different branches of that art, by land, and ſea, not omitting the ſcience of ſhip building and naval tacticks; that they read lectures and exhibit military experiments through the winter; that they be provided with proper books, inſtruments, apparatus, and engines: that young officers, officers ſons, cadets, together with marine and militia officers be admitted to theſe lectures, on paying a ſmall ſubſcription. That in future, every officer in the army, marines, militia, and Eaſt India ſervice, (thoſe excepted in remote garriſons or during actual war) previous to any ſtep of promotion, be obliged, by law, to produce a certificate of attendance on thoſe lectures. That a ſeparate courſe of lectures be alſo read by army phyſicians and ſurgeons on the diſeaſes and accidents moſt predominant in the military life, by land and ſea, in all climates and ſeaſons, their prevention and cure: that another courſe be read on the diſeaſes of horſes, farriery, n the whole veterinary art. That in each barrack an hoſpital, a riding houſe, and a church be erected.

I propoſe

I propoſe alſo, that *Military Muſical Schools* be inſtituted in each of theſe barracks, with able profeſſors, for teaching the ſons of ſoldiers, ſailors, and militia, the practice of all the wind and other inſtruments uſed in war, and military bands. Such an eſtabliſhment is greatly wanted in both Iſlands, for the ſupply of the army, navy, militia, Eaſt Indies, and Eaſt India ſhips. And I think the harp and bagpipe, as being peculiar national inſtruments, ſhould be added to the others now in general uſe. The number then of the different inſtruments of a compleat military band, would amount to thirteen or fourteen. It is ſuperfluous to obſerve how eſſential good muſic is to regulate marching. I could prove how it might be made to contribute to the health of ſeamen.

As a ſpur to induſtry, emulation, and excellence, both in the military and muſical ſchools, I propoſe that ſmall premiums of books, fire arms, medals, and muſical inſtruments be, annually, diſtributed in a public and honorary manner. That ſuperior dexterity in the rifle and air gun, in the long and

croſs

croſs bow, in the cavalry ſword, and in artillery evolutions be equally encouraged.

It would be curious to aſcertain, and might eaſily be done, the number of married ſoldiers, of widows, and children in the Britiſh army, navy, and militia. Would it not be politic to give this athletic claſs ſome encouragement to matrimony? The example in this inſtance of Alexander the Great, and of the late King of Pruſſia, are well deſerving our imitation. And ſhould not barracks be accommodated to the two claſſes of married and ſingle? Such population might be juſtly eſtimated as a conſiderable reimburſement of the public expenditure, in ſupport of the military profeſſions, and the epithet of unproductive labourers would be leſs applicable to this claſs of ſociety. Some might be advantageouſly employed on the fortifications and roads along the coaſt, as maſons, carpenters, and labourers: a portion might be taught to manufacture the regimental arms, accoutrements, and cloathing; the children of ſeamen to manufacture ſails and cordage; thoſe of the artillery the apparatus peculiar to their reſpective branch. Theſe barracks and ſchools would, in ſome reſpects, anſwer the purpoſes of the Gymnaſiæ

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of the Greeks, and the Campus Martius of the Romans. Indeed I can ſee no ſolid objections againſt the rudiments of military exerciſes being rendered an indiſpenſible obligation or rather qualification in the education of youth throughout both iſlands. Without theſe inſtitutions Greece and Rome would not have maintained ſuch a conſpicuous rank and pre-eminence amongſt the nations of the earth.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Conjectures whether the other Powers of Europe would ſuffer France, were ſhe really able, to conquer Great Britain and Ireland.

THIS Proverb has proved true ſince the days of Homer; that "many accidents happen between the cup and the lip." No nation ſhould exult in the ſucceſs of its arms, until its conqueſts are complete and terminated; nor, on the other hand, ſhould any nation deſpair of its ſafety until it is ſubdued. I have endeavoured to demonſtrate that France is unable to ſubdue Great Britain and Ireland. But were ſhe really adequate to theſe military wonders and miracles, would the other powers of Europe tamely look on, and behold, with indifference, the downfall of ſuch an important member? Would they ſit, like the audience in a theatre, or like the gods and goddeſſes on Mount Ida, as inactive ſpectators of theſe gallic triumphs, and Britiſh degradation? On this ſubject we muſt be cautious of drawing concluſions from remote precedents, ſuch as Rome, Carthage, Conſtantinople, &c. becauſe the circumſtances and parallel are extremely different

different in many points of compariſon. Europe is now ſubdivided into many powerful ſtates, who will not ſuffer the political equilibrium to be ſo immenſely deranged; and whoſe private intereſt and policy would, ſooner or later, unite them in hoſtilities againſt ſuch a voracious monſter. Modern hiſtory furniſhes inſtances in abundance of the truth of this propoſition.

The writer, who repreſents Britain as ſuch an eaſy prey to France, in his impetuoſity, forgot to reflect, that whilſt France may be occupied in ſuch invaſion, one or more auxiliary armies in the latter's favour may force an entrance into France; and it is not impoſſible might traverſe from Dunkirk to Breſt, and from the mouth of the Seine to Paris, before the invader had ſet his foot in the bank of England. Would Britain's Continental allies be idle ſpectators? Even Auſtria might think it a convenient opportunity to recover ſome of thoſe rich provinces, of which, in her misfortunes, ſhe was plundered by France. Britain has often reſcued Auſtria and Holland from her arbitrary gripe. Would the Northern nations of Europe be ſuch conſpirators againſt their deareſt intereſts, as to

acquieſce in France taking poſſeſſion of all the narrow avenues and ſtrong holds through which their commerce muſt be wafted, not only to the South of Europe, but to every part of the globe? Would theſe nations ſubmit to ſuch an enormous graſp of power in the hands of Frenchmen, whoſe general character, at leaſt in their politicks with other nations, is neither conſpicuous for moderation, nor plain dealing? In the preſent ſtate of France, theſe vaunts and menaces of univerſal dictatorſhip are premature and impolitic. I have calculated principally on their perſonal intereſt and ſecurity in rouſing the other independent and rival nations of Europe to avert the common danger, without laying much ſtreſs on their friendſhip or gratitude. And in truth I am warranted by hiſtory and experience to place ſo little reliance on the faith or efficacy of offenſive and defenſive treaties with theſe continental ſhufflers, that I hope ſoon to ſee all ſuch political traſh and cant cancelled and conſigned to the flames; and that Great Britain's alliances will in future be ſimply commercial and reciprocal convenience.

G——l L——d, in his Military Hiſtory, calculates that if the Northern frontier alone

of

of France, from Switzerland to Dunkirk, was to be vigorouſly attacked in three different points, it would require two hundred thouſand men, diſtributed into ſeparate armies, for its defence; excluſive of ſtrong garriſons in all the intermediate fortreſſes. And the other three ſides of the French frontiers, eſpecially the ports, and naval arſenals, could not, with prudence, be left defenceleſs.

It appears, on many accounts, problematical, whether an invaſion of Great Britain by France would not be more injurious to the invader than to the defender. Perſia was diſgraced, and nearly ruined by two invaſions of Greece. Spain ſunk much both of her treaſure and renown, in the boaſted Armada againſt England. France was no gainer by her repeated invaſions of Germany, Italy, and Holland. Lewis the Fourteenth, with half a million of ſoldiers, and without the neceſſity of croſſing any ſea, was driven back from Holland, which could not then muſter one third of the preſent effective ſtrength of Britain and Ireland. France long felt the extraordinary and ſtraining efforts of this monarch's military ambition. What naval or land trophies did the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Lewis

gain, by their repeated ſtratagems and attempts to invade our iſlands? It might, probably, be a fortunate circumſtance for the Britiſh empire, were France to put theſe public threats into execution. By thus grappling with our united force, ſhe might be diſabled from doing us any injury during a long period, and we might purſue in peace our commerce and induſtry. There could not without groſs ignorance, or treachery, be any juſt grounds to deprecate the attempt as a national calamity. But I am not ſo ignorant or confident as not to admit that if ever France, whoſe luſt is war and ſuperiority, ſhould be ſuffered to make a conqueſt of any neighbouring maritime nation to the South or North of Spain or Portugal, or of the Netherlands and Holland, that in either caſe Great Britain would have ſolid reaſons to be alarmed, not only for her remote colonies and commerce, but alſo for her domeſtic ſecurity. The notorious and ſagacious Dumorier was well aware of the difficulties and dangers attending an invaſion of England, without the previous poſſeſſion of Flanders and Holland: theſe were the preparatory ſteps laſt year to the avowed attack on our iſland and metropolis. In ſuch a conflict, for independence and exiſtence,

Great

Great Britain, in her offenſive operations and retaliation, ſhould abandon her former ſyſtem of military empiriciſm. *She never can avenge herſelf againſt France but upon the ocean, upon her ſea-ports and marine arſenals, and by diſmemberment of her tranſatlantic colonies.*

Note. See the alarming conſequences to Britain of France poſſeſſing herſelf of the Netherlands and Holland, in a Pamphlet publiſhed when Dumorier was near the gates of Rotterdam, intitled "*Reaſons for preventing the French, under the maſk of liberty, from trampling upon Europe.*" —Second Edition, Debrett, Piccadilly.

Note. His Majeſty's preſent miniſters will do me the juſtice to admit that ſix months ago, (in July 1794) I earneſtly exhorted them to take better precautions againſt inferiority at ſea, and therefore to aſſemble the Iriſh Parliament, and to requeſt their aſſiſtance to contribute 20,000 marines, with officers of the ſame country, to arrange them into legions and battalions, ſynonimous with the provinces and counties of Ireland; and to inſtruct them, with all ſpeed, in artillery evolutions, *only*, on board ſhips. The reader may credit me when I aſſure him that I am not of a forward diſpoſition to obtrude myſelf or my advice unſolicited, had I not ſeen torrents of danger and diſaſter rolling towards this country. Why, throughout this war, the opticks of Britiſh miniſters have been ſo obſcure, and their underſtanding and actions ſo lethargic I leave them to explain.

CHAP. VIII.

A new Military Syſtem, or Order of Arms, Arrangement, Firing and Dreſs.

IT is univerſally acknowledged, by the beſt military judges, that the firing by platoons, files, or even ranks is liable to weighty objections; and that we have not yet diſcovered that ſublime problem and deſideratum in war, *To unite miſſile and hand weapons, ſtill more effectually, than in the muſket and bayonet.* "The choice of arms, and arrangement is "the foundation of tacticks." G—— L——d (in vol. ii. page 20.) aſſerts that no ſpecies of arms can be made to ſerve the purpoſe of a muſket, and a hand weapon. On a ſubject of ſuch infinite moment, I venture, with extreme diffidence, to ſuggeſt ſome at leaſt new hints, which the reader, if he chuſes, may term innocent reveries. My obſervations ſhall be as conciſe as poſſible, and compreſſed under four heads, viz. arms, arrangement, firing, and dreſs.

Arms.

Arms. Suppoſe each battalion or brigade of infantry arranged four deep; each ſoldier and ſergeant furniſhed with Lloyd's pike, with the addition to its blunt end of a ſtrong iron ſpike, ſix inches long, well ſecured to the wood, and by which it may be ſtuck upright and firm in the ground, its upper half well defended with thin iron plates, and the ſteel point covered with a ſcabbard: or, perhaps it would be an improvement, if the ſteel point was to be occaſionally fixed on the ſhaft by a ſcrew, or as the common bayonet. The next weapon is a rifle gun larger in the calibre than the preſent; a leather belt fixed along its under part, in order to ſling it with the breech uppermoſt over the neck and left arm, and to reſt ſomewhat tranſverſely on the ſhoulder and back in marching; nor will the pike prevent it from being carried on the left ſhoulder in the uſual manner. No bayonet. Two ſhort flat piſtols, ſuſpended by leather ſtraps or a nooſe, and ſewed to the waiſtcoat near the lower and fore part of the ſides. The cartouch box ſlung by a croſs leather belt over the left ſhoulder and ſide; and another ſhorter croſs belt over the right ſide, to the extremity of which, under the right arm, is

fixed a ſtrong iron or braſs claſp, with a ſpring, in the form of thoſe by which keys or watch ſeals are hung; this claſp is for the purpoſe of ſuſpending the rifle, in a perpendicular poſition, by a ring fixed near the under part and breech of the barrel, when the pike is graſped for cloſe combat. The officers to be armed with pikes, piſtols and ſword: the light infantry and markſmen, with rifles and a ſword bayonet three feet in length; artilleriſts, with the ſame, and to have each a pike fixed at the ſide of their cannon. The cavalry to carry a ſhort rifle; a long and ſtrong cut and thruſt ſword; two ſhort double barrelled piſtols in the ſaddle holſters; a cartouch box at the right ſide or before. All theſe arms to be of the beſt materials and workmanſhip. Each ſoldier ſhould alſo carry, in a leather pocket caſe, a worm, flints, lock hammer, ſpunges for the barrel, and the pan, woollen rags, tow, and a ſmall tin flaſk of gunpowder.

Arrangement and firing. Thus arranged and armed, the infantry arrive within reaſonable muſket range of the enemy, the rifle then loaded and ſuſpended at the claſp under the right arm: the files and ranks ſo open

that

that the men do not as uſual, preſs and joſtle each other, and between each company and Battalion ſtill wider intervals. The battalion or brigade, by command or ſignal, dreſſes the line, the pike is inſtantly ſtruck into the ground, in range with, and between each file man; the whole then face to one ſide, always preſenting the left ſide in front to the enemy, leaving, in conſequence of this lateral motion, a wider interval between each tranſverſe file: through this interval, the fourth or rear rank advances ſideways to the front, but not beyond the line, aims, fires, retreats back to its former ſtation and loads, and ſo on each rank ſucceſſively; only that the front rank, if a favourable opportunity preſents, or urgent neceſſity requires, need not wait for the regular rotine of firing. In ground beſt calculated for muſketry, where the enemy is obſerved wavering or diſordered. and it is thought adviſeable to advance with miſſile weapons, the two front ranks may ſtep forward, thirty or forty yards, leaving their pikes, and the two rear ranks ſtanding, to which they can, without riſk, retreat; the light infantry and cavalry ſucceeding them to compleat the victory. In this way the ſingle line may, occaſionally, perform the part of chaſſeurs, and of a ſecond line. But

if

if the ground permits, and they are arrived within ſixty yards of the enemy, the pike is the deciſive weapon, and will render the victory more compleat. When this important moment arrives of coming to the cloſe ſhock either to attack or defend, the rifle is inſtantly ſuſpended by the hinder ring, beneath the trigger, to the claſp under the right arm; with the ſame face and direction that it is held in the hand; the pike is graſped, and levelled to the right of each file, and the files and ranks then cloſed more compact in all directions. If again, the enemy's cavalry advances with a rapid charge, ſome ranks will be loaded ready to receive them; and againſt horſe there is no neceſſity for each rank to advance to the front and fire, on account of the greater height of the object. Every military writer deprecates the extreme peril of changing the order of arrangement in face of the enemy, and in many caſes it is not practicable; but in the arrangement and arms here propoſed, the line may be immediately converted into two fronts, and defend itſelf, though attacked in front, flank, and rear. This is inſtantaneouſly effected by two ranks turned each way, and ſtill more effectually if its flank companies and artillery are poſted with ſloping faces, like baſtions or ravelins.

ravelins. In this manœuvre our line performs, in ſome degree, the part of the denſe column and ſquare.

Perhaps, at firſt view, this ſyſtem will not appear favourable to a *retreat*, on account of the two ſets of arms. I take it for granted, that the retreat of a brigade, when unavoidable, will always be covered, ſo far as circumſtances will admit, by the fire of the flanking companies, and the artillery, and by the cavalry when the ground admits of its acting; and if it does not, the enemy will have more impediments to overcome; and, excluſive of thoſe combined aids, by the reſerve. When the action has been maintained at ſome diſtance by miſſile weapons, a retreat will not be ſo difficult. If it is thought neceſſary to retreat gradually, with a wide front, and there are eight companies of each battalion, then four companies may retreat to the diſtance of half or whole muſket ſhot, leaving the two flank, and the center companies ſtanding and engaged; who will, in their turn, retreat, ſo ſoon as their companions marched to the rear are formed, and ready to cover them; and in theſe emergencies, there is no great embarraſſment in carrying

carrying the rifle and pike in each hand. It would be inſulting the reader's underſtanding to purſue this illuſtration any further; and I could only refer to the general principles of war, to the denſe column and ſquare, the wedge or triangle, and the other manœuvres of public notoriety. If our ſcrutiny, therefore, has not been partial, this ſyſtem ſeems calculated for a cloſe and open country, againſt infantry and cavalry, to reſiſt, attack, and retreat; it requires no material change during the action, nor a ſecond line but of cavalry, and a reſerve. At the battle of Agincourt, Henry the Fifth's Archers were four in file, and beſides bow and arrows, had battle axes and ſwords, and a ſtake pointed with iron at both ends to fix before them in the ground.

Let us make a few more comments on the above arrangement and weapons. From every thing I have read or ſeen, in even the leaſt exceptionable, in G——l L——d's ſyſtem, the three firſt ranks would find ſerious difficulties, were they to fire by ranks, ſtanding; and the fourth or rear rank being unprovided with miſſile weapons, except piſtols, could do the enemy no damage beyond the diſtance of his pike. We muſt keep in remembrance

membrance that, notwithſtanding the tremendous aſpect, and pomp of war, on a general average, by forty thouſand ſhots not more than one hundred of the enemy will be killed and wounded; and the killed rarely amount to one third of the wounded. Were I to reaſon from analogy, I would aſſert that the ſyſtem which enables a doctor to cure more patients, and a ſoldier to kill more of his enemies, and at the ſame time to run leſs riſque of deſtroying his comrades, is to be preferred to every other. The file intervals in our arrangement will not be wider than thoſe of the ancient Roman legions, and the depth, which in firing will not exceed 12 feet, is not ſo material. When the ranks are dreſſed, fixing the pike in the ground, and unlocking the rifle, can occupy but a few ſeconds; and "vice verſa," the change of the rifle for the pike cannot occaſion more embaraſſment, or waſte of time, and may be executed before the enemy's infantry could advance thirty yards in line. If it ſhould ſo happen, and ſuch inſtances muſt be rare, that the ground is rocky, and the pikes cannot be faſtened by the ends, the two firſt ranks may lay their pikes flat on the ground and parallel with their files, and the two rear ranks lay theirs in the oppoſite direction.

rection. Acting behind cover, or in defenſive poſts, or againſt cavalry, this ſyſtem ſeems ſtill leſs objectionable: an inceſſant, ſteady, and well directed fire will be kept alive along the whole front, and hand weapons ſuperior to the bayonet or ſword are ready for any exigency. The exerciſe can be much ſooner learnt, which is of infinite advantage in defenſive war, for volunteer aſſociations; or in thoſe extraordinary emergencies where it is neceſſary to raiſe the maſs: the front rank will run far leſs hazard of being ſhot or maimed by their comrades behind: all will fire with leſs impediment, confuſion, noiſe, and alarm, and with more deſtructive efficacy. A very ſhort practice will habituate the ſoldier to take out the cartridge with his left hand, as expeditiouſly as with the right. The pike may ſerve, occaſionally, as a chevaux de frize, and will alſo aſſiſt the ſoldier in getting over hedges, and trenches. This ancient weapon is peculiarly adapted to the intrepid temperament of the Britiſh and Iriſh ſoldier, whom, it is well known, their officers find it difficult to reſtrain from ruſhing forward to cloſe quarters with the enemy. It is alſo extremely well adapted to the long and croſs bow in lieu of the rifle; and it may be provided with a ſpring reſt,

occaſionally

occaſionally to lean the rifle on, and to fire with ſurer aim. As to cavalry, I believe they likewiſe are commonly formed too cloſe in the ranks, files, and ſquadrons; and that they would be of more real and general utility if, like the Turks and Aſiaticks, they acted in ſmaller bodies, and with more velocity.

The *dreſs* of a Britiſh ſoldier or volunteer ſhould be adapted to four cardinal objects, viz. defence, convenience, utility, ornament. We recommend the following. For protecting the principal vital parts, G——l L——d's round hat, made of the ſtrongeſt ſole leather, three inches in the brim, lined and quilted within; to which may be added a broad girdle, plate, and feather, and it may be glazed, or covered with black velvet; a helmet appendix may alſo be placed on the front. A cuiraſs of the ſame leather, covered over, ſuſpended by a ſtrap round the neck, and buckled behind the loins; or what would, perhaps, be as convenient, and equally uſeful, two pieces of the ſole leather, the depth and breadth of the foreparts of the waiſtcoat, lined or padded with cotton or ticken, or quilted within with cotton or fine wool. This ſort

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of cuiraſs, by means of four buttons or claſps, can be immediately fitted within the waiſt-coat, and removed, occaſionally, when there is no probability of coming to action. Tapes behind will unlooſe or draw the waiſtcoat to the proper dimenſions. The croſs belts to be broader over the top of each ſhoulder, and there a double fold ſewed together. The neck, which is alſo an important vital part, may be protected by a broad ſtock of the ſame ſole leather, quilted within, covered without with black velvet, and faſtened behind with claſps; or over a common leather or quilted ſtock, another may be, occaſionally, added of buff leather, covered with ſmall links of ſteel or braſs, like women's necklaces or bracelets. The ſame defence will ſuit the cavalry; and, previous to an engagement, they may likewiſe draw on each arm a large looſe ſleeve, lined with buff leather, and covered with ſcarlet cloth, buttoned at the wriſt and ſhoulder, and ſomewhat reſembling the coat ſleeves of his Majeſty's yeomen. Perhaps this would be more uſeful than the ancient oblong ſhields worn on the left arm. Their face might alſo be protected with a maſk of ſtrong ſole leather; and the ears and blood veſſels beneath them

them with a ſtrap and links, ſimilar to the ſtock, hooked to the hat and tied under the chin. The great blood veſſels running from each groin down the inſide of the thighs, will be ſufficiently guarded by the picked ſaddle and the holſters.

The coat or jacket of all Britiſh ſoldiers or volunteers, ſhould, for obvious reaſons, be *ſcarlet* univerſally, with different facings and lapels, and made in the light horſe faſhion. The waiſtcoat of the ſame colour as the facings, lapelled, and cut round at the bottom, but at the opening of the breaſt the inner lapel of the ſame colour as the coat. Long trowſers, with drawers, are preferable to breeches, and may be worn with half boots or with ſhoes. They are made of grey, blue, green, brown, yellow, or mixed cloth, drab fuſtian, Mancheſter ſtuffs, ſhagg, velveret, undyed cloth, flannel, camlet, ticken, &c. The cavalry trowſers muſt be ſeated with breeches leather, and the infantry with a ſmaller ſeat of the ſame. Great coats, huſſar cloaks, and other preſervations of health to be adapted to the climate, ſeaſon, duty, habits, conſtitutions, &c. The Spaniſh faſhion would alſo

be a becoming and convenient military dreſs: and as Britain has a conſiderable ſhare of the fur trade, a border of this would be both ornamental and uſeful.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Some Miſcellaneous Hints for the Improvement of the Military Art.

THE immortal Bacon, Lord Verulam, ſuggeſted a variety of philoſophical inveſtigations, which have ſince been matured into the moſt intereſting diſcoveries. In humble imitation of this tranſcendent genius, I ſhall here offer a few miſcellaneous propoſitions for the improvement of the Military Art by land and ſea. When that art is to be exerted in ſelf-preſervation, in the defence of every thing that is dear and valuable to a free and illuſtrious Iſland, no inquiry can be more laudable or beneficial. For my own part, I firmly believe, that if the domineering projects, the rapacity and ravages of the preſent maniacs of France, and of the Ruſſian ſavage, are likely to be crowned with ſucceſs, that, in this deplorable cataſtrophe, all the enlightened Europeans, who have any regard for property and liberty, and for the general intereſt of mankind, muſt take an active and manly part, in national and ſelf-defence.

Muller recommends a revival of ſeveral of the ancient military engines for the defence of fortreſſes, eſpecially when the enemy has made near approaches. They might be uſed to throw ſhells, grenades, ſtones, darts, and inflammable compoſitions. Archimedes, inventions for the defence of Syracuſe, and the compoſition of the celebrated Greek fire are now loſt. As to the latter, if we may form ſome conjectures from the effects, it would ſeem to have been a compoſition of inflammable ſubſtances, thrown to ſome diſtance from mortars, like the modern carcaſes, by means of gunpowder. But whether the Greeks of Conſtantinople had imported, with the ſilkworm, this latter ſecret from China, or India, where ſaltpetre abounds, or obtained it from the crucibles of European chemiſts, is now unknown. All we know for certain is, that Bacon and Schwartz are amongſt the firſt Europeans, on record, who ſtumbled on this extraordinary compoſition. Sulphur, bitumen, and naptha, are commonly alledged to have been the principal ingredients of the Greek fire. Whether they had procured ſaltpetre as an addition to this deſtructive mixture, cannot now be aſcertained. It is

of

of importance to learn that ſand, urine, vinegar were found the moſt effectual in extinguiſhing the flames.

The laws reſpecting the force and velocity of projectile bodies, and the different reſiſtances of the atmoſphere, require further inveſtigation. It ſhould be inquired what further aſſiſtance the military art can derive from the vaſt powers of mechanicks, of the lever, ſcrew, and pulley; from the ſciences of pneumaticks, hydraulicks, hydroſtaticks, opticks, projectiles, electricity, chemiſtry; by what mechaniſm to apply to military uſes, the principles and powers of the air pump, of ſteam, wind, and water engines; to inquire further reſpecting gaz and balloons; gunpowder; phoſphorous, Greek fire, heat, phlogiſton, light, burning glaſſes; reſpecting ſubſtances inflammable, and others capable of reſiſting or extinguiſhing fire; reſpecting ſuffocating vapours and ſmells carried by currents of air and wind; reſpecting luminous compoſitions, by means of which, objects in the night may be diſtinguiſhed at a conſiderable diſtance: whether mines, in caſes, might not oftner be ſucceſsfully uſed in the field, and defence of redoubts, and more howitzers and carronades in land

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actions: whether military, and artillery waggons, carriages, bridges, travelling hoſpitals, and vehicles for the ſick and wounded might not be improved: whether carriages and waggons might not, without any additional incumbrance or expence, be occaſionally adapted to defence, and to carry troops with rapidity to diſtant points of the line, like the war cars of antiquity: whether howitzers, ſhells, ignited balls, and even floating mines might not be more uſed at ſea, together with ſome of the ancient artillery machines: what further improvements to make to ſhips of war, floating batteries, gun boats: how to facilitate the embarkation and debarkation of men, horſes, and artillery on different coaſts: whether generals ſhould not inveſtigate more profoundly the different paſſions, foibles, temperaments, periodical, daily, and neceſſary habits of mankind, the atmoſphere, winds, rain, heat, cold, ſeaſons, climates, and reap advantages from this philoſophical warfare: by what artful manœuvres to debilitate and diſeaſe an enemy through fatigue, want of reſt, and a ſufficiency of generous nutriment: how to preſerve troops healthy in all climates and ſeaſons: what new or original combinations of ſounds can be invented to inflame military

military ardour: whether ſpeaking trumpets might not be of ſervice on land: by what mechaniſm or element to break ſtrong floors of ice?

To us as Iſlanders, it would be important to make further experiments reſpecting the moſt cheap and durable materials for conſtructing forts, piers, and embankments on the ſea coaſt: whether ſea ſand and ſea water mixed with lime is not a more durable cement than land ſand, and freſh water; whether the natural cliffs along our ſhores, compoſed of ſand, lime and pebbles, if properly confined by caſes, banks or walls of large looſe ſtones heaped together and entangled with ſea weeds, would not become in time cemented into a firm rock?

The Telegraphe ſyſtem, as it is called, of conveying intelligence and correſpondence on land, with the rapidity of viſion, having very recently been firſt put into practice by the French, I think it neceſſary to ſtate the original parent of this invention. An excellent paper on this ſubject was publiſhed, in the Philoſophical Tranſactions, by Dr. Hooke. But ſeveral centuries earlier (1391) we find ſome clear hints of this diſcovery in the works

of our immortal countryman, R. Bacon the monk; and the Britiſh Archimedes. In his "Opus Majus" are the following words.

"*Specula or ſpying glaſſes* may be erected on "a riſing ground oppoſite to cities and ar-"mies, in ſuch a manner that all things "done by the enemy may be diſcovered; and "this may be done at any diſtance we pleaſe. "For according to the laws of Opticks, an "object may be viewed through as many "glaſſes as we think fit, if they are

"; and they may be placed ſome "nearer, and ſome more remote, ſo that an "object may be ſeen at any diſtance we deſire. "Spying glaſſes or teleſcopes may be ſo "formed, and *ſo placed that we ſhall be able* "*to read the ſmalleſt letters at an incredible* "*diſtance;* or to number even the duſt and "ſands, and to make the ſun, moon, and "ſtars, to deſcend, or at leaſt ſeem to deſcend "from Heaven."

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Population, Reform, and Union recommended as additional means of Defence.

THE ſtrength and defence of Great Britain is connected not only with the military force, fortreſſes, revenue, and *population*, but with its geographical poſition, its parliamentary repreſentation and ſyſtem of government. It would be eaſy to trace the evil effects of this imperfect or vitiated ſtructure of our Legiſlature upon our general military ſyſtem, our public expences, and wars.

"If we ſearch for the foundation and columns of ſubſtantial power and revenue, we ſhall find them to conſiſt in *agriculture*, *mineralogy*, *manufactories*, *commerce*, *fiſheries*, *population*. Theſe may be termed the ſix elements, or orders of political architecture; they reciprocally aſſiſt and ſuſtain each other, and are at the ſame time intimately connected with all the arts and ſciences, and with political freedom. On each of theſe comprehenſive

prehenſive ſciences, a ſeparate profeſſor and lecturer ſhould be eſtabliſhed throughout our univerſities; and likewiſe a monthly magazine, publiſhed for the inſtruction of all ranks. But upon the latter of theſe alone, population, repreſentation and concord as being deeply involved in the ſubject of the preſent treatiſe, I ſhall make a few obſervations. Did time permit I ſhould have no difficulty in demonſtrating, that Britain and Ireland might, in one century only, be rendered equal in population to France, and that in a ſingle generation her maritime ſtrength might be trebled. In this and many other inſtances of political œconomy, we might learn important leſſons from the Chineſe and Japaneſe.

What made the Ruſſians finally triumph over the Swedes? Numbers. A ſcanty population was one of the cauſes which diminiſhed the reſources of reſiſtance, and at length rendered the Saxons, Danes, and Normans triumphant in this iſland. In what do all the French writers principally exult in the ſuperiority of France over Britain and Ireland? In comparative population. The glare of an immenſe but oppreſſive revenue, and of a mighty catalogue of ſhips of war, muſt, in time,

time, ſuffer an eclipſe, ſhould the ſubject of population continue to be treated with the ſame cold indifference by our legiſlators and miniſters. For it is not diſciplined ſoldiers alone, but the whole united and indignant maſs of a numerous community, which, in extreme peril, muſt aſſiſt in reſcuing the nation from a foreign yoke; eſpecially from the firebrands that now threaten the overthrow of civil ſociety. And this points out another important object of defence and reſiſtance, *union*.

If we draw a line acroſs the Southern baſe of Great Britain, from the Thames to the Severn, and another line from London to Harwich, we ſhall comprehend in theſe two ſegments of the coaſt all the parts of Great Britain moſt expoſed to invaſion, eſpecially from a Southern foe: we ſhall alſo find, that they furniſh almoſt one half of the repreſentatives in the Houſe of Commons, although their area does not amount to one fifth of the whole iſland. Reaſoning, therefore, on principles of analogy, we ſhould infer, that the lines of an entrenchment, or fortification, moſt expoſed to attack, ſhould have additional ſtrength, population, and guards. In erecting

erecting ramparts of earth let us not forget ramparts of men to defend them. Indeed nature has, in many reſpects, endowed the Southern ſegment of our iſland with ſuperlative pre-eminence. But except along the interſecting line of London, Bath, and Briſtol, there are no other large cities throughout the whole Southern baſe of Great Britain. Our great manufacturing towns have been gradually migrating more to the centre and north of England; and one half of our parliamentary boroughs have been ſuffered to fall into decay, and, for the purpoſes of venality and monopoly to check and circumſcribe population. It may be termed a war of corruption againſt the vital principles of national ſtrength and health: a ſyſtem more pernicious both in its objects and effects than that of monks; becauſe it not only tends to counteract population, but likewiſe to corrupt the national morals, and to taint legiſlative purity.

It ſeems never to have occurred to our political orators and writers, in their diſcuſſions and propoſals for a reform of parliamentary repreſentation, to combine and contraſt ſuch propoſitions with the invaſion, defence, and ſtrength of the kingdom. For inſtance,

inſtance, when we take a geographical ſurvey of Britain, as connected with the means of defence, and with parliamentary repreſentation, it will appear wiſdom or inſtinct in our forefathers, that the parts moſt expoſed to invaſion *ſhould* be fortified with additional population, and a ſtronger frontier. This, amongſt others, I conceive was one reaſon why political privileges and prerogatives were dealt out to the inhabitants of the channel coaſt, and why parliamentary boroughs were multiplied in the Southern and moſt vulnerable parts of our iſland. The population of the coaſts, and above all of the Channel coaſt, would produce more ſailors in proportion than the inland counties, and on the ſpot where they are moſt wanted. If half a million of men and a hundred thouſand ſailors could be collected in a few days on the channel frontier or between London and Liverpool, what enemy would make the deſperate attempt of invaſion?

The propoſitions for a parliamentary reform, which have been offered by men of tranſcendent abilities, the principles of which are, an increaſe in the number of repreſentatives, and the amputation or purchaſe of the decayed

decayed and rotten boroughs, are both liable to weighty objections; and the articles of union with Scotland, limiting the proportionate number of representatives, would increase this embarrassment. As to the late proscription and disfranchisement of a numerous class of the community entrusted with the collection of the public revenue, I will not deign to term it a remedy, or even a palliative; it appears to me absurd quackery, and an aggravation of the disease. I think it is a dubious proposition, whether parliamentary representation should bear an exact proportion to the geographical dimensions or area of the country; whether parliamentary representation should travel after the population; or *vice versa*, whether the latter should not be directed and guided to accompany the representation, and to be made subservient to the political organization and skeleton of the constitution, which time has rendered venerable.

For example, would it not be more beneficial to the joint security of the constitution, and of the kingdom, to strengthen the channel frontier, the glacis and covered way of Britain, and principal seat of the decayed boroughs, by one or two million of additional inhabitants?

inhabitants? Holland is one proof how population may be compelled to follow a wiſe legiſlation, even againſt all the diſadvantages of nature and ſituation. Decayed boroughs may be ſtocked like paſtures, or engrafted like old trees, and rendered again vigorous and prolific. Would there be more difficulty, or leſs prudence and œconomy in concentrating the ſtrength of Great Britain, by ſuch domeſtic colonization, than in founding empires, and ſqandering millions acroſs the Atlantic and the Pacific? Are there not diſbanded officers, ſailors, and ſoldiers? Some more encouragement ſhould be dealt out to theſe defenders of their country. Sweden provides her ſoldiers with lands and houſes; a policy far more beneficial and leſs expenſive than our invalid hoſpitals. Are there not fiſheries, manufactories, and extenſive waſtes of uncultivated commons, to encourage the neceſſitous and induſtrious? Are there not an exuberance of parochial and poor children in our overgrown and plethoric metropolis, who might be maintained at leſs expence, and with more utility to the nation, were they diſperſed throughout the counties and boroughs which ſkirt the channel?

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I am perſuaded that the proprietors of decayed boroughs, together with the legiſlature, and the nation, would be equally intereſted and benefited in adopting a mild remedy for parliamentary reformation; that is, by colonizing all decayed boroughs with additional houſes and inhabitants. Without a certain ſtandard of population, they ſhould not be permitted to nominate repreſentatives: and as long as they continue in this ſtate, ſhould be branded with political impotency. Alexander the Great, during the career of war, and whilſt he was adding immenſe empires to the Macedonian, built many magnificent cities. The Romans alſo during their reſidence in Britain, were liberal benefactors in this way. By the ſimple method here ſuggeſted, the repreſentation of our moſt opprobious boroughs might ſoon be recruited to a decent and reſpectable ſtandard. The Houſe of Commons ſhould beware of perſevering againſt every petition, remonſtrance, and ſatire, to degrade themſelves in the public eſtimation. To ſuffer the conſtitution to fall into ruins, or to pull it down by violence, appear to me equally criminal. It is for their own intereſt and credit, and indeed eſſential to the future ſtability of every branch

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of the conſtitution, that one third of the popular elections ſhould not be conſidered as a burleſque on repreſentation, and that they ſhould not be made a ſubject of ridicule throughout Europe. If they reject the projects of political re-edification, they cannot deny the propriety and neceſſity of political repair. They will not alledge that political or human conſtitutions, are like the planetary ſyſtem. It is obvious, that by acting thus, they will likewiſe add to the ſtrength, defence, union and ſecurity of the iſland, where it is moſt vulnerable, and moſt expoſed to an invader.

Opinion is of infinite conſequence to the peace and ſecurity of both the governors and the governed. I am apprehenſive that the preſent political ſyſtems of Britain and Ireland will require ſome melioration, in order to invigorate and unite the armed maſs of the community, againſt a ſerious invaſion. Both nations are now ſurfeited with court intrigues, political factions, conteſts for power and emolument, and diſguſted with other internal abuſes.

There is in my opinion, an eaſy and ſafe method of ſetting at defiance all French ſtra-

tagems and malevolence againſt our conſtitution, and property, and of ſoothing to reſt the feveriſh diſcord on that ſcore, which is as follows. By colonizing decayed boroughs, and applying a remedy againſt the dilapidations of age, or the corrupt views of ſelf-intereſt; by giving all perſons poſſeſſed of a certain fixed property, to wit, copyholders, tenants for terms of years or lives, together with houſeholders paying a certain portion of rent and taxes, equal privileges, as freeholders, of voting for repreſentatives in parliament; and, without any exception to the trifling ſhades and diſtinctions of Chriſtian ſectaries, or even to the place of their nativity. This, and abridging the time and expence of elections and of candidates, appears to me an unexceptionable remedy for all the purpoſes of rational repreſentation. It might be demonſtrated, by certain rules of political arithmetic, that the total number of electors would not then greatly exceed the preſent rabble ſyſtem, but they would be infinitely more opulent and reſpectable; the total amount of the whole iſland would not be above half a million, or in the proportion of about one thouſand electors to one repreſentative in the Commons, and one fifth of the

the former would never vote. It is to this reſpectable claſs of the community that we muſt look for a counterpoiſe and barrier againſt political corruption, faction, and anarchy. Perhaps alſo it would be wiſdom to revive the original ſyſtem and practice of the electors allotting a certain daily maintenance to their repreſentatives when engaged in public duty. As to the wild and ruinous chimeras of univerſal ſuffrage, the preſent tragical conſequences in France, are a ſufficient anſwer; and in truth, there is a glaring abſurdity in propoſing to give the ſuperior right of parliamentary ſuffrage, to thoſe who are excluded from a variety of petty parochial offices, and from juries. Surely there is both policy and juſtice in giving additional encouragement to induſtry, economy and uſeful talents. None but fools or parricides would endeavour to introduce the French ſyſtem as a model of reformation in this iſland.

A Political and Military ſurvey of *Ireland*, as connected with its invaſion and defence, is recommended to thoſe who have more leiſure, and better opportunities of information than the Editor of the preſent work.

I have pointed out the moſt vulnerable parts and the proper cantonments of the defenders.

Why does not the Iriſh legiſlature attend more to agriculture, to the culture of hemp, of oak, and other uſeful timber; to fiſheries, harbours, and to check the emigration and ſeduction of their inhabitants to the wilderneſſes of North America? They ſhould give encouragement to the employment of oxen in agriculture: their hides, tallow, and fleſh, would amply repay the national bounties. Ruſſia drains one million and a half of Britiſh guineas, annually, for flax and tallow only. The bogs and waſtes of Ireland, cleared out and cultivated, would produce hemp and flax in abundance for the Britiſh navy and the linen manufactory. Great Britain ſhould no longer depend for the wings and pinions of her marine on the treacherous cabinet of Peterſbourg; that capital would be far better applied in giving encouragement and employment to induſtry at home. The Iriſh ſhould remove their Univerſity from Dublin, and divide it into two or four. It would be happy for both iſlands if their parliaments dealt leſs in rhetorick, and more in plans for the public proſperity, ſecurity, and happineſs. A mo-

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mentous epoch ſeems nearly approaching, when they will find it neceſſary to expunge ſome obnoxious portion of their political breviary.

It is now time for rational governments to pauſe, to look back upon the folly and miſconduct of preceding ages, and even from their ignorance and inexperience to derive precepts of wiſdom. Alas! amongſt the heterogenous maſs of Continental powers, there would ſeem to be everlaſting embers of political diſcord. But from theſe hoſtile feuds and combinations, Great Britain and Ireland might, in moſt inſtances, be as ſecure as if they conſtituted a diſtinct planet. Let their legiſlators therefore direct more of their attention at home, and endeavour to correct or alleviate the errors and abuſes which more or leſs pervade not only the Conſtitution, but likewiſe every group, department, profeſſion, and rank of civil ſociety. This would render theſe two fertile iſlands more contented and united, more reſpectable to their neighbours, and formidable to their enemies. It is diſcontent with their government which has greatly contributed to the preſent rapid triumph of the French over the neighbouring

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ſtates with whom they have provoked hoſtilities. Diſcord, diſcord, the principal theme and moral of the immortal Iliad, has been, ſince the Trojan war down to the preſent moment, the principal cauſe of the decay and craſh of every independent ſtate.

To cement ſtill more cloſely the union and ſtrength of the Britiſh empire, I have long been convinced that *one Legiſlature* would be infinitely more beneficial for the general benefit and proſperity of both iſlands. The diſtance is not greater than from Scotland to the metropolis. But as the population is more than double, ſo ſhould the repreſentation. I think it even more honourable for Ireland, of which I am a native, to conſtitute a part of the Britiſh legiſlature and empire, than if ſhe were totally independent. Without the aid of Engliſh ſtock and capital Iriſh agriculture and manufactories are doomed to ſtruggle many generations with difficulties and penury. A few placemen, penſioners and idle drones, will exclaim againſt propoſitions of this tendency: I have no hopes nor wiſh of pleaſing their ſelfiſh vanity and venality: my objects are the ſubſtantial comforts and happineſs of the great majo-

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rity and maſs of the Iriſh nation, and the everlaſting ſecurity of both iſlands againſt all external and internal enmies.

The period is now arrived for Britiſh ſtateſmen to adopt the wiſe ſyſtem of Auguſtus, Hadrian, and the Antonines, to ſet bounds to the empire, and to all wars of future conqueſt; and perhaps, like thoſe judicious monarchs, to lop off all unprofitable appendages. Their talents will be more uſefully employed in keeping the nation always prepared to reſent and puniſh public injuries and inſults, in cultivating the arts of peace, and in rendering all claſſes of the ſociety as happy and contented as the circumſtances of human affairs will admit. Lamentable would be the lot of mankind in our hemiſphere if, after beginning to emerge from ſo many centuries of ignorance and wretchedneſs, they ſhould be checked in their progreſs by folly and depravity.

As the recent rapid ſucceſſes of the French arms on the Continent has rendered the ſituation of Europe, and of this country in particular, extremely critical, wiſdom and prudence dictate the neceſſity of providing againſt

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even the poſſibility of future untoward contingences, of ſteering clear of thoſe rocks upon which other nations are likely to be wrecked. The *Military Reform*, which has been ſo earneſtly recommended in every edition of this Treatiſe, I apprehend muſt be ſpeedily adopted. As to the other *Conſtitutional Reform*, I am aware that many of the *ſincere* friends to this meaſure, and to this Conſtitution, are of opinion that, in the preſent criſis, it ſhould be poſtponed until the termination of hoſtilities. The deciſion for the beſt becomes daily a more ſerious and important problem, on which, perhaps, the fate of Britain in a ſhort time may hinge. United againſt external enemies alone, I have not the ſmalleſt deſpondency of final triumph. But the ſad example of other independent governments lately laid proſtrate in the duſt, as well as my own obſervation and information, all convince me that the internal traitors of this country, the partizans of anarchy, the profligate and unprincipled, " cum mul-" tis aliis," ſhould not be furniſhed, in the day of trial, with ſo many weighty arguments to damp public zeal and activity, and to facilitate the ſecret and open operations of an artful, vindictive, formidable and enthuſiaſtic enemy.

enemy. He muſt ſhut his eyes and ears who does not or will not perceive that there are in this country, two hoſtile and dangerous extremes. Againſt both theſe claſſes of our internal enemies, I think it my duty to record this ſolemn proteſt.

Quere. As, *at this inſtant*, the Dutch and Spaniards ſeem likely to be overrun by theſe modern Arabians the French, would it not be politic in the parliaments of Britain and Ireland to hold out an aſylum to the fugitive merchants, manufacturers, mechanicks, and fiſhermen, and thereby to prevent the enemy from reaping ſuch abundant harveſt from their conqueſts? This is at leaſt one mode of extracting good out of evil. Let the Dutch ſailors be accommodated with towns, houſes, and ſhips, and encouraged in proſecuting the herring fiſhery; others in draining, and embankments to exclude the ſea, and to convert moraſſes into dry land.

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POSTSCRIPT.

A Catalogue of Military Authors.

MOST of the Stateſmen and Orators of Greece and Rome, were renowned commanders by land or ſea. In modern times, how many legiſlators, orators, hiſtorians, miniſters, and officers of rank are ſhamefully deficient in military rudiments. Might not the diſaſtrous event of the late American war be, in ſome degree, aſcribed to this cauſe? Are there no reaſons to fear that England may be plunged into future misfortunes from this cauſe? Quis talia fando temperet a lachrymis"? I once aſked an eminent military bookſeller in London, why he did not reprint Vegetius: he returned for anſwer, " that he was apprehenſive it would not repay " him the paper, print, and advertiſements, " as very few of the Britiſh officers peruſed " profeſſional books, except a few of the " Artillery corps." Notwithſtanding the inceſſant wars in which our iſland has been engaged, ever ſince the revival of letters, the ſcantineſs

ſcantineſs of good authors, in our language is a matter of aſtoniſhment and diſcredit. Excluſive of ancient and modern hiſtory, voyages, travels, eſpecially thoſe parts which relate to military ſubjects, and of particular hiſtories of diſtinguiſhed conquerors, and remarkable campaigns, the eſſential maxims of this moſt important profeſſion may be found in a very compendious liſt of authors. It muſt however be obvious, that I do not here mean to include the preliminary ſciences of mathematicks, natural philoſophy, geography, drawing, &c. nor of navigation and aſtronomy, ſo indiſpenſible to the navy. It is equally evident that in every thing relating to ſhips and the ſea, the moderns infinitely ſurpaſs the ancients. The following are genuine ſources of information in the military ſcience, and in fortification. And there are tranſlations, in either Engliſh or French, of the greateſt part of the Greek, Latin, and German authors.

Greeks and Romans—Homer—Herodotus—Xenophon—Thucydides—-Polybius—Cæſar—Arrian—-Polyænus—-Plutarch—-Livy-—Saluſt—Tacitus—Joſephus—Vegetius—Leo.

Moderns—

Moderns—R. Bacon—Tamerlane—Muratori—Machiavel—Specle—Dilichius—Coehorn—Vauban—Pagan—Belidor—St. Remy—Valliere—Villeneuve—L. Beau—Goulon—Muller—Montecuculi—Folard—Saxe—St. Germain—Guichard—Guibert—Chenevieve—Antoni—Lloyd—Templehoff—Frederick, King of Pruſſia—Tielke—Soldern—Simes—Jones—Townhend—Cambridge—Fullarton—Dirom—Stedman.

Of the modern writers, expreſsly on the Naval Military Science, I have not ſufficient information to ſelect and preſent a correct catalogue. The few following I conſider as entitled to the firſt rank.

Pere Hoſte—Bouguer—Morogues—Bourde de Villehuet—Grenier—Elements of the Practice of Rigging and Seamanſhip—On Naval Hiſtory, Campbell, Entick, Barrow, and Anderſon may be conſulted.

FINIS.

Gilbert is a Clear Head
Folard — Nonsense

BSB Bayerische StaatsBibliothek

MDZ Münchener DigitalisierungsZentrum Digitale Bibliothek

Lloyd, Henry

A political and military rhapsody, on the invasion and defence of Great Britain and Ireland to which is annexed a short account of the author and a supplement by the editor

London 1795

Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek -- R.mil.o.135-i
urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb11766033-9